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Dividends payout is important to shareholders as it serves as a return on their 
investments and a mechanism for controlling agency problems. However, non-
dividend paying firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) have continued to 
increase over the years. The study is aimed at investigating the effect of board 
characteristics and ownership structures on the propensity to pay dividends and the 
moderating role of blockholders ownership in Nigeria. The study employs non-
financial firms listed on the NSE spanning from 2009 to 2015 and return on assets, 
firm size and investment opportunities are used to construct the propensity to pay 
dividends. The study also uses random panel logit regression technique, with 89 
sample firms with 596 firm-year observations. The regression results from the direct 
model showed that board diversity, financial experts, foreign and managerial 
ownership are strongly related to propensity to pay dividends. However, 
blockholders reduced propensity to pay dividends and theoretically, implied that they 
are less likely to use dividend in controlling the managers. Further, the interaction 
regression results revealed strong positive interaction between blockholders and 
board size; board diversity and CEO tenure and propensity to pay dividends. Thus, 
suggesting the importance of blockholders in the firm‘s governance structures in the 
sense that they jointly increase the propensity of paying dividend and used dividend 
payout as a monitoring tool in addressing agency problems. The study recommends 
that the regulatory authorities should strengthen the rules regarding board diversity 
and CEO tenure as they affect the propensity to pay dividends of firms listed on the 
NSE.  
 







Pembayaran dividen adalah penting kepada para pemegang saham kerana ia berfungsi 
sebagai pulangan atas pelaburan mereka dan mekanisme untuk mengawal masalah agensi. 
Walau bagaimanapun, terdapat peningkatan di kalangan firma yang tidak membayar dividen 
di Bursa Saham Nigeria (NSE) sejak beberapa tahun kebelakangan ini. Kajian ini bertujuan 
untuk menyelidik kesan ciri-ciri lembaga pengarah dan struktur pemilikan atas 
kecenderungan untuk membayar dividen dan peranan moderasi pemilikan pemegang blok di 
Nigeria. Kajian ini menggunakan firma bukan kewangan yang disenaraikan di NSE dari 
tahun 2009 hingga 2015. Pulangan ke atas aset, saiz firma dan peluang pelaburan digunakan 
untuk mengira pemboleh ubah kecenderungan untuk membayar dividen. Kajian ini juga 
menggunakan teknik regresi logit panel rawak, dengan 89 sampel firma dan menjadikan 
pemerhatian tahunan sebanyak 596 buah firma. Keputusan dari model langsung 
menunjukkan bahawa kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah, pakar kewangan, pemilikan luar dan 
pemilikan pengurusan, amat mempengaruhi keputusan pembayaran dividen. Walau 
bagaimanapun, kewujudan pemilikan pemegang blok mengurangkan kecenderungan untuk 
membayar dividen dan secara teorinya, ini menunjukkan bahawa mereka kurang 
menggunakan dividen bagi mengawal pihak pengurusan. Keputusan kajian berdasarkan 
model interaksi pula menunjukkan interaksi positif yang kukuh di antara pemilikan 
pemegang blok dan saiz ahli lembaga pengarah, kepelbagaian pengarah dan tempoh 
perkhidmatan sebagai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif. Sehubungan dengan itu, keputusan kajian 
mencadangkan kepentingan pemilikan pemegang blok dalam struktur tadbir urus syarikat 
yang secara bersama dapat meningkatkan kecenderungan pembayaran dividen dan 
menggunakan pembayaran dividen sebagai kaedah kawalan ke atas masalah agensi. 
Keputusan kajian ini mencadangkan supaya pihak penggubal undang-undang perlu 
meningkatkan peraturan berkaitan kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah dan tempoh berkhidmat 
Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif kerana kehadiran mereka sebagai ahli lembaga pengarah dapat 
memberi kesan ke atas kecenderungan untuk membayar dividen di kalangan firma tersenarai 
di NSE.  
 
Kata kunci: kecenderungan untuk membayar dividen, kepelbagaian lembaga, pakar 
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1.1 Background to the Study 
Dividend policy refers to the path managers tend to follow in determining the level 
and the pattern of corporate payout distribution to the shareholders (Baker, Veit, & 
Powell, 2001).  Dividends are viewed as corporate distribution of either present or 
past earnings to the shareholders relative to the proportion of their holdings in the 
firm (Frankfurter & Wood, 2003). Dividends are shareholders‘ return on investment 
and are either distributed in cash or in the form of shares (Osamwonyi & Imasuen, 
2006) and are derived from yearly profits or previous years accumulated retained 
earnings. 
Dividend policy has been a topical issue over the years and remains a subject of vital 
concern in modern finance (Baker & Weigand, 2015). Additionally, Al-Malkawi, 
Rafferty, and Pillai (2010) noted that dividend policy has become the top agenda 
item of managers in the modern corporate world and has emerged as a contending 
topic in the field of accounting and finance. Dividend policy is described as an 
essential element of the current business environment (Ajanthan, 2013). This is 
because investors tend to monitor their dividend returns carefully (Hussainey, 
Mgbame, & Chijoke-Mgbame, 2011). Karpavičius (2014) concluded that a firm‘s 
dividend payout is important in the determination of its value, and dividend stability 
increases the value of the firm. Hence, dividend is crucial to the shareholders as well 




A dividend serves as a function of firm performance and the effectiveness of its 
governance (Ghosh & Sirmans, 2006).  Thus, dividend policy also provides an 
insight or signal on the prospects of a firm, and its payment could be a sign of 
company‘s strength and stability. Nissim and Ziv (2001) suggested that a dividend 
contains information about the future and the level of profitability of the firm. Thus, 
investors are more likely to be drawn to the firms with a good dividend paying 
history to enjoy a return from their investments (Hassan, 2015). Several studies from 
the developing markets of Egypt (Omran & Pointon, 2004), Sri Lanka (Ajanthan, 
2013), and South Africa (Vermeulen & Smit, 2013) have attested to the importance 
of a dividend payout. 
Likewise, in the Nigerian context, dividend payout is very vital and relevant 
(Amadasu, 2011). Adelegan (2003) showed the relevancy of a dividend as it 
influences changes in the economic policies. Similarly, Musa (2009) reaffirmed that 
dividend payout in Nigeria is important and relevant because of its link with 
sustainable economic growth in the country. Dividend policy in Nigeria was first 
examined during the indigenisation era. This era was a period in which the 
government increased the participation of local Nigerians in the ownership of 
companies. However, the studies are constrained by the lack of adopting 
conventional models of payout policy (Musa, 2005). 
The benefit of paying dividends by firms is evident in its share prices, which tend to 
increase in the stock market as they pay dividends (Oyinlola & Ajeigbe, 2014; 
Stephen, Nneji, & Nkamare, 2015). In the same vein, Nwidobie (2013) argued that 
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firms may likely select payout policy that may satisfy the needs of investors. Thus, 
investors consider dividend policy very useful. This evidence aligns with the 
suggestion made by Musa (2009) that the board of directors should maintain a steady 
increase of its payment because investors in Nigeria attach a premium to dividends 
payout. Adelegan (2009) concluded that firms paying a dividend may generate 
excess returns from the day of the dividend announcement to thirty days and the 
opposite for dividend-omitting firms. Therefore, dividends become very crucial to 
the firm‘s stakeholders. 
The payment of dividends increase the influence of investors in terms of corporate 
value drivers (Julio & Ikenberry, 2004) because the firms will be exposed to market 
scrutiny. The importance of dividends to investors has made corporate managers 
tend to be reluctant to omit them even during financial distress (Frankfurter & Wood, 
2002). Despite the importance of dividends to firm stakeholders, the propensity to 
pay dividends by firms has been reduced according to the studies of  Fama and 
French (2001) and Kim and Kim (2013). Both studies referred propensity to pay 
dividends as a tendency or likelihood that a firm will pay a dividend given its 
characteristics. The lower propensity to pay dividends is due to changing 
characteristics that include profitability, growth and market capitalization. Therefore, 
the economic fundamentals of firms comprising profitability, growth and market 
capitalization among others are of importance when making decisions related to 
dividends. 
In line with the propensity to pay dividends literature, Fatemi and Bildik (2012) 
found evidence supporting the decline of dividends from 33 countries across world. 
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They argued that the reduction is because of improved in corporate governance that 
reduces the need for using dividends as a controlling tool. In contrast, some studies 
have determined that good governance practices are associated with an increase in 
dividend pay outs (Hwang, Kim, Park, & Park, 2013; Jiraporn, Kim, & Kim, 2011; 
O‘Connor, 2013) and that poor governance practices lead to lower dividend pay outs 
(Setiawan & Phua, 2013). Thus, the decline in the propensity to pay dividends could 
exacerbate agency problems as managers may pursue investments that may lead to 
empire building and perquisite consumption. However, no consistency exists on the 
lower propensity to pay dividends as documented in the previous findings 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 2004; Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2011). In 
addition to the inconsistency, Andres, Betzer, Da Silva and Goergen (2009) cast 
doubts on the propensity phenomenon and concluded that a more convincing 
explanation for the propensity to pay dividends is yet to be established. 
The corporate governance of the firm may provide an insight into the decision to pay 
dividends. Corporate governance is seen as an instrument instituted with a view to 
provide protection to the shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 2000). This is because powerful Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) for 
example, may waste the free cash flow of the firm (Jensen, 1986) when strong 
control mechanism is not in place. Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) indicated that 
firms complying with a corporate governance code have better performance 
compared to non-complying firms. Therefore, higher performance may increase the 
likelihood of paying dividends by firms. 
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One important aspect of corporate governance is board structure. de Villiers, Naiker, 
and van Staden (2011) view board characteristics as the features of board members 
who are responsible for monitoring and resource provision in a firm. The board of 
directors constitutes an important arm in corporate governance as they oversee 
various critical corporate policies including mergers and acquisitions and decisions 
to pay dividend, which must be approved by the board of directors (Chen, Lai, & 
Chen, 2015). Hence the characteristics of the board are significant in determining the 
propensity to pay dividends. 
A board comprises outside and or independent directors who occupy board seats and 
who are monitors and oversee CEO activities (de Villiers et al., 2011). The 2011 
Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG) has stipulated that the number of 
non-executive directors should be greater than the number of executive directors. 
This provision was not available in the previous 2003 Code.  The authority believed 
that having more non-executive directors will allow the board to have an 
independent opinion with respect to board decisions. 
Board size is the number of board member occupying board seats.  The agency 
theory suggested that in the presence of a fear of free riding, a small board size will 
be more efficient in monitoring managers. In contrast, the resource dependence 
theory posits that larger boards may include prestigious directors having experience 
that will benefit the firm. To integrate these views together, the argument may be 
made that other monitoring tools such as dividend need to be put in place. In the 
2011 NCCG, the upper limit of the board size was scrapped, with the lower limit 
being a minimum of five. Previously, the NCCG had a mandated that firm have a 
 
 6 
minimum of 5 and maximum of 15 members on board. The change may be attributed 
to having a flexible board that reflects operations of a company and that having more 
experts on the board who will lead to an increased linkage with its outside 
environment (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; de Villiers et al., 2011). 
Board diversity indicates the presence of outside female director on the board. A 
gender- diverse board may mitigate agency related to conflicts of free cash flow to 
the extent that the interests of the agent might be aligned with those of the principal 
more effectively. Evidence from other countries have documented that gender 
influences dividend payout and that this is associated with the reduction of free cash 
flow (Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2016). It is not surprising that the 2011 NCCG 
demanded a diverse board in terms of gender. Therefore, examining how gender 
affects the propensity to pay dividends will be meaningful in the Nigerian context. 
On the other hand, a financial expert is a director with accounting or a related-field 
expertise. Financial experts perform major roles such as monitoring, advising the 
CEOs and providing easy to access financial resources that improve the firm 
(Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2009). Studies on how financial experts influence the 
propensity to pay dividends is uncommon in the propensity-to-pay literature and is 
especially limited in Nigeria. Financial experts on a board could also play a 
significant role relative to corporate financial policies. This is because they are 
expected to be a strategic partner of the CEO and the board (Florackis & Sainani, 
2016). Hence, the role of financial experts should be examined regarding financial 
policies. Moreover, the 2011 NCCG made a provision the inclusion of financial 
experts among audit committee members. 
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CEO tenure is the number of years a director serves as CEO in the firm. Studies on 
the association of CEOs and the propensity to pay dividends is relative scarce. When 
a CEO has served for a longer period he/she likely become powerful and able to use 
free cash flow for private benefit. Longer-tenured CEOs may become powerful such 
that firing him or her on the basis of performance becomes difficult (Ishak, Ku 
Ismail, & Abdullah, 2012);  however, longer-tenured CEOs may accumulate more 
experience that may benefit a firm. One possible mechanisms to be used by 
shareholders in controlling a CEO is to demand a dividend payment. CEO tenure in 
Nigeria has been limited to only 5 years. Whether this limitation on tenure affects a 
firm‘s likelihood to pay dividends is an avenue for further investigation. 
Another important factor that may determine the propensity to pay dividends is the 
ownership structure. Wahl (2006) refers to an ownership structures as the 
distribution of equity with reference to the votes, capital or by the identity of the 
equity owners. Ownership structures around the globe continue to attract the 
attention of researchers, practitioners and policy makers (Lam, Sami, & Zhou, 2012). 
The attention drawn could be due to existence of agency problems resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control and the increased volatility of the portfolios of 
corporate ownership witnessed in recent years (Wahl, 2006). 
Sophisticated market investors such as foreign and block owners monitor 
management either directly or indirectly given their interest in the firm. Institutional 
and foreign shareholders are in a better position to promote shareholder activism 
(Kruse, 2007) and, in turn, help in controlling the opportunistic managers of the 
firms (Satkunasingam & Shanmugam, 2006). Likewise, managerial ownership is 
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also a monitoring mechanism. Managerial ownership is considered as among the 
techniques used for controlling managers and for enhancing the distribution of free 
cash flow (Florackis, Kanas, & Kostakis, 2015). Therefore, its inclusion among the 
ownership variables may shade more light on a firm‘s propensity to pay dividends in 
Nigeria. 
Previous studies have noted that the Nigerian market is characterizes by 
blockholders (Arowolo & Che-Ahmad, 2017; Sanda, Mikailu, & Garba, 2010) .  
This means that investors with large holdings may likely exercise some degree of 
control because they will have more information about the firm. They may monitor 
the activities of management and, therefore, the board may focus less on monitoring 
and give more attention to strategic decision making (Desender, Aguilera, Crispi, & 
Garcia-Cestona, 2013). The presence of controlling owners in a firm may strengthen 
the monitoring aspect of the board. Because the directors are hired by the 
shareholders with a view to be providing an adequate monitoring role in a firm, this 
will reduce agency costs. Accordingly, introducing blockholders as moderating 
variable will offer additional information on the board monitoring role because of the 
existence of interdependency between ownership concentration and the board of 
directors (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009). 
This current study is motivated by the new 2011 NCCG, which stipulates several 
control mechanisms. These mechanisms include requiring firms to have either all or 
most of the board members be independent directors, a diverse board (for example, 
gender and expertise), the separation of the CEO position from that of the chairman, 
and the inclusion of financial experts on the board among others. The investigation is 
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in line with Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven (2011) and Claessens and Yurtoglu 
(2013) who suggested further investigation on the functionality of corporate 
governance under different and local settings. This is because of different regulatory 
frameworks, market strengths, economic environment among countries, so corporate 
governance structures should be examined separately (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). 
The reforms embedded in the 2011 NCCG were aimed at enhancing both the 
confidence of existing and prospective shareholders in the capital market. Ofo (2011) 
noted that non-compliance with the code could be associated with negative effects 
and may be disastrous for investors and perhaps for the economy at large. This 
indicates that the investments of shareholders may be ruined and, by extension, no 
return on investment in the form of dividend will be expected. Furthermore, potential 
investor confidence may be ruined for the capital market and the entire economy 
may suffer. 
This study investigates how board characteristics affect the propensity to pay 
dividends. The incidence of a decrease in the tendency of firms to pay dividends 
started in US markets and then spread to markets in the united Kingdom (Ferris, Sen, 
& Yui, 2006) and other parts of the world (Fatemi & Bildik, 2012). Therefore, the 
phenomenon may also affect the African region as advancements in technology and 
globalization continue to unite markets into a single entity. Similarly, with the 
greater level of dependency of several other markets on the United States, 
particularly emerging markets, the lower propensity-to-pay dividend phenomenon 
may exist in the Nigerian market. 
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Other reasons motivated this current study as well. First, scant evidence exists 
regarding the decision to pay dividends in Nigeria, which is the second largest 
market after South Africa in the sub-Saharan region.  Second, the legal framework of 
Nigeria originated from the British common law and is expected to be stronger than 
civil law in terms of investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000).  
However, the observance of the shareholder‘s rights in the country is merely an 
imagination according to Abor and Fiador (2013). They added that there is 
inconsistency in Nigeria with regards to issues that relate to board activities and 
communicating relevant information to owners and market participants with due 
warnings on the capital structure changes of a firm.  Adegbite (2015) concluded that 
enforcing corporate law as well as harnessing the benefit of self-regulatory initiatives 
in Nigeria remains merely a narrative. Although the prevailing regulations in the 
country require a fair conduct in those issues, they have not been fully effective. 
Therefore, the Nigerian market is an interesting avenue for examining the propensity 
to pay dividends. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Dividend policy for the past five decades has attracted the interest of economists and 
has been a topic of theoretical modelling as well as empirical investigation 
(Frankfurter & Wood, 2002). It is classified among the top most debated topics in the 
accounting, finance, and management literature (Al-Malkawi et al., 2010). Baker and 
Weigand (2015) claimed that no common set of factors is applicable for all firms. In 
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fact, dividend payout policy is sensitive to several factors that range from firm 
characteristics to market characteristics (Baker & Weigand, 2015). 
In a recent study, Abdulkadir (2015) highlighted that, among the most challenging 
issues facing the Nigerian market, is the non-payment of dividend. In addition, 
Nwidobie (2011) pointed out that the dividend satisfaction of shareholders in the 
country is very low. The study indicated that about 85% of the existing shareholders 
are not pleased with the dividend payout of their firms. These findings, therefore, are 
alarming giving the fact that dividends are a major source of compensating investors 
for the capital committed in a market. 
Statistics by the NSE (2016) indicated that the number of firms paying dividends in 
Nigeria is declining hence, the number of non-paying firms is increasing. For 
example, in 2013 only 44.9% of the firms paid dividends (89 of 198 firms), which 
decline to 40.8% in 2014 (80 of 196 firms) and to 37.9% in 2015 (72 of 190 firms). 
Further investigation into the history of firms paying dividend indicated that only 18 
listed firms consistently paid dividends to their shareholders between September 
2011 and September 2016 (Awoyemi & Bagga, 2016). This condition of the higher 
number of non-dividend paying firms than the number of paying firms is problematic 
for the market. 
Indeed, the consequential effect of the non-payment of dividend behaviour might 
affect an investor negatively diminishing the confidence of the existing and potential 
shareholders. This, in turn, may make investing in the stock market less attractive 
because non-payment is considered a poor signal for the prospect of firms (Ethel, 
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Okwo, & Inyiama, 2015). Theoretically, there may be an increase in agency costs 
due to the reduction of dividends because free cash flow may be accumulated 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Dividend payout serves as a mechanism to reduce 
such costs as it deflates the cash available in the possession of manager who may use 
it for perquisite consumption. Thus, dividend reduction might be associated with 
poor prospects. Moreover, from survey evidence, Lintner (1956) documented that 
managers pays dividend to lessen any form of negative reaction from the point of 
view of investors. Thus, it is not surprising that managers are reluctant to reduce 
dividend payments, even in difficult times such as financial distress (Brav et al., 
2005; Frankfurter & Wood, 2002). 
Union Diagnostic was one of the listed companies in Nigeria that proposed to pay a 
dividend and communicated such intention to the concerned authorities and the 
media. Surprisingly, few days later, the company reversed the proposal 
(Nairametrics, 2015).  This reversal of a dividend might raise questions regarding the 
roles of the board of directors, which relates to the effectiveness of the 
implementation of corporate governance. The non-payment of a dividend in the 
market may attributed to the probability of aggravating agency problems (Nwidobie, 
2011, 2013). Hence, the need exists to institute good and strong corporate 
governance practices. In fact, Park (2009) agreed that good corporate governance 
practices are associated with higher dividend payout. This is because in a legal 
regime that tends to protect investors, firms with greater investor protection pay 
higher dividends compared to firms with lower investor protection regimes (La Porta 
et al., 2000). 
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Addressing the non-payment of dividends may require increased efforts from 
regulatory and implementing policies aimed at protecting shareholders. One effort 
made by the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (the apex regulatory 
body) is strengthening internal monitoring mechanisms through NCCG regulations. 
Corporate governance in Nigeria was first introduced in 2003 and was subjected to 
review in 2008. In 2011, a new code was commissioned and all listed firms were 
advised to comply with all its requirements. In their study, Adewuyi and Olowookere 
(2013) revealed that the performance of the firms complying with the NCCG 2011  
are better than non-complying firms. Similarly, studies have found that good 
corporate governance practices have significant effect on corporate dividend payout 
(La Porta et al., 2000; Park, 2009), hence, increasing the likelihood to pay dividends. 
Corporate governance is a major component of a corporation (Brown et al., 2011) 
and its stipulates the way and manner corporations in which should be governed. The 
board of directors and its committees are among the central issues in corporate 
governance. However, ineffectiveness or negligence in discharging their 
responsibilities has led to various reported corporate scandals around the globe. For 
example, Bhasin, (2013) mentioned that the world has witnessed numerous corporate 
scandals that include giant corporations such as Enron, Qwest Communications, 
Xerox, Parmalat and Vivendi Universal and which directly or indirectly will affect 
the dividend policy of the firms. 
In Nigeria, corporate scandals have also appeared and among the prominent and 
well- publicized ones were the Cadbury Plc, Intercontinental Bank and Oceanic 
Bank Plc (Adewale, 2013).  A report showed that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
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of Cadbury Nigeria Plc used among other things, cost deferrals, trade loading and 
false suppliers‘ stock certificates to manipulate the company‘s financial reports 
amounting to 13.3 billion Naira from 2003 to 2006. This occurred in collaboration 
with the board of directors, some management staff and the audit committee of the 
company (Adewale, 2013) and therefore, could not pay dividends. Furthermore, 
because of the scandals, Cadbury Plc failed to meet its shareholders‘ expectations in 
relationship to dividend payout despite the track record it had regarding dividend 
payout. Besides that, Cadbury Nigeria Plc took over the administration of dividend 
payment from its registrars. Thus, indicating the intensity of the corporate scandal as 
it could not pay dividends to shareholders because of the manifested irregularities. 
Most previous studies that have examined the propensity to pay dividends have 
found firm characteristics (for example, profitability, size, and investment growth)  
of dividend payers to differ from those of non-paying firms (DeAngelo et al., 2004; 
Fama & French, 2001; Fatemi & Bildik, 2012; Grullon, Paye, Underwood, & 
Weston, 2011; Kim & Kim, 2013). A firm‘s characteristics may be seen to make it a 
dividend payer, but when a firm‘s governance practices are weak, this may affect its 
decision to pay any dividends at all or may lead to less disgorgement of cash to 
shareholders than expected (Jiraporn et al., 2011). Moreover, firm characteristics are 
one aspect among the numerous factors that needed to be considered in examining 
corporate dividends. Therefore, firm characteristics alone may be biased in 
indicating whether a firm might be a dividend payer or not.  To overcome this 
problem, a firm‘s governance and ownership structures should be considered 
including the board of directors who are the top ranking officers of the firm and who 
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recommend the payment of dividends, which is ratified by shareholders (Choi, Kang, 
& Lee, 2014). 
Furthermore, the evidence revealed regarding the propensity to pay dividends is 
predominantly within the developed markets context (Francis, Hasan, John, & Song, 
2011; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2011). Hence, it is necessary 
to investigate the propensity to pay dividends in developing market such as Nigeria. 
Measuring the propensity to pay dividends has advantage over dividend payout as it 
allows the study to identify firms with their basic characteristics that suggest that the 
firms should be dividends payers and on the other hand to examine whether the set 
of the independents variables influences the likelihood to pay dividends. For 
instance, a firm may be a dividend payer in a certain period but when the existing 
board characteristics and ownership structures are weak or ineffective, the dividend 
payment may not be considered. 
Moreover, Jiraporn et al. (2011) posited that propensity to pay dividends may offer a 
more robust conclusion because it may circumvent potential bias that may be 
encountered during the analysis as a consequent of an imprecise model for the 
optimal dividend payout (Jo & Pan, 2009). Unlike the propensity to pay dividends, 
dividend payout ratio of a firm may require optimal model and such model is yet to 
be   in the dividend literature. (Jiraporn et al., 2011). 
Additionally, previous studies such as Brown et al. (2011) and Claessens and 
Yurtoglu (2013) have suggested the need for further investigation of corporate 
governance practices based on local settings to gain more understanding from those 
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environments about how corporate governance practices influence firm outcomes 
such as the propensity to pay dividends. 
Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) affirmed that, in addition to corporate governance 
mechanisms, ownership structures of firms are crucial and could be of use in 
addressing agency problems. Similarly, Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) noted that the 
effectiveness of dividend payout in mitigating agency costs will depend on the 
structures of the ownership. Ownership structures are also of significant importance 
not only in a determining firm‘s dividend policy but on a firm‘s corporate 
governance practices because they impact managers‘ incentives and the efficiency of 
firms (Wahl, 2006). 
Florackis (2008) opined that blockholders seem to play an important role in 
mitigating agency costs. Truong and Heaney (2007) pointed out that firms are less 
likely to pay dividends when the largest shareholder is an insider. As a consequent of 
their holdings, investors with substantial holdings for example, blockholders may 
acquire more relevant information and thus, monitor management directly (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). In this vein, Desender et al. (2013) argued that controlling 
shareholders may influence both the incentives and the abilities of board members in 
terms of monitoring. Additionally, blockholders can benefit minority shareholders 
because they have the incentive and power to mitigate expropriation or asset 
stripping by managers (Okpara, 2011). Hence, blockholders ownership may 




In line with the above arguments, Nigeria is a good market to test the effectiveness 
of blockholders. On the average, the market has a high degree of blockholders 
ownership, which is about 32.46% of equity (Okpara, 2011; Sanda et al., 2010), and 
the existence blockholders in the market is significant across all the sectors of the 
NSE market (Adenikinju, 2012; Babatunde & Olaniran, 2009). Moreover, Arowolo 
and Che-Ahmad (2017) noted that Nigeran market exhibit two major classes of 
blockhoders; institutional and individual blockholders and the institutional 
blockholders dominated most of the listed firms on the NSE. The study further 
revealed that the institutional blockholders in the market has a mean value of 47.41% 
compared with individual blockholders scoring a value of 8.44%. Thus, it is 
expected that the institutional blockholders may have more influence on firm‘s 
activities including monitoring than the individual. The institutional blockholders in 
most of the Nigerian firms are corporate bodies or organizations (Arowolo & Che-
Ahmad, 2017; Miko, 2016). In another Also, Arko et al. (2014) showed that majority 
of the shareholders in the Nigerian market are the institutional and account for a 
mean value of 53.36%. Consequently, Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad (2016) reported 
that blockholders provide better monitoring and hence, lead to the reduction of 
agency problem between owners and the managers. 
Therefore, the blockholders may have an important role to play in firm governance 
structures as Setia-Atmaja (2009) opined that blockholders have a greater effect on 
controlling agency problems than do other shareholder. 
Consequently, in good corporate governance regimes, excess funds may be returned 
to shareholders in the form of dividends as shareholders are better protected 
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(Sharma, 2011) and the propensity of a firm propensity to pay is increased. Hence, 
based on the gap highlighted above, the study investigates how board characteristics 
and ownership structures influence a firm‘s propensity to pay dividends. 
Furthermore, this study investigates the moderating effect of blockholders on the 
relationship between board characteristics and the propensity to pay dividends. 
First, the choice of board characteristics and ownership structure variables for this 
study is guided by the existing theoretical explanations underpinning them. Hence, 
incorporating these selected variables is an extension of the previous evidence that 
has examined the propensity to pay dividends (DeAngelo et al., 2004; Fama & 
French, 2001; Fatemi & Bildik, 2012; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Kim & Kim, 2013; 
Sharma, 2011). 
Second, this study is also being motivated by the changes in the 2011 corporate 
framework and is consistent with Brown et al. (2011) and Claessens and Yurtoglu 
(2013) who suggested the need for investigating governance structures in a local 
setting. In the same vein, when there is change in regulatory framework of a given 
market, more evidence is needed regarding its functionality (Germain, Galy, & Lee, 
2014) and ascertainment of its effectiveness. Moreover, investigating the interaction 
effect of blockholders ownership on corporate governance practices is a response to 
the call made by Desender et al. (2013) and based on the arguments highlighted in 
the previous paragraphs. The investigation will be interesting as the 2011 NCCG 
allows a firm to decide on the ratio for which blockholders may be given the 
opportunity to have a board representation instead of stipulating the percentage as it 
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did in the 2003 NCCG. This is one of the unique features of the 2011 NCCG 
regarding blockholder ownership. 
1.3 Research Questions for the Study 
Based on the discussion on the problem statement (1.2) above, the study attempts to 
provide answers to the following research questions: 
1. Do board characteristics (size, composition, diversity, financial expertise on the 
board and CEO tenure) affect the propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria? 
2. Do ownership structures (foreign, managerial, and blockholders ownership) 
influence the propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria? 
3. Do blockholders moderate the relationship between board characteristics (size, 
composition, diversity, financial expertise on the board and CEO tenure) and the 
propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of board characteristics 
and ownership structures on the decision to pay dividend as well as the interaction 
effect of blockholders among the listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. Thus, the 
specific objectives of the study are: 
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1. To examine the effect of board characteristics (size, composition, diversity, 
financial expertise on the board and CEO tenure) on the propensity to pay 
dividends in Nigeria; 
2. To investigate the influence of ownership structures (foreign, managerial and 
blockholder ownership) on the propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria; and 
3. To investigate the moderating effect of blockholders on the relationship between 
board characteristics (size, composition, diversity, financial expertise on the board 
and CEO tenure) and the propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria. 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
This study investigates the effects of board characteristics and ownership structures 
on the propensity to pay dividends. In addition, this study also tests the moderating 
effect of blockholders on the relationship between board characteristics and the 
propensity to pay dividends in the NSE spanning from the years from 2009 to 2015. 
The choice of 2009 was encouraged because there was substantial decline in 
dividends in Nigeria (Abdulkadir, 2015) and 2015, is due to the availability of recent 
annual reports of the listed firms. Moreover, the choice of this period is encouraged 
to ascertain the efficacy of the NCCG 2011 since board of directors who are acting 
on behalf of shareholders and therefore, it is expected that they should influence the 
paying of dividend when the firm have met the requirements and vice versa as 
discussed in chapter three. The study excludes financial related companies because 
they are specialized in nature with distinct corporate governance administered by 
CBN. The financial firms also must meet certain requirement as stipulated by the 
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prudential guidelines for example capital adequacy ratio and cash reserve 
requirements. In addition to the above reasons, Baker, Dutta, and Saadi (2008) 
indicated that combining financial with non-financial firms while studying dividend 
payout may not yield fruitful results. Lastly, previous studies on propensity to pay 
dividend do not mixed financial with non-financial firms in one study. 
1.6 Contributions of the Study 
This study is useful as it is conducted in the Nigerian market where formulation and 
implementation of policies that drive private sector development is relatively low 
and inconsistent (Hearn, 2013). The country is also the largest economy among the 
African economies and its corporate governance development is being influenced by 
blockholders (Adegbite, 2015). 
The study contributes to the extant literature on resource and agency theories through 
the characteristics of board of directors‘ membership. Similarly, the study has made 
contributions to the study of ownership structures. The study provides additional 
evidence on roles of blockholders and how they influence the propensity to pay 
dividends. The theoretical and policy implications are discussed in the following 
paragraph. 
1.6.1 Body of Knowledge 
This study is an extension of propensity to pay dividends research. The Fama and 
French (2001) propensity-to-pay model is being tested in a different environmental 
setting. Unlike previous studies that have examined propensity to pay dividends 
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(Baker & Wurgler, 2004b; Fatemi & Bildik, 2012; Kim & Kim, 2013), the current 
study investigates how board characteristics and ownership structures affect a firm‘s 
propensity to pay dividends. This is entirely a novel approach in sub-Saharan Africa 
particularly in Nigeria. 
Based on individual variables, the study offers incremental evidence on board 
diversity and how it affects the propensity to pay dividends. The findings support the 
agency and resource dependence theories. From the agency theory perspective, a 
female director may use dividends to scale down the level of cash that is available in 
a firm. The reduction of this cash enhances the impact of her monitoring role in a 
firm such because a manager may not have excess funds to use in empire building. 
Resource dependent theory suggests that a director serving on the board of a 
company that is rich in resources will have an impact on the firm. Firms may likely 
hire the services of a director based on his or her experience, and a female director 
may strive hard to protect the interests of the shareholders. For example, they may 
support a decision to pay dividends when a firm has a greater tendency to pay 
dividends. Therefore, paying dividends to shareholders in this sense is an indication 
of good governance (Jiraporn et al., 2011). 
Study of the role of financial expertise on the propensity to pay dividend is 
uncommon. A considerable number of researches has examined how financial expert 
enhances financial reporting quality (Kibiya, Che-Ahmad, & Amran, 2016) and 
leads to reduction of earnings management (Cunningham, 2008).  However, little is 
known about the effect of financial expert directors on board on the propensity to 
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pay dividends. Financial expert directors are regarded as rich in resources and are 
very useful to an entity as they provide expert advice to the CEO and board on issues 
related to cash management such as dividends (Florackis & Sainani, 2016). Hillman 
and Dalziel (2003) contended that monitoring and resource provision are at their best 
when directors possess the requisite experience and expertise. Therefore, the current 
investigation provides strong evidence about how financial experts on the board 
influence the propensity to pay dividends. The study lends support to agency and 
resource dependence theories. 
Ownership structures also influence firm financial policies. Most previous studies 
have examined a few classes of ownerships. For example, Abdulkadir, Abdullah, and 
Wong (2016) tested the effect of foreign ownership of the decision to pay dividends 
from the Nigerian market. However, the current study employed the propensity to 
pay dividends model to explore the effects of foreign, managerial and blockholders 
ownership, thus, filling the gap. The study provides strong statistical evidence on the 
role foreign, managerial and blockholders ownership on the propensity to pay 
dividends in Nigeria. 
As Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) suggested governance mechanisms may be either 
irrelevant or even destructive when blockholders are neglected. The study examines 
how blockholders moderates board characteristics on the propensity to pay 
dividends. This relationship has also received limited attention in the propensity to 
pay dividends framework. However, the current study provides empirical evidence 
that, when firms have blockholders, directors on board, female directors and longer-
tenured CEOs, they are more likely to pay dividends in the NSE. Hence, contributing 
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to the existing literature on agency theory through the reduction of cash available in 
a firm. 
1.6.2 Practical Contributions 
Pertinent to practice, the study provides contributions in the following ways. First, 
the findings from this study are expected increase the understanding of regulatory 
bodies Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) on some key issues driving the propensity to pay dividends. For instance, the 
study establishes strong evidence on board diversity and financial expertise on 
boards in which the SEC has mandated firms to have gender diverse board. 
Second, examining the NCCG is in line with Brown et al. (2011) and Claessens and 
Yurtoglu (2013) who suggested a need for further investigation of corporate 
governance based on local settings. The findings are also expected to provide a clue 
to SEC regarding the effectiveness and relationships with corporate monitoring 
mechanisms such as dividends. 
The findings of this study are timely as they add to the understanding of the NSE on 
the factors that influence corporate dividend payment at a time when the number of 
dividend paying firms continue to shrink. The study may assist the NSE to further 
strength any measures that the NSE may consider in addressing dividend payment. 
The empirical evidence of this study also indicates the importance of blockholders in 
relationship of whether to pay or not to pay dividends. Furthermore, the finding in 
relation to the blockholders shows that they are likely to reduce dividends as a 
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monitoring mechanism. However, when the blockholders jointly acted with the 
board size, females on the board, and CEOs with a longer tenure, their monitoring 
strategy may change. These results indicated that indicate that block shareholders 
have influence on board members in terms of monitoring (Desender et al. 2013). 
More so, the block shareholders may prevent asset stripping by managers (Okpara, 
2011). Therefore, consistent with the agency theory that blockholders may have 
greater influence on the firm and strengthening the monitoring role of the board. 
The study found evidence on gender and financial experts on board may provide clue 
to the shareholders to pay greater attention during the selection and hiring of a 
director on the board. This because the gender as well as the experience or expertise 
of a director have a significant effect on determining whether a firm should be a 
dividend payer. 
Equally, existing and potential retail shareholders who are dividend-driven investors 
will find this study of benefit concerning the type of directors and ownership that 
support dividend payment. Likewise, this study could serve as a reference material to 
academics, and researchers in corporate governance and corporate finance can use 
these findings as reference material in their quest for broadening the existing 
knowledge on the propensity to pay dividends. 
1.7 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter highlights the background of the study, the problem statement, the 
research questions and the objectives. It also provides the scope as well as the 
contributions of the study. Overall, the study investigates the effect of board 
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characteristics, ownership structures and the propensity to pay dividends moderated 
by blockholders. Hence, filling the gap in the existing literatures on board 






The focus of this chapter is on the relevant literature that relates to the propensity to 
pay dividends, board characteristics and ownership structures. It includes the legal 
framework on dividend policy, and development of corporate governance in Nigeria, 
also it takes into consideration the underpinning theories of the study. The literature 
also comprises both conceptual and empirical studies that previously examined the 
propensity to pay dividends, dividend payout and corporate governance/board 
characteristics and ownership structures. 
2.2 Legal Framework of Dividend Policy in Nigeria 
Corporate dividend policy is regulated by several bodies controlling the affairs of 
companies in Nigeria. These regulatory bodies comprise the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). In addition to these 
two bodies, the Central Bank of Nigeria has also some pronouncements regarding 
the dividend policy of banks and other financial institutions. Similarly, acts like the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA 2004) and the Companies Income Tax 
Act (CITA) have made some provisions with regards to the administration of 
dividend policy in Nigeria. 
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2.2.1 The Securities and Exchange Commission Nigeria 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the top regulatory body of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and is supervised by the Federal Ministry of 
Finance (SEC, 2015).  The SEC acts as a surveillance for the purpose of maintaining 
and ensuring orderly transactions in securities. It also protects against any abuses in 
the form of insider trading.  The commission was established from a committee 
known as the non-statutory Capital Issues Committee set up by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN). It was charged with the mandate to examine applications from 
different companies that intend to raise capital from the capital market and to 
recommend the timing of such issues. 
Given the need from the increase in the level of economic related activities along 
with enactment of the Enterprises Promotion Decree in 1972, it became necessary 
for the government to establish a body that will be responsible for regulating the 
activities of the capital market (SEC, 2015).  The Capital Issues Commission came 
into existence and took over from the Capital Issues Committee with the enactment 
of Capital Issues Commission Decree in 1973. The new commission had a board of 
nine members, with a representative from the CBN that served as chairman. The 
other eight members were sourced from Federal Ministries, the industrial and 
financial sectors of the economy. 
The commission‘s power was later enhanced because of Financial System Review 
Committee to review the activities of the capital market in 1976. According to SEC, 
the committees‘ recommendations gave rise to the establishment of the Nigerian 
SEC following the promulgation of the Securities and Exchange Commission Decree 
 
 29 
No. 71 of 1979 to supersede the Capital Issues Commission in 1973. The 
commission enjoyed more powers to develop and regulate the Nigerian Capital 
Market along with determining the prices of issues and setting the basis for allotment 
of securities. After nine years of its establishment, the law was amended to cater for 
new challenges facing the capital market and enhance its effectiveness. In 1996, 
however, a panel was commissioned headed by Chief Dennis Odife. The outcome of 
the panel led to a new act called The Investment and Securities Act No. 45 of 1999. 
The primary intent of the newly enacted Act was to promote a more efficient and 
virile capital market setting, capable of meeting the nation‘s ambitions economic 
activities. 
In 2007, the Investment and Securities Act was further revised and passed into law in 
same year. Currently the act empowers the SEC to carry out it functions effectively 
and efficiently. The SEC is also member of International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO). The goal of the international organisation is to cooperate in 
developing, implementing and promoting adherence to internationally recognised 
and consistent standards of securities market regulation around the globe. 
2.2.2 Companies and Allied Matters Act 
In Nigeria, the Act governing the affair of companies is known as the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) as amended in 2004.  This Act spelt out what is 
required of a company from its incorporation up to liquidation as the case might be. 




The CAMA empowers the board to recommend the payment of a dividend to the 
shareholders during the general. The general meeting will from there either approve 
or disapprove of their recommendations. Once shareholders approved a dividend it 
becomes a liability to the company as stated in section 379 (1) of the CAMA 2004. 
Section 379 (3) of the Act allows the shareholders to reduce the amount of dividend 
recommended by the board.  Conversely, the Act does not permit them to increase 
the level of the dividend where the general meeting considers it as too small and 
requests for an increase. 
Furthermore, on the declaration of the dividend, the act also stipulates how it should 
be handled. Section 379 (5), stipulates that dividends shall be paid to the 
shareholders (owners) of the company only out of the distributable profits of the 
company. Additionally, the act does not restrict the payment of a dividend from the 
current profits of the company, and the company may also pay dividends from its 
accumulated profits. 
2.2.3 Prudential Guidelines Issued by CBN 
In addition to the requirements of the CAMA 2004, the prudential guidelines made 
some provisions in connection to the financial sector. In banking sector, the 
prudential guidelines issued by the CBN elaborate on the payment of dividends by 
the money deposit banks. Section 3.14 of the prudential guidelines for money deposit 
banks states that ―no bank shall pay dividend until (i) all its preliminary expenses, 
organizational expenses, shares selling commission, brokerage, amount of losses 
incurred and other capitalized expenses not represented by tangible assets have been 
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completely written off; (ii) adequate provisions have been made to the satisfaction of 
the CBN for actual and contingent losses on risk assets, liabilities, off balance sheet 
commitments and such unearned incomes as are deliverable there from; (iii) it has 
complied with all capital ratio requirement as specified by the CBN‖. This means 
that banks willing to pay dividends must satisfy certain requirements that include 
preliminary expenses, capital requirements, and reserve funds creation to mention 
but few. From these provisions, clearly the regulatory authorities do not take the 
issue of dividend payment lightly. Hence, financial firms tend to have more strict 
regulation than the non-financial firms in listed in the NSE. 
2.2.4 Companies Income Tax Act 
Nigeria like any other country in the world, subject companies that carry out 
business in its environment to taxation along with individuals. The tax laws came 
into being in 1961. They were amended several times to accommodate the dynamic 
nature of business and are now referred to as Companies Income Tax Act of 2004 
(CITA Chapter, C21, 2004 LFN) amended in 2007 (Ekeocha, Malaolu, Oduh, & 
Onyema, 2012). Companies before 1996 paid a tax rate of 35% chargeable to their 
profits. However, the rate was reduced to 30% effectively from January 1996, which 
was aimed at providing incentives for companies to increase the level of compliance 
and transparency. 
Ehigiamusoe (2014) argues that factors both from the demand and supply sides 
accounts for tax evasion and avoidance. The study further stated that poor tax 
administration, poor taxpayers‘ education, inconsistent polices from the government 
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inadequate statistical data base and corruption led to the large understatement of the 
revenues sourced from companies‘ income tax. For the purpose of improving 
compliance level, the federal government further reduced the rate to 20% from 30% 
in the 2010 assessment period and also subjected companies to an education tax of 
2% meant for the enhancement of tertiary institutions in the country (Ekeocha et al., 
2012). 
Besides that, the Act made certain provisions regarding dividends and interest 
income earned by individuals. This tax is known as the withholding tax on dividends 
and interest. The law provides that dividend income of an entity or an individual 
shall be subjected to the payment of a withholding tax of 10% deducted from the 
source. This is included in Section 72 of the Personal Income Tax Act (PITA) and in 
Section 63 of Companies Income Tax Act (CITA) for personal and corporate bodies 
respectively. Moreover, provisions were also made as to reduce the incidence of 
double taxation. Section 63 (3) of CITA provides that dividends that are received by 
individual investors are regarded as franked investment income. In this case, the 
dividends are not taxable in the hands of the investors because they have been 
deducted from the source. The Act mandated the authorised bodies to deduct such 
withholding taxes and remit them directly to the relevant authority within 30 days of 
the deductions. 
Conversely, the Nigerian tax laws exempt some dividend income from taxation some 
of them are; dividends distributed by Unit Trust; dividends derived by a company 
from a country outside Nigeria and brought into Nigeria through Government 
approved channels of CBN, dividends received from small companies in the 
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manufacturing sector in the first five (5) years of their operation and dividends 
received from investments in wholly export oriented businesses. 
2.2.5 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (Act) 
Prior to the relaxation of the indigenization policy known as Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree (hereafter NEPD) of 1972, the government imposed restrictions 
on the inflow of foreign direct Investments (FDI). The decree reserved about 22 
different business to the Nigerians. These include advertising, gaming, electronics 
manufacturing, basic manufacturing, road transport, bus and taxi services, the media 
and retailing and personal services. Similarly, in 1977, the government tighten its 
restrictions on the FDI inflow from 60% ownership to only 40% in areas like plastic 
and chemical manufacturing fish-trawling, insurance and banking. In addition to that 
other areas such as drugs manufacturing, hotels and metals business that were 100% 
allowed to own by foreign was also reduced to 60%. This policy decreased the 
percentage of foreign ownership, but the list of local investors ownership was 
expanded (Amobi, 2014). 
Adeoye (2009) asserted that foreign direct investment can bring about substantial 
benefits to emerging economies and increase the speed of their economic 
development. FDI relates to the ownership structures of company. According to 
Adeoye (2009) FDI comprises long-term investments that comes from different sets 
of investors, ranging from individual and multinational entities as well as other 
bodies from outside their country of existence. It entails the control of an enterprise 
in a particular country by a firm that resides in another country that is different from 
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the targeted one. The investment could be either buying a firm or expanding 
operations of an existing business activities in a given economy. The FDI is expected 
to have numerous advantages as it can create jobs and enhance economic growth. In 
specific terms, FDI can shape corporate policies because it is associated with transfer 
of technology and productivity of local firms (Alsubaie, 2012). 
The FDI may as well influence corporate policy decisions because foreign investors 
control a significant percentage of ownership in the country. Therefore, local firms 
may tend to adopt policies that suit multinational corporations or investors. Desai, 
Foley, and Hines (2009) indicated that multinational companies influence positively 
the activities of local firms. Amobi (2014) asserted that the primary goal of the FDI 
policy of the Federal Government Nigeria is to increase the presence of transnational 
corporations in the country to bridge capital, management, skills and technology 
gaps, and to support the competence of local companies and the local workforce 
towards achieving world standards. 
Furthermore, the increasing demand for diversification and for foreign expertise 
among others influenced the government in 1989 to amend the NEPD of 1972. This 
paved the way for the foreign business list to be extended to 40 different businesses. 
This addition excludes the former shareholdings of 40% allowable to them in the 
banking, insurance oil production and mining sectors.  Additionally, a remarkable 
change that took place in 1995. This was the result of a new Act called the Nigerian 
Investment Promotion Commission Act. The Act led to the relaxation of all the 
restrictions that were previously imposed on foreign ownership holdings across all 
the sectors of the economy. 
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2.3 Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
The world has witnessed the collapsed of some reputable and giant corporations as a 
consequence of fraudulent activities and limited means of checks and balances, 
which drew attention from governments as well as the markets (Tariq & Abbas, 
2013). In response to those failures, various corporate governance codes were 
enacted in different parts of the world and Nigeria was one of them including the 
2003 code of corporate governance. Subsequently, the 2003 code was replaced by 
the 2011 NCCG because of the need to meet the dynamic nature of business entities. 
Corporate governance, according to Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013), depends on its 
applicability at the country level. The authors viewed corporate governance as a 
behavior of corporate bodies relating to firm-specific variables such as performance, 
efficiency, growth, financial structure, shareholders‘ treatment and other 
stakeholders. In comparative studies, corporate governance could mean the set rules 
under which firms are operating. The sources of the rules could be from the legal 
system, the judicial system, and capital markets. Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) posited that corporate governance is the way in which investors who provide 
funds to corporate entities assure themselves of obtaining returns on the invested 
capital.  In addition to the above definition, the Nigerian SEC also explained that 
corporate governance served as a guide to promote and facilitate sound corporate 
behavior (SEC, 2011). 
A corporate governance code is classified into two elements which are: the 
principled-based and rule-based codes (Tariq & Abbas, 2013). Principle-based 
corporate governance is common in the United Kingdom, Commonwealth countries 
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and the Europe. For principle-based corporate governance, a firm must comply with 
these codes or otherwise must explain the reasons for non-compliance publicly in 
their annual reports (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). The idea behind this 
―comply or explain‖ system (principled-based) is to let the market decide on some 
particular set of standards that a firm considers desirable for its purposes. 
However, the rule-based system of corporate governance, is sometimes referred as 
―one size fits all‖ is a prescriptive approach to corporate governance. The supporters 
of the rule-based system are of the view that it is easier to comply with it and ensure 
its enforceability. An example of this rule-based system, is the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
2002. The regulators require United States-listed firms to fully comply with the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act 2002. The objective of both codes is to enhance monitoring. For 
the case of Nigeria, the regulatory body directs all the listed firms on the NSE and 
firms wishing to be listed to comply fully with all its provisions (SEC Nigeria, 
2011). 
In summary, corporate governance could be seen as a set of rules guiding the affairs 
of a business enterprise that will promote best practices among corporations and 
negate any form of activity that is detrimental to owners of the corporation and its 
stakeholders (Okike, 2007). Therefore, corporate governance is very vital from an 
economic development sense. Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) found supporting 
evidence that firms with good corporate governance enjoy greater access to 
financing, lower costs of capital, and experience better performance and more 
favourable treatment from numerous stakeholders. In addition to this Reddy, Locke, 
and Scrimgeour (2010) noted that a firm with good corporate governance has an 
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increase cash flows accruing to the investors as well as reductions in the costs of 
capital to the firm. 
In Nigeria, several calls were made for the need of an effective and efficient 
corporate governance. In response to the calls, a committee of seventeen members 
was set up by the SEC in collaboration with corporate affairs commission headed by 
Atedo Peterside in the mid-2000 to facilitate the enactment of NCCG. The 
committee made recommendations with regard to instituting a code of best practices 
that registered public corporation should be followed. At the end of their assignment, 
the committee submitted its reports, which made recommendations to ensure the 
transparency as well as the accountability of public companies‘ boards. The 
recommendations made to the SEC in respect of the new corporate governance code 
(NCCG 2011) were extracted from other corporate governance codes around the 
world that are captured as best practices codes (Okike, 2007). 
Prior to the adoption of the committee report as the NCCG, a draft was published in 
different newspapers for further review in three different areas of the country: Abuja, 
Lagos and Port Harcourt. After a rigorous review, the boards of the SEC approved 
the final report as the NCCG, which was considered as a code of best practices 
(SEC, 2001). 
As time passed and due to corporate failures as well as fast changes in business 
activities caused by ICT, the NCCG of 2003 became obsolete. The need to provide a 
more comprehensive review of the existing one arose. In 2008, the M.B. Mahmoud 
committee was inaugurated and tasked with reviewing the existing NCCG of 2003. 
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The committee was in particular mandated to identify weaknesses and constrains to 
good corporate governance and further recommend ways by which greater 
compliance and aligning the code with international best practices could be achieved 
(SEC Nigeria, 2011). The committee conducted an in-depth review and handed over 
the report in 2009. The report was further exposed to other regulatory authorities. At 
its 43rd meeting, the SEC offered amendments based on what the committee had 
submitted to them (Ofo, 2011). Subsequently, the draft was also made available for 
further inputs from the stakeholders and members of the public. In doing that, the 
SEC made the draft of the code available in its website and in the newspapers. After 
having reviewed the suggestions, the final code was later released and was to take 
effect from April 2011. 
In Nigeria, there are five prevailing corporate governance codes. Among these codes 
are, the SEC code of corporate governance 2011 (NCCG), which is the general code 
applicable to all public corporations. The remaining codes are specifically designed 
to meet the demands of peculiar industries (Ofo, 2011). For example, the code of 
corporate governance for banks and discount houses of 2014 is applicable to banks 
and discount houses registered in Nigeria and is issued by the CBN. Second, a code 
of corporate governance was issued by the National Pension Commission for all 
pension fund administrators and pension fund custodians. Third, is the code of 
corporate governance for insurance corporations of 2009 issued by the National 
Insurance Commission, which focuses attention on insurance firms in the country. 
The last is the code of corporate governance for the telecommunications industry 
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2014 issued by Nigerian Communications Commission. Nonetheless, the SEC Code 
of 2011 is the primary code of corporate governance that cut across all industries. 
The new 2011 code highlighted areas that were not fully articulated in the previous 
code of 2003. Among these areas are the duties of the chairman, CEO and the board 
of directors. Section 5.1 of the 2011 code pointed out fully what is required for the 
chairman. The chairman is charged with the duty to preside at the general meetings 
of the company and to ensure the continuation of the meeting with regards to a 
quorum. The chairman has the power of adjourning the meeting where necessary. 
The chairman is also to ensure the proper functions of the board that align with the 
strategic goals of the company. However, the code denied the chairman from 
interfering with the day-to-day affairs of the board. It states that the CEO and the 
management are responsible in running the day-to-day affairs of the company. 
Additionally, the roles of the board of directors are expressly provided for in the new 
code. The success of the company rest with the board of directors. They are expected 
to define strategic goals and ensures that both financial and human resources are 
channelled towards attaining those strategic goals (Ofo, 2011). The code also 
emphasizes the need for the board of directors to properly manage the company and 
carry out activities as stated in companies‘ memorandum and articles of association. 
The board comprises three different members; executive, non-executive and the 
independent directors. 
The 2011 NCCG also categorically defined what it means to be an independent 
director compared to the former code in which very little was discussed about them. 
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An independent director according to the code refers to a director with shareholding 
not exceeding 1% of the paid-up capital of the company. An independent director is 
not employed by any person or group that has a substantial interest in the company, 
which may influence the management Section 5.5(a). The code also sheds light about 
its size. A board should not constitute less than five (5) members. In this regard, the 
number of the non-executive should exceed that of executive directors. This is so 
because of the need to have an independent board capable of discharging its 
responsibilities. The code strongly embraces professionalism at the board and 
committee levels. 
Furthermore, the new code emphases also that at least one financial expert is 
expected to be among the members of the audit committee. Section 30.1 stipulates 
that one member of audit committee should be financially literate, which will enable 
them to read and understand a financial statement. Moreover, Section 30.2 further 
states, that among the members of the committee, at least one of them must 
possesses accounting or financial-management knowledge. 
The 2011 NCCG also made provisions for the performance evaluation of the 
chairman, board and other committees; the orientation and training of the board; 
diversity in terms of gender and expertise of the board members; establishment of a 
website that will provide information to shareholders termed as  ―investors relation 
section‖; disclosure of the owners of the company with substantial holdings; 
provision of a whistle-blowing mechanism that will expose wrongdoings or unethical 
practices and sustainable related issues.  Provisions for external audit related issues 
are also captured in the code. The 2011 NCCG prohibits the provision of non-audit 
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services by auditors to their clients; the mandatory rotation of the external auditors; 
and restricting the total percentage of auditor income from a single client. These are 
some of the fundamental issues that were captured in the recent 2011 NCCG. 
2.3.1 Board Characteristics 
Corporate governance mechanisms are simply classified into internal and external 
mechanisms. Regulatory bodies tend to focus more on the internal aspects of 
corporate governance. The external mechanisms, are determined by factors outside 
the firm such as legal protection and takeover rules (Man, Kong, & Wong, 2013). 
Board structure falls under  the category of internal governance mechanisms 
(Bekiris, 2013). Internal governance mechanisms are utilized to check for and 
mitigate abuses, whether existing or anticipated, from the management, and to 
mitigate agency problems in modern corporate entities. The board acts on the behalf 
of shareholders in running the activities of the company. Board members are 
expected to carry out their duties effectively in monitoring the managers and provide 
resources to the company.  
A board member is elected when a vacancy exists, and, if any short fall occurs 
relative to fulfilment of their responsibilities, they stand a chance of being voted 
them out, and, in this case, a new member would be elected to fill the position (Man 
et al., 2013). The monitoring role of the board makes its structure an important 
feature, and the compositional dimension of the board has been found to be related to 




Board characteristics and structure have been studied extensively with respect to 
corporate governance. Factors such as board size, board independence, and gender 
diversity are classified as being among the components of board characteristics 
(Akpan & Amran, 2014; Amran & Che Ahmad, 2011; Bradbury, Mak, & Tan, 
2006). Additionally, Wan and Ong (2005) considered elements of board structure to 
include the distinction between directors who occupy management positions in the 
firm and those who do not.  In a another study, Amran, Yusof, Ishak, and Aripin 
(2014) considered professional qualifications and multiple directorships among the 
variables of board characteristics. Drawing from the above studies, board size, board 
composition, board diversity, financial expertise on board, and CEO tenure are the 
board characteristics variables studied in the current research. 
2.3.2 Ownership Structures 
Various forms of ownership exist in the today‘s corporations. They comprise family, 
institutional, managerial, domestic and foreign, and dispersed (diffuse) and 
concentrated ownerships among others (Ezeoha & Okafor, 2010). Some study has 
noted that ownership in many countries seems to be concentrated in the hands of few 
individuals. For example, Becht and Mayer (2001) revealed that in European 
countries, a single voting shareholder may have a more than 50% holding in the 
stake in a firm. In East Asian countries, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) 
reported the that a high concentration of ownership exists in various corporations. 
Azlina (2013) and Ishak (2010) also concluded that Malaysia is an environment with 
ownership concentration in the hands of few individuals. 
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In Nigeria, Adenikinju (2012) revealed that, even though the concentration of 
ownership varied across sectors, evidence of the existence of the blockholders 
remains very significant in general. The study further stated that the ownership 
concentration in most sectors was more than 50%. The highest concentration was 
exhibited in the airline (99%) industry followed by agriculture (88.9%), automobiles 
(89.6%), commercial services (85.7%) and chemical and paints (72%). It was, 
however, low in footwear (25%) and printing and office equipment (49%). 
According to Oyejide and Soyibo (2001), the average total holdings of the 
government between 1995 and 1998 was about 8.1% of the shares of the quoted 
firms. Nonetheless, individual ownership appears to be increasing in many sectors, 
and on average domestic individuals now own about 35% of the shares of the quoted 
companies in Nigeria. 
The presence of ownership by foreign and domestic institutions of firms quoted on 
the NSE accounts for nearly 48%. Further analysis shows that the participation of 
foreign institutions is much more pronounced in the quoted firms compared to the 
local domestic institutional ownership. The differences in terms of shareholdings 
may be around 30%. 
Meanwhile, management-staff ownership accounts for less than 6%. On the overall, 
this implies that the Nigerian economy is fruitful for investors, but especially for 
foreign investors, and this may have implications for the corporate governance 
structures of Nigerian firms. The presence of blockholders may yield an avenue to 
protect minority shareholders, increase firm performance and the less likely to use 
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dividends as a monitoring tool. Thus, this study investigated the effect of foreign, 
managerial and blockholders ownership on the propensity to pay dividends. 
2.4 Theories Underpinning the Study 
This study has identified two important theories to be used as the underpinning 
theories. These theories are the agency theory and the resource dependence theory, 
and their explanations are provided below. 
2.4.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory is the first theory to be considered in this study. The theory 
explains the relationship between the principal and agent and their behaviours. It 
further explains how directors on the board can act on behalf of a principal so that 
they control or monitor the agents‘ activities. An agency relationship is defined ―as a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent‖ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 5). Agency 
theory describes the association between the principal and the agent. In other words, 
it discusses the relationship between shareholders and managers. This relationship to 
some extent suffers as the two parties may have different goals or interests. The 
agents tend to behave contrary to the wishes of principal because both are utility 
maximizers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) or as a result of risk bearing and decision 
making (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This form of conflict is viewed as an owner-
manager conflict or a type one agency problem (Thomsen, 2005). 
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According to the agency theory the primary role of the directors on board is 
controlling the managers or monitoring the managers in a firm (de Villiers et al. 
2011; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Sharma, 2011). Agency theorists have claimed that, 
because of the conflict of interest existing between the owners and the managers, 
managers may undertake investments that may result in value destruction instead of 
enhancing the value of a firm for the benefit of the shareholders of a firm 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Sharma, 2011). 
However, the presence of directors on board who have strong monitoring abilities 
can enforce dividends as a tool that has strong effect in addressing the agency 
conflict (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2014; Jiraporn et al., 2011). Moreover, the payment of 
the dividends is likely to deflate the amount of free cash flow that the managements 
can waste through perquisite consumption or investing in projects, which yield 
negative net present value (Boumosleh & Cline, 2015; Jensen, 1986; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Jiraporn & Chintrakarn, 2009; Rozeff, 1982; Sharma, 2011). Thus, 
a strong board may likely not allow managerial investment decisions without being 
properly examined (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Jiraporn & Ning, 2006; La Porta 
et al., 2000). 
Likewise, the exposure of a firm to the market due to paying dividends may enhance 
the monitoring role of the managers as the firm requires capital to finance new 
projects (Easterbrook, 1984; Jiraporn et al., 2011). This study therefore, adopts 
agency theory to explain the relationship among board composition, CEO tenure, 
foreign managerial ownership, and blockholders ownership and dividend payments. 
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This study is also used resource dependence theory as the second underpinning 
theory. 
2.4.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
The board of directors is believed to have dual functions or responsibilities. It acts as 
a monitor and providing resources to a firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The resource 
dependence view can be seen to be rooted in the classical works of  Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) and Pfeffer (1972). They contended that the outside directors 
support the company to acquire numerous resources and to safeguard it from the 
influence of the environment. According to Hillman and Dalziel (2003) resources 
mean anything that could improve or support a firm in relationship to its needs.  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) provided that the essence of appointing a board member 
is to aid the firm and offer special services that the firm needs or requires. In general, 
the expectation is that such an appointment will serve a root in obtaining greater 
opportunities for the firm. In areas such as advice and counsel legitimacy, these links 
will enhance the relationship between the environment and a firm and improved 
access to commitment from outside the firm. Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold (2000) 
classified directors as either insider or outsiders, experts in businesses, or those with 
strong influence in community and specialists who support the firm. This 
classification is based on the likelihood of resources that a firm could derive from its 
board of directors. 
The resource dependence theory for example, will relate to board size in the sense 
that when a board is large may incorporate more experience as well as 
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knowledgeable directors and are expected to provide valuable advice to the firm. In 
larger board, it is probable to have directors whom are experts on finance related 
issues. de Villiers et al. (2011) posited that firms with larger boards have more 
probability in accessing critical financial resources which a firm requires and 
therefore, allowing such boards to be financially flexible to improve the firm 
performance and in turn have more likely to pay dividends. 
Board comprising members with diverse knowledge not only on board affairs but 
also with expertise in their fields of endeavors will certainly benefit a firm  (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003). For instance, firms that require financial policy advice may likely 
seek personalities identified with financial expertise to become a director. This 
means that issues relating to financial policies would be handled appropriately.  
Daily, Dalton, and Cannella (2003) referred such board members as ―boundary 
spanners‖ who could provide advice depending on their expertise. Similarly, Kor and 
Misangyi (2008) maintained that experienced directors drawn from industry may 
complement managers who have less expertise in some key areas of the firm to carry 
out strategic investment decisions, create competitive dynamics, and probably help 
in product repositioning. They also showed that resource provision by the outside 
directors is important especially in young firms. This evidence lends support to Kor 
and Sundaramurthy (2009) who indicated that advice and counsel business experts 
might have an additive influence on firm growth. 
According to Carpenter and Westphal (2001) a board comprising experts enables the 
inflow of resources and vital information within an industry. In a nutshell, the 
resource dependence theorists emphasize issues relating to resource provision to an 
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enterprise. de Villiers et al. (2011) contended that resource-rich directors have the 
capabilities of establishing wider societal connections that fit with resource 
provision. With respect to the financial policies of a firm, the directors rich in 
resources tend to be knowledgeable in a firm‘s financially related issues (Florackis & 
Sainani, 2016; Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2009). They tend to advance ideas on firm 
financial policies that will yield positive outcomes for a firm, which will, in turn, 
affect the returns of shareholders (Florackis & Sainani, 2016). For instance, a 
resource-rich director in finance may advocate that a firm should take advantage of 
the tax deduction on interest payable. Therefore, a firm may prefer financing its 
projects with debt rather than through issued equity (Ghosh & Sirmans, 2006). This 
research adopts resource dependence theory to relate board size, board diversity and 
financial expertise with the likelihood of dividend payout. 
2.4.3 Justification for the Underpinning Theories 
The rationale behind using agency theory in this study is based on the fact that 
conflict of interest in the firm is inevitable and control mechanisms are needed 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The mechanisms put in place will monitor the managers 
and ensure that those managers do not deviate from the will of the shareholders. One 
of these controls is corporate governance. It suggested that most of the board of 
directors should be from the outside so that they will be independent from managers. 
This will enable them to monitor and ensure that the managers interests are aligned 
with those of the shareholders. Similarly, the stake or interest of the blockholders 
usually serves as an incentive to carefully monitor the management entrusted with 
the responsibility of the business operations (Desender et al., 2013; Setia-Atmaja, 
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2009; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Furthermore, the alignment of interests could also 
be achieved when managers hold some reasonable amount of stakes in the firm 
(Farinha, 2003; Rozeff, 1982). 
Additionally, foreign owners like blockholders may institute more monitoring 
mechanism to ensure that managers interests are aligned with those of shareholders 
(Jeon, Lee, & Moffett, 2011; Jeon & Ryoo, 2013). The presence of foreign 
shareholders may weaken the agency- related conflicts better than local investors 
because their financial as well as technological resources and experience allows 
them to more closely monitor the management (Hwang et al., 2013; Pucheta-
Martínez & López-Zamora, 2017). Foreign shareholders, moreover, are profit-driven 
investors and have no close ties with the management that can weaken their 
monitoring roles (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). Additionally, the foreign 
shareholders are more likely to demand reasons from the management with regard to 
strategic decisions and may be more critic of the initiatives that are not in alignment 
with the firms values (Jeon & Ryoo, 2013). 
On the other hand, resource dependency will also be used as another underpinning 
theory for the study. The theory maintains that outside directors serving on the board 
will provide linkages to the external environment such that the organization they 
serve will be able to have access to those required resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Outside directors are expected to be better monitors because they do not 
depend on the management.  
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In addition, outside directors have incentives such as preserving reputational capital 
and avoiding legal liability (Ali, Ng, & Kulik, 2014) to monitor the effectiveness of a 
firm‘s management; their abilities to do so are also very important (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010). Therefore, boards may 
likely vary in their abilities to monitor because outside directors possess 
heterogeneous abilities in terms of skills and incentives in the form of reputation (Ali 
et al., 2014). Moreover, firms tend to hire directors based on their capabilities in 
terms of monitoring and resource provision rather than occupying board seats. 
Hence, resource dependence could also explain the association between outside 
directors and dividend policy. 
The need for heterogeneous board members such as female directors and financial 
experts, may make the board size large; even so, this offers better monitoring and 
resources provision services (Certo, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 
1999; de Villiers et al., 2011). Similarly, a diverse board may enhance strategic 
board decision making and develop links with outside stakeholders of the firm by 
integrating a wide range of information that allows for a more informed judgement 
(Ali et al., 2014;  Hillman et al., 2000; Mishra & Jhunjhunwala, 2013). 
2.5 Dividend Policy on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
Historically, the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) began as the Lagos Stock 
Exchange and was incorporated in 1960 and was a privately owned entity under the 
1960 Lagos Stock Exchange Act provisions  (Osaz, 2007).  Later, the name was 
replaced by the Nigerian Stock Exchange to align with the 1977 Indigenization 
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Decree. Subsequently six other trading floors were commissioned in various part of 
the country to boost the capital market activities. 
Among the first trading floors established where Kaduna and Port Harcourt in 1979 
and 1980 respectively. Later, in 1989, the Kano trading floor was launched, and the 
Onitsha and Yola floors were created in 1990 and 2002 respectively. Furthermore, 
the second-tier market referred to as the Alternative Securities Market (ASeM) came 
into existence in April 1985 as a segment of the NSE. The ASeM was created to 
cater for small and medium enterprises who intended to raise funds in the NSE. 
Afterwards, in line with international standards and to further improve the efficiency 
of the NSE activities, the Central Securities Clearing System (CSCS) was 
incorporated in July 29, 1992. The CSCS is charged with the full responsibility of 
offering clearance and depository services for securities listed on the NSE.  
Consequently, the activities of the NSE is enhanced with the creation of  ASeM  and 
CSCS. 
As indicated in the previous paragraphs, the NSE began its operations in 1961 with 
only few securities. However, as at end of the year 2010, 217 listed companies were 
trading on the exchange with a total market capitalization of N10.33 trillion. 
Moreover, the equities market capitalization stood at N7.92 trillion. For 2011, with 
198 companies listed on the Exchange, the total market and equities market 
capitalization were noted to be N10.28 trillion and N6.54 trillion respectively. This 
shows that a percentage decrease of the activities occurred in 2011 compared to 
those of 2010. The activities of the NSE recorded an impressive performance in 
2012. The All Share Index (ASI) appreciated by 35.5% in the year compared to a 
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loss of 16.3% recorded at the end of 2011. Along this line, the market capitalization 
appreciated by 44.04% to close 2012 at ₦14.80 trillion from ₦10.28 trillion. The 
results of 2013 were quite good also as the market witnessed an increase in its 
activities. The record shows that total market capitalization closed at N18.60 trillion 
from N14.80 trillion in 2012, indicating an appreciation of 25.68%, and there was an 
upsurge in market activities. 
According to Baker (2009) dividend policy refers to the ―payout policy that a firm 
follows in determining the size and pattern of cash distributions to shareholders over 
time‖ (p. 3). This is the return investors receive when they purchased shares of a firm 
(Longinidis & Symeonidis, 2013). This is described as an important element of the 
current business environment (Ajanthan, 2013). Several groups are concerned about 
decisions concerning the payment of dividends by a company to its shareholders and 
it includes investors, creditors, regulatory and authorities. Dividend policy for the 
years has been a topical issue that has engaged managers since the inception of 
modern corporation in 1932. Al-Malkawi et al. (2010) noted that dividend policy has 
become the top agenda of the managers in the modern corporate world. Since then 
dividend policy has emerged as a contentious topic in the field of accounting and 
finance. Dividend payout could be in the form of cash or shares (Osamwonyi & 
Imasuen, 2006). 
In the Nigerian market, cash dividend is the most common means of rewarding the 
shareholders in the NSE (Abdulkadir, 2015). The board of directors may make a 
recommendation of its payment to be deliberated on at the annual general meeting. 
Prior to its declaration, a company must formally communicate its intention first to 
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the NSE in written form. The notice contains vital information, which includes the 
date for which the registry of the company will be closed and the accounting period. 
An investor will be a beneficiary of that dividend only if his or her name is included 
in the register of the company before its closure; otherwise, such an investor will not 
be entitled to the dividend the company proposes to pay. Accordingly, the SEC 
mandated a company to transfer the total amount of the dividends voted for by the 
shareholders to the registrar of the company. The registrar them makes the payment 
immediately and files a return to the commission within 24 hours. The payment is 
done using dividend warrants and, more recently, through an electronic dividend (e-
dividend). In the event the registrar fails to comply with the commissions‘ 
requirements, the commission has the right to sanction them. 
After a firm has declared and paid dividends to the existing shareholders whose 
name appears on the registry before the ex-dividend date, the dividend account with 
the company‘s registrar should have a zero-balance indicating that every shareholder 
has received his or her dividend. This is not the case for most Nigerian companies. 
More than half of the companies in both first tier and second tier markets are having 
some amount of cash balance in their dividend account with not less than 4% of the 
dividends declared every year (Elujekor, 2012). These outstanding dividends are 
termed as ―unclaimed dividends‖. An unclaimed dividend usually is the amount of 
dividend that is yet to be received by the shareholders for one reason or another. 
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2.6 Propensity to Pay Dividends 
The focus of this section will be on the relevant empirical evidence on the propensity 
to pay dividends and then will proceed to review studies correlating dividend payout 
policy with board characteristics and ownership structures. Appearing and 
disappearing or the propensity to pay dividend is a recent topical issue surrounding 
the dividend puzzle. Fama and French (2001) were the first to note the lower 
tendency of paying dividends among US firms. 
A lower propensity to pay dividends according to Fama and French (2001) is a 
situation in firms appear to make zero dividend payments irrespective of their 
characteristics. This means that firms prefer to retain all their earnings despite the 
fact that it has the capability to do so. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004) 
explained that a reduction in the propensity to pay dividend refers to the situation 
whereby dividend paying firms distribute a lower proportion of their earnings than 
before. The propensity to pay dividends could be seen as the situation in which the 
tendency to disburse net cash to the owners of the firm declines (Grullon et al., 
2011). According to Baker and Wurgler (2004b), the decline of the propensity to pay 
dividends means the likelihood that a firm will not pay dividends because investors 
preferences have shift from dividends to capital gains.  
The catering theory on dividends provides that managers respond to the investors 
demand for either dividends shares or non-dividend paying shares. Catering theory 
as suggested by the theorists such as Baker and Wurgler (2004a) contended that 
investors varying preference for dividend paying firms. Moreover, the theorist 
pointed out that their inclination for dividends or not is what makes the firms to 
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consider whether to pay or not pay dividends. As a consequent of this demand, 
investors may have preferences for dividend or capital gains depending on the value 
they attach to dividend payers.  
The value attached according to Baker and Wurgler (2004b) is termed as premium. 
They further noted that managers follow the path of the dividend premium. Thus, 
when the dividend premium is high, managers are more probable to pay and vice 
versa. Baker and Wurgler (2004b) concluded that the decline in dividend payment 
among US firms is largely attributed to the catering theory. This current study 
considers the propensity to pay dividends as the tendency of a firm to pay a dividend 
to the extent that firm characteristics suggested that the firm should pay that 
dividend. 
The propensity to pay dividends is considered to have a direct association with 
dividend policy. This is because the factors that determines the dividend policy of 
firms are also the same factors used to describe a firms‘ propensity to pay dividends 
(Baker & Wurgler, 2004b; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2006; Fama & French, 
2001; Li & Lie, 2006). The factors include profitability, firm size, market 
capitalization, age, idiosyncratic risk, growth opportunity, retained earnings, and 
ownership which  are common in the literature that surrounds the patterns of 
dividend policy of a firm (Holder, Langrehr, Hexter, & Holder, 1998; Rozeff, 1982; 
Singhania & Gupta, 2012; Patra, Poshakwale, & Ow-Yong, 2012). 
However, despite the similarities that exist between dividend policy and the 
propensity to pay, the methodology of study differs. It is a tradition in the propensity 
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to pay dividends literature to use probability models as the tool of the analysis, thus, 
logit regression is mostly used. This is unlike normal dividends payout literature in 
which a linear model and its family are employed such as ordinary least squares 
regression and feasible generalized least squares are employed for analyzing the 
data. 
Fama and French (2001) noted that the number of publicly listed firms paying cash 
dividend has significantly dropped from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999. They 
argued that this behaviour was because of changing firm characteristics (high 
investment, firm size and low earnings). Similarly, Baker and Wurgler (2004b) 
indicated two distinct positions in relationship to the propensity to pay dividends by 
firms. The study pointed out that the likelihood of a firm paying a dividend tends to 
increase as the dividend premium increases. However, it reverses when a dividend 
premium becomes negative. The study lends support to Fama and French (2001), 
which concluded that the decline in the dividend payment is the result of catering to 
the needs of shareholders and investors. The evidence, therefore, is consistent with 
the catering theory that managers pay dividends when investors show their 
preference for it by paying more for the stock of firms that intend to pay dividends. 
In examining dividend policy, Skinner (2008) classified firms into three groups 
according to their payout policies. First are those firms that combine dividend 
payments with repurchases, second are firms that repurchase regularly and third are 
those firms that rarely repurchase. The study of Compustat firms revealed that firms 
that the pay payment of only cash dividends significantly decreased from 13.2% to 
6.8% during the period from 1952 to 2004, and, on aggregate dividend supply, there 
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was a sharp decline of payout from 8.3% to 1.7% during the same period. Also, 
Ferris et al. (2006) studied the pattern of company dividend policy from United 
Kingdom setting and revealed evidence on dividend decline. The evidence shows 
that the magnitude at which dividends are declining are lower when compared to the 
evidence indicating the declines reported from the United States. 
Besides the factors that Fama and French documented as driving the lower 
propensity to pay dividends, risks may also be a contributing factor. Bulan, 
Subramanian, and Tanlu (2007) indicated that dividend-initiating firms have lower 
idiosyncratic risks than non-initiators prior to initiation and that idiosyncratic risk 
becomes weaker around the event as opposed to non-initiators. In a study combining 
idiosyncratic and systematic risks, Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) found market and 
firm-specific risks to be associated with a firm‘s propensity to pay dividends. The 
study contended that the variability of the daily stock returns emanated from firm-
specific (idiosyncratic) or market associated (systematic) risks having standard 
deviations of 2.35% and 0.58% respectively; also, both risks have values which are 
bounded below by zero. The study, therefore, concluded that almost 40% of dividend 
disappearance (another term used the for propensity to pay) can be explained by 
risks. 
In cross-country evidence, Kuo, Philip, and Zhang (2013) confirmed that the 
propensity to pay dividend is mainly risk driven. Although in common law countries, 
the catering theory of dividend tends to offer an additional explanation. The catering 
evidence could be attributed to the legal system that prevails to the extent that 
investors enjoy better protection in common law countries than in civil law 
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countries. The finding is in accord with Ferris, Jayaraman, and Sabherwal (2009) and 
La Porta et al. (2000). However, Amihud and Li, (2006) suggested that the decline of 
the information content of dividend announcements could be a possible explanation 
for dividend disappearance. 
Fatemi and Bildik (2012), in a broader international sample, revealed that the 
disappearance of dividends is certain. The study noted that both the proportion of 
dividend-paying firms and the average dividend payout have declined over time. 
This led them to conclude that dividends have disappeared and that this issue is more 
prevalent in civil law economies than in common law economies. 
In an attempt to provide more light on the propensity to pay dividends, Baker and 
Wurgler (2004b) posited that the propensity to pay dividends in US markets 
increases when the dividend premium increases and the propensity to pay dividends 
become lower when the dividend premium decreases. Hence, the study concluded 
that the propensity to pay dividends is associated with catering incentives. Whereas, 
the study by Abdulkadir, Abdullah, and Wong (2014) based on the Nigerian market  
documented strong evidence that dividend premium is positively associated with 
decision to pay dividends among some listed financial firms. The study concluded 
that mangers in the financial sector of the market have responded to the demand of 
investors that attached more value to dividend paying shares. Similarly, Kim and 
Kim (2013) also noted the decrease of the propensity to pay dividends among 
Korean firms. They found that lifecycle provides an explanation regarding the 
decline in the likelihood of paying dividends in addition to other factors such as 
profitability, size systematic risk, investments and idiosyncratic risk.  
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From the governance perspective, the propensity to pay dividend decreases by 8.9% 
and 1.7% in response to antitakeover laws (Francis et al., 2011). For dividend payers, 
the result is like that of previous studies that affirmed firms that specific features 
drive the probability of paying dividends. Moreover, Francis et al. (2011) added that 
the probability of the paying dividends also declined with managerial shareholdings 
risk and taxation. 
Some authors have attributed an increase in dividends to a significant change in the 
US tax law in 2003, which reduced the individual tax rate on dividends substantially 
(Chetty & Saez, 2006, 2010; Grullon et al., 2011). On the other hand, Julio and 
Ikenberry (2004) attempted to examine whether cash dividend reappeared using US 
data. Their investigation showed that dividend reappeared and reached a level of 
more than 20% in 2004, after which it fell to lowest level of 15% in 2001. They 
concluded that the reappearance of the dividend was a result of tax cuts, the 
advancement in technology (internet era), the need by the lower-growth firms to 
communicate earnings quality to the market and lastly because of a firm‘s maturity. 
Chetty and Emmanuel (2005) and Skinner (2008) affirmed that the increase in 
dividends and repurchases since 2003 was related to taxation. Chetty and Emmanuel 
(2005) added that the strong responses by the firms was due to tax incentives of 
some class of owners that have influence on a firm and who benefited from the tax 
cut. Therefore, this lead to an increase in the number of firms paying dividends, in 
other words, referring to reappearance of dividend payment. Similarly, DeAngelo et 
al. (2004) also refuted the notion that dividends payout was declining as earlier 
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provided by Fama and French (2001) and supported the increase of the likelihood to 
pay dividends. 
Though tax cuts in the United States did motivate an upsurge in dividends, however, 
it re-emergence preceded the tax reduction policy in the US markets and cannot be 
the main explanation for the increase in the propensity to pay dividends (Bank, 
2007). For example, according to Poterba (2004) dividend pay outs rose by 39.4% in 
2000 and by 43% in 1993. Bank (2007) found this incidence was associated with 
other factors such as the cash holding of firms. The study argued that the cash 
holdings necessitate previous non-dividends payers to pay dividends because these 
firms have reached their maturity stage, which therefore, leads to an increase in the 
propensity to pay dividends. Consequently, cash holdings are among the leading 
explanations of the increased likelihood to pay dividends. Bank (2007) further 
insisted that a tax cut could only be a temporary issue to explain the propensity to 
pay dividends and, hence, may have a limited effect on dividend policy in the long 
run. 
Moreover, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2009) cast doubt on the declining of 
dividend payout among firms in the United States but insisted that dividends have 
been concentrated in a few individual firms. Their evidence showed that the dividend 
payers reduced in number due to categories of payers who were no longer paying 
dividends to shareholders, and, in contrast, many dividend payers have increased 
their current dividend payout ratios. Eije and Megginson (2008) examined the 
dividend pattern in the European Union and refuted Fama and French claims about 
the possible explanations regarding dividend policy. On one side, the study showed 
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support for the increase in the real dividends payout consistent with DeAngelo et al. 
(2009); on the other side, they revealed a decline on the number of dividend- paying 
firms. Denis and Osobov (2008) failed to find support for the disappearance of 
dividends. Their results indicated that aggregate dividends increased over the period 
of their study consistent with the findings of DeAngelo et al. (2004). Theoretically, 
the study is in line with life cycle and agency costs theories and failed to support 
catering and signalling theories. Conversely, these studies have concentrated in the 
US market and other developed markets little is known from the developing markets 
such as Nigerian. A close study of propensity to pay dividends is the one conducted 
by Abdulkadir et al. (2016). The study showed that the decline of dividends payout 
could be linked to foreign shareholders. The study further revealed that foreign 
shareholders preference for capital gains instead of dividend as a result of taxation is 
the primary reason for the decline in dividends. Hence, supporting the catering 
theory of dividends. 
2.6.1 Board Characteristics and the Propensity to Pay Dividends 
Besides a firm‘s specific factors including profitability, growth, size of the firm that 
may influence dividend policy, the board structures of firms may affect the corporate 
payout policy. According to Dhamadasa, Gamage, and Herath (2014) board 
characteristics have an impact on corporate policies as the board is viewed as a 
catalyst to various segments of a firm. Among others, board characteristics comprise 
board size, the fraction of non-executive and independent directors (Abdul Latif, 
Kamardin, Mohd, & CheAdam, 2013),  professional qualifications (Amran et al., 
2014) and board diversity in terms of gender. 
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The board of directors governs a firm, and primarily they have two essential 
functions: monitoring and advisory roles to the management. The monitoring role is 
stressed by the agency theory whereas the resource dependence theory emphasizes 
advisory functions (Daily et al., 2003). Bianco, Ciavarella, and Signoretti (2015) 
noted that the monitoring and advisory functions may be influenced by the 
characteristics of the board, and a well-functioning board may influence dividend 
policy. Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms (2016) found the presence of female 
directors on the board was positively related with dividend policy, and the presence 
of independent director also affects the payment of dividends (Yarram & Dollery, 
2015). However, Benjamin and Zain (2015) showed that board independence and 
dividend policy were negatively related. 
2.6.1.1 Board Size 
Board size refers to the number of directors sitting on the board (Kuan, Li, & Chu, 
2011; Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2007). Therefore, board size is defined as all 
members appointed to serve as directors irrespective of their status whether 
executive, non-executive, independent or affiliated directors. The NCCG 2011, 
provides that board size should not constitute less than five (5) members and with no 
upper limit. It is also clearly stated that the number of the non-executive should 
exceed that of executive directors.  
The directors on board are responsible for formulating policies for the company. 
They also monitor the entire activities of the managers on behalf of the shareholders 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) as well as provide resources to the firm (Hillman et al., 
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2000), including advice to the CEO and  linkages to the external environment 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Consequently, the board of directors shoulders 
tremendous responsibilities. 
The board of directors as noted in the literature has a fiduciary responsibility to 
guard and protect the shareholders (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010). That is 
board members acting on behalf of the shareholders of the company, will efficiently 
carry their primary responsibilities, which are monitoring the management and 
providing resources to the organization. Erickson, Park, Reising, and Shin (2005) 
noted that a duly constituted board should be able to drive the firm toward greater 
value. The board has to manage and control the management of the firm to maximize 
value for  the owners and its stakeholders (Kumar & Singh, 2013). Irrespective of the 
conferred responsibilities on the board of directors, a board must have a reasonable 
number of members to function effectively (Raheja, 2005). 
Previous studies have itemized three areas in which larger board size is found to be 
ineffective. These include the tendency to increase communication- and 
coordination-related problems; the inability to effect control measures on 
management, and the costs of poor decision making, which may arise because of free 
riding on the board (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Yermack, 1996).  
Therefore, some studies have suggested a relatively small board size, which is 
consistent with the work of Jensen (1993). 
Jensen (1993) argued that a small board tends to be better in monitoring the CEO 
and that it is less likely for the CEO to manipulate a smaller board and, therefore, he 
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shows a preference for a small board over a large one. The study further revealed 
that a large board may be exposed to coordination and communication problems. 
This idea is supported by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). In addition, Cheng (2008) 
suggested that much effort is required for a larger group to reach a consensus while 
taking a decision. In this regard, a small board moderates the extremity of board 
decisions in decision making. The study concluded that larger boards adversely 
affected corporate performance variability. 
However, the proponents of a larger board are of the view that it enables a firm to 
have a greater number of experienced directors that can enhance shareholder value. 
According to Certo (2003), firms having larger boards will probably include more 
prestigious directors. Along this line, de Villiers et al. (2011) showed that a larger 
board has a significant and positive effect on total environmental strengths. The 
benefits of a larger board size are numerous. Dalton et al. (1999) highlighted some of 
these benefits in that a larger board size brings into firm more experienced and 
knowledgeable directors, secures critical resources required by the company, and 
leads to efficient capital acquisition. 
Nakano and Nguyen (2012) revealed evidence indicating that a larger board size 
reduces performance variability and is associated with a lower bankruptcy risk. 
Chang and Dutta (2012) concluded that shareholders received a higher dividend 
when the board size is large.   
Given these divergent views about board size, it is conceded that board size should 
be determined by the relative needs of the firm because one size does not fit all.  
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Coles et al. (2008) lent support to this argument. They found board size to be non-
linear with Tobin‘s Q and suggested that board size is determined by the complexity 
of a firm‘s operations. Similarly, Xie and Fukumoto (2013) also revealed a non-
linear association between board size and firm performance. The study, therefore, 
supported the findings of previous evidence that the size of the board is a function of 
a firm‘s operations. Consequently, corporate governance researchers have linked 
board size with a variety of corporate issues that such as CEO turnover (Ishak, 
Ismail, & Abdullah, 2012), firm value (Kumar & Singh, 2013), firm performance 
(Kumar & Singh, 2013), voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain, & 
Yao, 2009) and dividend policy (Chang & Dutta, 2012).  
Chen, Lin, and Yong-cheol (2011) analyzed the propensity to pay dividends in 
Chinese listed companies. The study found that board size had a significant impact in 
determining the propensity of the companies for paying a cash dividend. The finding 
is in line with Officer (2006) and Boumosleh and Cline (2015) who indicated that, 
when the size of the board is large, a firm shows a higher likelihood of paying 
dividends. In a recent evidence from Turkish firms, Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan 
(2016) examined board size and the propensity to pay dividends from 2003 through 
2012 using unbalance panel data. Consistent with the prediction, the study indicates 
a strong positive relationship between board size and the likelihood of a firm to pay 
dividends. These findings were also observed by other studies such as Prasanna 
(2014)  and  Iqbal (2013) from India and Pakistan respectively. These studies 
indicate that firms with large boards have a higher likelihood to pay dividends than 
those with smaller boards. 
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Similarly, Gill and Obradovich (2012), using US data confirmed the findings by 
documenting a positive association between board size and dividend payout. An 
examination of variables comprising board size and board independence are recorded 
in the study (Mansourinia, Emamgholipour, Rekabdarkolaei, & Hozoori, 2013). The 
study employed 140 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2006-
2010 and found a significant and positive influence of board size on dividend policy. 
They concluded that dividend payout policy is a good mechanism to align the 
interests of shareholders with those of directors by extracting more dividends from 
the firm. 
This result is also observed by Bokpin (2011) who identified a significant and 
positive relationship between board size and dividend pay outs in Ghana. Similarly, 
Abor and Fiador (2013) posited that companies in Kenya and South Africa pay 
higher dividends when having larger board size. The study suggested that high 
dividend payout in Kenya and South Africa were because of good corporate 
governance that tends to ease the access and relatively costs of external debts. 
Moreover, a direct correlation between board size and dividend was documented by 
Uwalomwa, Olamide, and Francis (2015) who determined that board size had a 
positive and significant effect on dividend payout in listed Nigerian firms. The study 
had fifty sample firms between 2006 and 2011. They concluded that the higher the 
number of board members, the higher the payout, which reduced the potentiality of 
agency problems. 
Using linear regression, Shabbir, Tahir, and Akbar (2014) found a strong and 
positive association between board size and dividend payout among 45 non-financial 
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firms from Pakistan. Similarly, using pool data of listed firms from the Tehran Stock 
Exchange, Aazam and Vali (2014) confirmed the previous findings that board size 
had a significant and positive effect on dividend pay outs. The result also supported 
the findings of Soliman (2013) who reported that board size of listed firms in Saudi 
Arabia had a positive impact on dividend policy. Nuhu (2014) examined 30 listed 
companies in Ghana to find out the determinants of dividend policy in the country 
from 2000-2009. The study measured board size as the logarithm of the number of 
board of directors and concluded that a higher dividend payout is associated with an 
increase in the size of the board. 
Jiraporn and Ning (2006) investigated corporate dividends and the strength of 
shareholder rights. They showed that board size and dividend pay outs were 
consistently positive and significant. Therefore, the study suggested that this 
relationship was an indication that the sampled firms had weak governance 
structures and therefore paid dividend generously. 
Conversely, some authors have argued that having a larger board is associated with a 
free riding problem, and the board becomes more symbolic and less functional 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Jensen, 1993; Wu, 2000). Therefore, a larger board is 
interpreted as a sign of weak governance. Chang and Dutta (2012) from Canada 
showed that firms with a larger board size favour higher dividend payout. The study 
concluded that countries with weak shareholder protection pay dividends to 
safeguard their reputations as previously documented (La Porta et al., 2000). 
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Studying dividend patterns has been also extended to family enterprises. Roy (2015) 
examined some board structures variables in family and non-family firms. The study 
showed that the size of the board is positively and significantly related to dividend 
policy in both family and non-family run companies in India. Studies show that level 
of dividend paid to shareholders by family-controlled firms is a bit higher compared 
to non-family controlled firms. Kuan et al. (2011) showed that, on average, the 
dividend payout of family-controlled firms is higher than of non-family controlled 
firms. 
The debate about whether board size has an impact on dividend policy has another 
dimension in that some authors have reported negative or insignificant results. 
Subramaniam and Devi (2011) and Alias, Rahim, Nor and Hasimi (2014) 
documented the negative and significant relationship between the size of the board 
and dividend policy. They concluded that dividend payout is lower for companies 
having larger boards. Supporting this is the evidence advanced by Abor and Fiador 
(2013) who studied sub-Saharan Africa and found sufficient evidence from the listed 
Nigerian firms that board size and dividends payout are negatively related. This 
finding contradicts the study conducted by Uwalomwa et al. (2015) which indicated 
that board size and dividend payout were positively related. Subramaniam et al. 
(2014) tested the dividend policy of the top market capitalized companies listed on 
the Bursa Malaysia. The result indicated that dividend payout is significant and 
negatively associated with the board size of firms. 
In the Australian context, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) analyzed the effect of board size 
on dividends during the period from 2000 to 2005. Contrary to its proposition, the 
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study failed to find any significant association between board size and dividend 
policy. Similar evidence was documented from Egypt by Abdelsalam et al. (2008) 
while examining dividend policy of Egyptian top listed companies using pooled 
cross-sectional observations. Also, Arshad, Akram, Amjad and Muhammad (2013) 
found an insignificant association between board size and dividend policy in the 
Karachi Stock Exchange while investigating the information, communication and 
transport services sectors of the market spanning from 2007-2011.  
In addition to the above evidence and in line with these findings, Prasanna (2014) 
who investigated 176 firm listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange market in India also 
failed to find that dividend decisions were positively associated with board size. 
Likewise, Ahmad et al. (2015) in their analysis using firms listed in the NSE during 
2008-2012, documented an insignificant relationship between board size and 
dividend payout. 
It is quite interesting that efforts have been made to understand the connection 
between dividend policy and board size. However, a need still exists for further 
investigation due of the mixed findings of previous studies. 
2.6.1.2 Board Composition 
Scholars have put forward different ways in which board composition can be 
defined, and the measurements could reach up to twenty ways (Dalton et al. (1999). 
However, in the corporate governance research the most commonly used 
measurement is considering the composition of the board by means of inside or 
outside directors. Some authors view board composition as the ratio or percentage of 
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inside directors (executive directors) on the board compared to the ratio of outside 
directors. Still others have defined board composition as the proposition or ratio of 
outside directors (non-executive directors) on the board (de Andres, Azofra, & 
Lopez, 2005). 
It is important to dwell on the concepts of board composition. First, the inside 
directors are those who are appointed to serve the board and, at the same time, they 
are part of the management of the firm. These category of directors, therefore, are 
believed to possess more inside information than any other directors (de Andres et 
al., 2005). Despite the superior knowledge on the affairs of the firm, they may 
aggravate agency costs by acting contrary to the interest of the shareholders (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). 
Second, outside directors may refer to as directors who independent with no direct or 
indirect relationship with the management or having significant interest in the 
corporation. Affiliated directors can be either inside and outside directors. They are 
more independent relative to inside directors because their employment is not 
directly linked to the company they serve as directors. Conversely, this category of 
directors (affiliated directors) has personal interest in the firm that ranges from 
financial or other forms of relationship with a firm‘s executives (Ellstrand, Tihanyi, 
& Johnson, 2002). Another type of director is the unaffiliated director. An 
unaffiliated director refers to those directors on the board who have no other 
connections with the firm or its executives and do not have the full status of an 
independent director (Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007). When 
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compared to an inside director or the management, affiliated directors are closely 
related to the independent directors. 
The objective of this categorization could be to preserve the independence of these 
directors thereby reducing the agency costs and making them to be truly 
independent. However, ascertaining whether an outside or affiliated director is truly 
independent despite the availability of the information related to them is difficult (de 
Andres et al., 2005). This is at the developed market level where there is reasonable 
degree of transparency and a free flow of information. Coming down to the emerging 
economies such as Nigeria, the available information may not grant further 
classification of the board of directors apart from an executive (insider) and a non-
executive (outsider) director. 
Therefore, in the context of this study, board composition simply refers to the 
proportion of non-executive directors to the total directors. This proportion of 
directors provides a signal that a board is free to carry out its activities independently 
and that the board is well constituted with non-executive directors as required by the 
law. Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian (2002) and Choi, Park, and Yoo (2007) are 
among the previous studies that also identified external board members as outside 
directors. 
The outside directors are an integral part of the board. This is because of their level 
of knowledge, experience and their independence from the management team 
(Abdelsalam et al., 2008). Therefore, their presence on a company‘s board become 
very crucial. Moreover, the role of outside directors, especially in terms of 
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monitoring, has become a topical issue because of the global corporate scandals. 
Particularly, the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States has drawn 
the attention of other countries around the world to incorporate and place more 
emphasis on outside directors serving on the board. Besides, many corporate codes 
of governance stipulate the number of outside directors that are supposed to be on 
the board. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States mandated all 
companies have a majority of board members from the outside known as the 
independent directors (Sharma, 2011). Similarly, in the Netherlands and Australia, 
the majority of the board is required to be independent directors. In the United 
Kingdom, France and Czech Republic, the codes stipulate that one-third to one half 
of the directors must be independent. 
In comparison to the mentioned countries above, NCCG provides that at least one of 
the board members must be independent and pointed out categorically that the 
majority of the board members should be from outside the firm. Probably, because of 
the cost of hiring independent directors, firms might prefer to the maintain minimum 
requirements. In a nutshell, the logic behind an outside director (independent, 
affiliate or unaffiliated director) is monitoring and providing resources to the firm 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Alternatively, dividend policy may serve as tool to control the managers against any 
self-pursued goal within the context of the firm. This is done by exposing firms to 
the capital market wherein the managers are then scrutinized. Dividend policy may 
act as a substitute or complement for a monitoring mechanism where the non-
executive directors exhibit their effectiveness (substitute) and otherwise 
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(complement) in discharging their roles in the firm (Abdelsalam et al., 2008). A lack 
of a sufficient monitoring role by the non-executive directors may therefore require a 
higher dividend payout by a company that can complement  the other tools and vice 
versa (Farinha, 2003). 
Empirical evidence on the association between the propensity to pay dividends is 
relatively scant. Hu and Kumar (2004) pioneered the examination of the association 
between outside director on the board and the propensity to pay dividends. The study 
found that outside directors on board have a positive and strong influence on the 
propensity to pay dividends. The study posited that outside directors who reached a 
40% threshold of the board effectively affected the likelihood of paying dividends.   
Furthermore,  Sharma (2011) also explored this relationship from the United States 
market in a correctional analysis. The study revealed that a board with greater 
independence was positively and significantly associated with the propensity to pay 
dividends. Similarly, Prasanna (2014) and Boumosleh and Cline (2015) also showed 
support to previous evidence that, when a board has a greater percentage of outside 
directors, the firm is more likely to pay dividends. Likewise Chen et al. (2011) also 
provided strong evidence supporting the positive association between board 
composition and the likelihood of dividend payment among firms in Australia and 
China respectively. More recently, Idris, Ishak, and Hassan (2017)  indicated that 
outside directors from the non-financial listed firms in Nigeria exhibited a higher 
likelihood of paying dividends. 
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On the association between board composition and dividend payout, Abor and 
Fiador (2013) investigated the effects of corporate governance on dividend policy in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The sample countries employed were South Africa, Nigeria, 
Ghana and Kenya for the period of 1997 to 2006, using simultaneous panel data 
regression analysis. The results showed that board composition had positive and 
significant effect on dividend payout on companies in Ghana and Kenya. For the 
Nigerian companies, the results were statistically significant but negatively related 
(Abor & Fiador, 2013). In a study conducted by Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) in 
Canada, they found that board composition was positively and significantly related 
to dividend policy. 
Yarram and Dollery (2015) attempted to provide evidence on the role of independent 
directors on dividend policy. They showed that dividends were positively and 
significantly correlated. The finding was in agreement with La Porta et al.'s (2000) 
hypothesis and also in line with previous studies (Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski, & Skully, 
2009; Setia-Atmaja, 2010). They documented a positive effect of independent 
directors on dividends in family-controlled firms. Therefore, the findings suggested a 
complementary role of independent directors and dividend payout when it comes to 
monitoring the managers.  Interesting,  Yarram and Dollery (2015) addressed the 
possible effects of global financial crises; however, the study failed to take into 
account the possibility of endogeneity effect. 
Belden, Fister, and Knapp (2005) found that firms with higher number of outside 
directors serving on boards pay more dividends. The result validated the earlier 
findings of Schellenger, Wood, and Tashakori (1989) who measured the composition 
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of the board as the number outside directors to the total number of the company‘s 
board of directors. The study examined a hypothesis on whether outside directors are 
associated with firms‘ dividend policy and found a strong positive relationship 
between outside directors and payout policy. However, it failed to support the 
substitution hypothesis of dividend policy. 
Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) focused on Hong Kong firms during the 
period from 1995 to 1998 and revealed a positive association between non-executive 
directors and dividend payout measured by total dividend divided by net profit in 
companies controlled by family members. The result was only significant for firms 
with a relatively lower market capitalization. This implies that for firms with higher 
market capitalization the evidence may not hold. The above findings, however, failed 
to consider the possibility of the endogeneity effect among the variables, for 
example, dividends, debt, board structures variables. 
Sawicki (2009) examined the relationship of corporate governance and dividends in 
five East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) over the period from 1994 to 2003. The study compared the outcome and 
substitute models at the same time before and after the Asian crises in those 
countries. Evidence showed that the relationship between governance and dividend 
payout during the pre-crises was insignificant. Unlike the pre-crises regime, the post-
crises indicated a strong positive association between governance and dividends. The 
evidence clearly revealed how the implementation of good governance practices 
affects dividends. This also confirmed the importance of both country-level and 
firm-level governance to dividends. However, the author noted that greater board 
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independence is among the key factors that results in corporate governance 
improvement and, in turn, affects dividends. 
Using data of listed food and beverage firms from the Nigerian Market,  Ahmad et 
al. (2015) showed that the presence of non-executive directors was related to 
dividend policy positively. Even though the study found such a relationship, the data 
were not enough to make a generalization as it may suffer from a small effect. In a 
related study from the same country, Uwalomwa et al. (2015) revealed a positive and 
significant association between dividend payout and board independence. Board 
independence was measured as the presence of non-executive directors on the board 
of 10 listed companies on the NSE. The result is consistent with Ranti (2013). The 
result may not be surprising as the study failed to account for the possible effect of 
the structural changes that took place during the period as well as the financial 
meltdown to which Nigeria was not an exception. In addition to the above studies, a 
strand of studies exists that either found a negative or no association between non-
executive directors and dividend policy. 
Benjamin and Zain (2015) analyzed 114 companies spanning the years from 2002 to 
2008 with the goal of investigating the role of corporate governance features in 
controlling agency problems. The results of the study indicated a negative and 
significant association between board independence and dividends, which was 
consistent with the substitution hypothesis that corporate governance and dividend 
policy in Malaysia are substitutes in addressing agency problems. The findings 
corroborated the results of study of Leng (2007) and Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009) 
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that non-executive directors were negatively related with dividend payout in 
Malaysian and United Kingdom markets respectively. 
Moreover, Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, and Kehr (2005) who analysed the 
independent directors and dividend policy using sample firms from the United States 
found independent directors on board were negatively related to dividend payout. 
This implies that all other things being equal, companies with a higher number of 
outside directors on their boards tend to pay lower dividends. Therefore, dividend 
payout serves as a substitute for outside directors on the board supporting the 
substitution hypothesis of  La Porta et al. (2000). 
Conversely, Subramaniam and Devi (2011) failed to establish strong evidence on the 
association between board composition and dividend policy using Malaysian data 
with a final sample of 409 companies drawn from OSIRIS and BANKSCOPE from 
2004 to 2006. Similarly, Abdelsalam et al. (2008) also revealed no significant 
relationship between board composition and dividend policy using top Egyptian 
companies during the period from 2003 to 2005. Mansourinia, Emamgholipour, 
Rekabdarkolaei, and Hozoori (2013) investigated the role of board independence on 
dividend policy in the Iranian market and found no sufficient evidence on how 
independent directors influence dividend policy. 
Additionally, Subramaniam, Suppiah, and Shaiban (2014) employed a sample of the 
most capitalized firms from the Malaysian market and found no association between 
board composition and dividend policy. Similar evidence was also revealed by Tahir, 
Aslam, and Akhtar (2014) from Pakistan who found that board independence was 
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statistically insignificant.  In the same vein, a study from Saudi Arabia by Soliman 
(2013) also reported an insignificant relationship between board composition and 
dividend policy. This evidence conforms with Cotter and Silvester's (2003) study 
from Australia that board independence and dividend payout did not have any 
significant association. They found that, although they were positively related, the 
relationship was insignificant. The studies may lack generalizability due to sampling 
bias. 
2.6.1.3 Board Diversity 
Kang, Cheng, and Gray (2007) said that board diversity means a multiplicity of the 
composition of directors present on a board. Diversity of the board is indicated in 
two ways. First is the apparent difference that is readily seen in the directors. 
Indicators of this aspect of diversity are gender, age ethnic or cultural background 
and nationality. Second is a less visible form of diversity. Indicators of this aspect 
are education, professional, industry expertise and organizational membership (Kang 
et al., 2007). 
Board diversity is best seen as a good avenue when values are enhanced in achieving 
individually established objectives. This enhancement can range from a clear view of 
the marketplace, to an increase in creativity, to the promotion of innovative ideas and 
consequently to better capabilities in problem-solving (Carter, D‘Souza, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2010). Additionally, a diverse board with individual from different 
backgrounds facilitates global linkages particularly outside the entity and offers 
some degree of independence. Because the personalities of individuals may differ 
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according to gender, ethnicity and cultural origins, which may allow them to ask 
critical questions that would not emerge from directors having similar backgrounds 
(Kang et al., 2007). Furthermore, the inquisitive nature of the female directors might 
make managers avoid self-pursuing objectives that are not aligned with the interests 
of shareholders. 
Gender diversity reflects the existence of female in a group that males dominate. 
Males in most cases have been seen to have significant numbers in various entities, 
professions and, in general, the political structure of a country. For the purposes of 
this study, gender diversity refers to the presence of at least one female director on a 
firm‘s board. Many corporate governance codes around the world, for example, 
France, Germany, Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria, have recommended or made 
provisions for the availability of female director on the board (Mordi & Obanya, 
2014). This provision is aimed at exploring the talents of the females, their views and 
perceptions and contributions toward achieving organizational goals. 
In this regard, studying diversity in connection with gender may yield fruitful 
outcomes to corporate bodies particularly as the contributions of females in 
corporate performance are becoming noticeable globally. Carter et al. (2010) 
indicated a link between gender diversity and higher performance. Moreover, 
because of the new ideas that may emerge from their presence, women on boards, 
according to Adams and Ferreira (2009), influence the performance of firms more in 
weak corporate governance settings. Additionally, female directors on board is 
worthwhile in other areas such as attitudes towards tax (Huseynov & Klamm, 2012) 
less tendencies for tax evasion (Kastlunger, Dressler, Kirchler, Mittone, & Voracek, 
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2010), firm performance (Amran et al., 2014), stock market valuation (Ntim, 2013), 
board monitoring (Kamardin, AbdulLatif, Mohd, & Adam, 2014) and the 
enhancement of shareholders‘ value (Nguyen & Faff, 2007). Moreover, gender 
diversity is also important in corporate payout policy (Florackis et al., 2015; 
Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2016). 
The benefit of females on the board has been noted as they contribute immensely to 
the decisions taken by a board and in other corporate actions (Pucheta-Martínez & 
Bel-Oms, 2016). Despite the potentially significant role of female directors serving 
on a board few studies have tested their relationship with corporate payout policy. 
Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms (2016) investigated dividend policy and gender 
diversity on board using data from Spanish firms. The study found that women 
directors on a board strongly affected the decision to pay dividends and concluded 
that gender diversity influences a firm‘s overall dividend policy. 
Moreover, Byoun, Chang, and Kim (2016) examined the effect of gender and non-
gender diverse board on dividend payout. The results indicated that a gender diverse 
board is associated with higher dividend payout. The study also noted that gender 
diversity is likely to offer a solution for companies that are much-exposed to agency 
problems. The study is in line with Al-Rahahleh (2017) who found evidence that 
having females on the board tends to reduce agency conflict by paying more 
dividends in Jordanian firms. Therefore, this provided support to the argument 
advanced by Adams and Ferreira (2009) that gender diversity is important in 
monitoring the opportunistic behavior of the managers and in having distinctive idea 
to facilitate strategic decision making (Carter et al., 2010). Thus, a board with gender 
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diversity provides better and closer understanding of a firm‘s internal and external 
environments and minimizes uninformed decisions (Byoun et al., 2016). 
In addition to the above studies, Wellalage, Fauzi, and Wang (2012) hypothesized 
that an increase of female directors on a board is associated with higher dividends. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, the study revealed that female directors influence 
cash dividend payout in companies characterized with larger boards and highly 
profitable. Likewise, the results supported the recent findings documented by Byoun 
et al. (2016) that corporate cash dividends become higher with the presence of 
female directors on the board. From the above findings, the deduction can be made 
that aligning the interests of managers with shareholders is not merely a function that 
male directors on the board alone can play, but that female directors can also play a 
similar role in firms. The finding is also in line with Florackis et al. (2015) who 
revealed significant and positive association between dividend and the proportion of 
female directors on the board. 
Examining the effect of gender diversity among the board members on corporate 
actions has also extended to the gender status of the CEO. McGuinness, Lam, and 
Vieito (2015) used Chinese firms to investigate the impacts of female gender on 
dividend payout. They posited that a female manager weakens the tendency of cash 
distribution. In support of their argument, the study found that the level of dividend 
payout did not change with a female being the CEO of a firm. Also, the study 
revealed that an inverse correlation existed between having two or more female 
directors on a board and dividend policy. The authors argued that the evidence could 
be the result of the financial knowledge exhibited by female directors on the board 
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that could be like that of male directors. Moreover, Jurkus, Park, and Woodard 
(2011) indicated that gender diversity has a strong inverse association with dividend 
payout suggesting that studies on gender diversity should consider controlling for 
endogeneity as it poses threat to the validity of the results. 
However, Hamzah and Zulkafli (2014) documented no relationship between females 
on a board and dividend payout. The argument could be made that the insignificant 
results may be the function of a measurement error or due to the limited number of 
the female directors on boards of the firms used during the investigations. From this 
review, it is unclear whether having female directors on board influences propensity 
to pay dividends in Nigeria. The next section discusses financial experts on board. 
2.6.1.4 Financial Expertise on Board 
The board of directors is the topmost body that oversees the affairs of firms. They 
design the policies of the company in addition to monitoring and proving linkages to 
acquire resources that may benefit a firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Businesses 
make selections for board membership in accordance with their needs, and individual 
directors on the board are expected to have vast experience in their professions. 
From an academic view, Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) defined financial 
experts as those persons in the position of treasurer, chief financial officers, banking, 
finance, investment or accounting. In terms of financial reporting and governance, 
Cunningham (2008) considered financial experts to belong to any of these three 
classes, namely, individuals who have a strong accounting background, non-
accounting financial experts and non-financial experts. 
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Financial expertise and its related occupations of finance, analysts, and investment 
bankers, among others are of paramount importance to a firm. They contribute 
greatly to the policies relating to finance and investments. Companies require funds 
to finance their operations and, in the event of having an excess, they may likely 
invest that excess on projects that may yield better returns. Experts in the financial 
and its related field are needed to appraise investment and financially related issues. 
A growth in demand for experts was witnessed after the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2009). Besides, successful firms normally have 
robust financial planning to withstand challenging times. Other advantages of 
financial experts on a board include ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
board (Minton, Taillard, & Williamson, 2014) and appraising and accessing risk-
related information, which, when ignored, may endanger a firm‘s survival (Harris & 
Raviv, 2008). 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) asserted that board members should provide firms with 
monitoring and resource provision services. In specific terms, firms may benefit 
from the services of expert directors based on their unique features and environment 
(de Villiers et al., 2011). For example, a government-dependent firm may hire 
directors with political skills (Hillman, 2005). Similarly, a dependency on external 
funding will lead a firm to recruit directors with such expertise. Likewise, having 
international investments will necessitate firms to have global experts as board 
members (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). In general, while firms need certain experts 
to discharge a particular role, financial experts are required across all firms because 
they transact or carryout their operations with a legal tender (money). Expertise has 
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been found to be worthwhile in a number of accounting, finance and governance 
literature. 
Previous literature has linked financial expertise with a variety of factors, but 
specifically, in areas related to control and financing decisions. Defond, Hann, 
Xuesong, and Engel (2005) noted that the market reacts favorably to the appointment 
of directors with pure accounting expertise. A board of directors typically considers 
financial experts first and then others when appointing audit committee members 
(Iyer, Bamber, & Griffin, 2012), and financial experts are important in addressing 
conflicts and acting in accordance the interests of shareholders (Güner, Malmendier, 
& Tate, 2008). In the area of earnings management, financial expertise on an audit 
committee tends to reduce the likelihood of aggressive accounting (Cunningham, 
2008; Kibiya et al., 2016). Firms tend to show better outcomes as a result of having 
experts with relevant experience on the board (Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008). 
Consequently, having experts on a board may be associated a firm‘s outcomes such 
as performance and better investor protection because the corporation will benefit 
from the services of these experts in various capacities including access to lower 
costs of capital. 
The proponents of the resource dependence theory have asserted that directors who 
are professional, are rich in human capital resources and are experts in their areas or 
have long-term experience tend to offer incredible and relevant information and 
better advice to the firms (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) and to the CEO as well (Chris 
Florackis & Sainani, 2016). Therefore, drawing from the resource dependent tenets, 
the presence of financial experts on a board may significantly impact a firm‘s 
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financial policies. Linck et al. (2009) claimed that financial experts are among the 
scarce individuals for appointment as a director. This is because they offer 
professional advice to the firm regarding  issues relating to financial policies 
(Custodio & Metzger, 2014). 
Financial experts are adept when it comes handling finance and investment matters. 
They can raise funds more easily even when credit terms are rigid (Custodio & 
Metzger, 2014). Their expertise in financially related issues provides them with 
high-level technicalities in such a way that the sensitivity of cash flow as a function 
of firm investment may not be a concern. Güner et al. (2008) offered strong support 
for the argument that a firm with a financial expert on the board experiences a 
reduction of investment sensitivity to cash flow. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) noted that financial experts dedicate large parts of their 
time in advising a firm. Firms with financial experts tend to hold little cash. Bates, 
Kahle, and Stulz (2009) noted that cash holding by firms is because of unforeseen 
events in the future. Based the numerous advantages mentioned above that relate to 
financing and control, it is likely, that firms with a financial expert on board may pay 
higher dividends than those without these experts on board. In line with this view, 
Custodio and Metzger (2014) found strong evidence that a financial expert who is 
also a CEO is related to dividend payout positively. 
2.6.1.5 CEO Tenure 
Tenure refers to the period which a CEO serves and is counted in years or in months 
(Abor, 2007; Güner et al., 2008; Ishak, Ku Ismail, et al., 2012). From the agency 
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view, longer tenure may provide the CEO with an opportunity to become entrenched. 
An entrenched CEO is considered to be powerful in the sense that he/she may 
influence the selection process of his successor or the appointment of new directors 
(Daily et al., 2003) and could make outside directors less effective, thus resulting in 
a rubber stamp for the decisions of the CEO (Burress & Cook, 2010). However, 
Cheng, Chan, and Leung (2010) argued that the greater the tenure of  CEO the 
higher the familiarity and greater task knowledge the CEO may possess in a firm. 
Thus, this provides him with vast knowledge in corporate strategies.  Conversely, 
Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) refuted that notion by revealing that the longer the 
tenure of CEO the less changes will be expected in corporate strategy. 
Tenure forms part of the metrics measuring CEO power or attributes of an 
entrenched CEOs and has been linked to dividend policy by previous studies 
(Boumosleh, 2012; Feng, Ghosh, & Sirmans, 2007; Sharma, 2011).  Feng et al. 
(2007) investigated entrenched CEOs in the real estate investment trusts (REITs) 
using an index comprising CEO tenure and duality. The study found a positive and 
significant association between entrenched CEOs and dividend payout in the firms 
that do not have a CEO nomination committee. On the other hand, the influence of 
the CEOs in firms having a nomination committee is less.  Thus, this supports the 
view that entrenched CEOs use dividends to circumvent the possibility of 
shareholder sanctions as well as a threat of takeover. Even though he/she may 
circumvent shareholder sanctions he/she will be monitored by the market particularly 
when the need for funds arises. Along this line, Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2009) 
indicated that companies having entrenched managers may rely more on dividends to 
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mitigate agency costs than those companies without entrenched manager.  The result 
suggests that entrenched CEOs could be monitored more by the market because 
dividends paid to shareholders reduce the level of available cash (Jensen, 1986). 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) contended that dividend payout functions as metric for 
the quality managerial decisions and is a representation of performance and effective 
monitoring in real estate investment trusts (REIT) in the United States. The study 
showed that CEO tenure was positive and significantly correlated with dividend 
payout. The findings is also consistent with Feng et al. (2007) who documented that 
entrenched CEOs measured by tenure and duality have an impact on dividend policy, 
and CEOs pay a higher dividend as a mechanism for antitakeover threat and for 
evading shareholder sanctions. Lee, Chiu, Lee, Chiang, and Slawson, (2010) 
documented that in the REIT industry, firms with greater information asymmetry 
tend to pay higher dividends, and the results lend credence to agency and signaling 
theory. Strong firms with managerial power are associated with paying higher 
dividends (Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008). It is also revealed that a staggered 
board1 pays higher dividends because a CEO may be more entrenched (Jiraporn & 
Chintrakarn, 2009). 
Hu and Kumar (2004) examined the likelihood of dividend payment between 1992 
and 2000. They reported that longer tenured CEOs and the likelihood to pay 
dividends were positively related. Thus, suggesting that the longer the CEOs stays in 
                                                     
1 A staggered board as opposed to unitary board classifies the board of directors into a maximum of 





the position, the greater the probability of a firm paying dividends. Similarly, Jo and 
Pan (2009) reported that entrenched managers have a higher probability for paying 
dividends, and the dividends tend to persist over a period of time. Studies such as 
Feng et al. (2007) and  Hu and Kumar (2004) also supported the substitution 
hypothesis that firms with weak corporate governance practices pay higher 
dividends. Consistent with this notion, John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2015) 
revealed that a combination of debt and dividend commitments or dividend 
superseded the use of debt only for firms with weak corporate governance practices. 
McGuinness et al., (2015) concluded that a strong positive relationship existed 
between dividend and CEO tenure. Hence, supporting the previous findings. 
In contrast, Boumosleh (2012) examined the influence of CEO tenure and dividend 
policy during the period from 1995 to 2006. The results indicated a negative 
association between CEOs tenure and dividend payout, which revealed that a longer 
tenured CEOs tended to exact influence on a firm‘s financial policies, which led to 
less payment of dividends. The result is also in line with recent finding (Boumosleh 
& Cline, 2015). However, other studies have found weak evidence regarding CEO 
tenue and dividend payout. Sharma (2011) tested conducted a study on the firms 
listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ markets. The study found a weak and negative 





2.6.1.6 Summary of Literature Review on Board Characteristics 
Based on the previous review, a summary of the empirical evidence is offered below. 
Table 2.1  
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2.7 Ownership Structures 
Lazarides, Drimpetas, and Dimitrios (2009) claimed that ownership structures affect 
both the financial and the non-financial decision making processes and significantly 
contributes to the managing and mitigating of agency problems (Sun, Ding, Guo, & 
Li, 2015). The ownership structure could either be concentrated or dispersed 
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otherwise called diffused. In a concentrated setting, the shares are held in the hands 
of few individuals with a large control of the firm affairs. The concentrated 
ownership is very active in the governance of the firm because they have incentives 
to monitor the management so as to achieve their objectives such as the 
maximization of shareholders‘ wealth (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999). In this regard, the prevailing agency problem may be associated with 
protecting the minority from any expropriation expected by the majority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). 
The second category of the ownership structure is dispersed or diffused ownership. 
In a dispersed set up, Lazarides et al. (2009) posited that shareholders have either 
limited or no incentive to monitor the managers thus allowing the managers to fully 
control the firm. This enables managers (agents) to control significantly the affairs of 
the firms. This situation may give rise to an agency problem, which exists between 
the owners and the agents. However, the only source of protection for shareholders 
that is obtainable is through the legal system. If the legal system is weak, this will 
give rise to a higher degree of expropriating the rights of shareholders in different 
ways. Therefore, the ownership structure of a firm should not be ignored. This is so 
because it is among the focal points of corporate governance and determined by the 
development of the stock market and state regulatory intervention (La Porta, Lopez-
De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishn, 1998).  This study incorporates particular structures 




This section discusses the conceptual and empirical evidence on ownership structure 
variables as they relate to dividend payout policy. These variables are foreign, 
managerial and blockholders ownership. These variables are selected based on the 
premise that previous studies such as Adenikinju (2012) and Sanda et al. (2010) have 
demonstrated their relevance to the Nigerian market. Adenikinju (2012) argued that 
the structure of ownership of a firm in the country has an important effect on the 
capability of firms to react to external factors interrupting its performance, thus, 
influencing other corporate outcomes such as dividend payout. He also added that 
ownership structure is one of the internal factors that have a direct bearing on the 
firms. Furthermore, foreign, managerial and blockholders ownership may have 
significant influence, but have received less attention in the propensity-to-pay 
dividend literature and in particularly from the Nigerian context (Abdulkadir, 2015; 
Adenikinju, 2012). 
2.7.1 Foreign Ownership 
Foreign ownership is seen as the involvement of non-nationals in the ownership 
structure of a company (Tsegba & Herbert, 2013) and represents the amount of 
holdings of non-nationals in firms. Foreign ownership according to Yoshikawa and 
Rasheed (2010) is the ratio of shares held by foreign owners on the total outstanding 
shares of a firm. These definitions are centered on corporations that seek financial 
returns and exclude other strategic foreign corporations. 
The separation of ownership and control give rise to the necessity for monitoring. 
Foreign ownership is believed to have the expertise to aid in monitoring insiders 
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(Abor & Biekpe, 2007). Other benefits such as cost of capital minimization can be 
sourced from the foreign ownership. Consequently, having larger holdings of foreign 
ownership is an added advantage to the firm to prosper. The foreign investors may 
be accompanied with advancements in technology that may likely be transferred to 
the firm (Pucheta-Martínez & López-Zamora, 2017). Prior literature has highlighted 
that having foreign investors may reduce agency costs (Jeon et al., 2011). 
Foreign ownership can be seen an effective mechanism to complement the current 
governance structure to monitor the management about non-value maximizing 
activities (Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001). Companies with foreign ownership may 
be more likely to institute better internal control measures relating to auditing (Abor 
& Biekpe, 2007),  to increase profitability and to reduce dividends (Yoshikawa & 
Rasheed, 2010). Hence, the presence of foreign ownership is important to a firm. 
Nigerian market like other developing markets has attracted the inflow of foreign 
investors. The literature surrounding foreign ownership and dividends is centered on 
how this type of investor influences corporate payout policy given their 
shareholdings  (Abdulkadir et al., 2016). 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010) opined that the influence of foreign owners may 
depend on the type of the firm. In matured and larger firms, foreign investors, may 
probably require more dividends, and this results in the indirect monitoring of 
management and information asymmetry (Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001). 
Conversely, in some small and growing firms such as Over-The-Counter (OTC) 
firms, the motives may change and the preference is for capital growth thus, 
indicating a negative relationship with dividends. Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2010) 
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contended that factors such as repatriating dividend income, transaction costs for 
reinvesting the dividends, and taxation treatment may have an effect on foreign 
owners, thus, influencing dividend payout. 
The relationship between foreign ownership and dividend policy has been found to 
be mixed in the literature. Some studies have reported a positive association with 
dividends, while others have documented either an inverse or no significant 
relationship. For example, Yoshikawa, and Hashimoto (2005) found a positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout, therefore, showing 
support for the preference of foreign owners for dividends over capital growth in the 
Japanese manufacturing firms. In this regard, Baba (2009) argued that the significant 
inflow of foreign investors into the Japanese firms arises from the need to obtain a 
higher level of dividends and the enhancement of management performance with a 
view to increase their return on equity. Consistent with their hypothesis, the study 
reported that an increase in foreign ownership was significantly associated with a 
higher likelihood of dividend payout. The study suggested that, because of the 
greater information asymmetry foreign investor may face, a greater tendency exists 
for them to pressure management to pay dividends, thus, supporting the agency 
theory. 
Similarly, Ullah et al. (2012) examined the ownership structures of Pakistani firms. 
They showed that a strong positive association between foreign ownership and 
dividend policy prevailed among Pakistani companies. Along this line, Jeon, Lee, 
and Moffett (2011) and Warrad, Abed, Khriasat, and Al-Sheikh (2012) also found a 
positive correlation between foreign ownership and dividends payout policy in the 
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Jordanian and the Korean markets respectively. Jeon et al. (2011) posited that 
foreign owners may influence higher payout because of institutional charters, 
embedded restrictions under the prudent-man rule or tax advantage considerations. 
Consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, Jeon and Ryoo (2013) argued that the 
foreign owners are likely to influence the payout of more dividends through their 
representation on board particularly when it is an independent director. In agreement  
with the monitoring role, foreign shareholders could exact pressure on firm 
management to disgorge free cash flow because of a fear of empire building by the 
management (Jensen, 1986). Min and Bowman (2015) supported the effective 
monitoring role of foreign investors. They found that an increase in the ratio of 
foreign ownership was attributed to the enhancement of firms‘ corporate governance. 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) in their analysis found that foreign investors prefer 
firms paying lower dividends specifically when the firms are large and hold large 
amounts of cash. The preference for lower dividends by foreign investors is likely to 
be associated with tax advantage. Foreign investors are rational and are expected to 
consider the trade-off between capital gains and dividends because the level of 
taxation on dividend varies in many countries.  
Empirical evidence on the association between foreign ownership and dividend 
payout have been reported to be inversely related. Lam et al. (2012) hypothesized 
that cross-listed firms having foreign ownership may be likely to exhibit this peculiar 
feature. In support of their hypothesis, the study showed foreign ownership has a 
negative and significant impact on cash dividends while suggesting that foreign 
ownership may play a significant role in addressing problems related to agency type 
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two problems (majority-minority related agency problems). However, Lin and Shiu 
(2003) documented that foreign investors prefer companies that exhibit a higher 
export ratio and low profitability, lower dividend yield and growth due to the 
asymmetry of information, and foreign investors enhance monitoring thereby 
reducing the tendency of a family to expropriate the rights and wealth of other 
shareholders (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010). 
In contrast, Sulong and Nor (2008) suggested that foreign investors are passive with 
regards to monitoring in the Malaysian context and, therefore, may not act as a 
control mechanism for agency problems. From the Chinese market, Thanatawee 
(2014) concluded that foreign investors and dividend policy were negatively 
associated and were detrimental to non-foreign shareholders‘ wealth because their 
presence may reduce the magnitude of dividends expected by shareholders. 
Moreover, the decision of whether to pay dividend or not to pay has been linked to 
foreign ownership. Recently, Abdulkadir et al. (2016) reported that foreign owners 
influenced dividend decisions negatively when the foreigners control a substantial 
number of holdings for firms listed in the NSE. The results indicate that foreign 
investors in Nigeria have less preference for dividends. The finding may be driven 
by factors that are likely to influence foreign owners‘ preferences for dividends that 
may include less advantage with regards to the transaction costs of repatriating the 
dividend income and taxation. Hence, the result is consistent with the findings of 




2.7.2 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership refers to the fraction of interest held by executive directors 
and the managers who do not form part of the board (Short, Zhang, & Keasey, 
2002). This kind of ownership that tends to alleviate agency problems, which are 
common among firms (Florackis et al., 2015). This implies that the managers may 
pursue investments that will add value to the shareholders‘ funds. Studies have 
shown that a substantial level of managerial stake in the firm may go a long way to 
align with the interests of the outside owners (Al-Gharaibeh, Zurigat, & Al-
Harahsheh, 2013). The result implies that managers may be fully engaged in 
advancing policies that are beneficial to all shareholders of the firm. 
Managerial ownership is used interchangeably with insider ownership and directors 
holdings among others (Farinha, 2003; Francis et al., 2011; Sanda et al., 2010; Short 
et al., 2002). However, for this study, managerial ownership is referred to as the 
stake controlled by executive directors on the board. The existing literature on 
ownership structures and dividend policy is tilted towards how dimensions such as 
managerial ownership affect decision to pay dividend. 
Dividend policy is among the techniques that provide control in a firm against 
potential agency problems. The probability of the managers owning a stake in a 
company may portray the likelihood of alleviating agency problems (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The argument is that, because the managers form part of the 
shareholders, they may not go against the interests of other shareholders by wasting 
the accumulated cash. This is because such an act may not be at the expense of 
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merely a given group of shareholders but all the firm‘s shareholders. Therefore, it 
could be assumed that managerial owners influence corporate dividend payout. 
The arguments on the relationship between managerial ownership and dividend 
payout are based on a monitoring effect. Quite many studies have debated the 
appropriate sign between dividend policy and shares held by managers. The 
monitoring hypothesis suggests that managerial ownership and dividend policy are 
inversely related (Jensen, Solberg, & Zorn, 1992; Manos, 2003; Short et al., 2002). 
They viewed the negative sign as an indication that managers are likely to pursue 
projects that maximize shareholder value. 
Agency theory emphasizes the importance of managerial shareholding as a control 
mechanism that aligns the interests of parties of a firm, which are the principal and 
the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Goergen, Renneboog, and Correia da Silva 
(2005) argued that, as the managerial shareholding increases, the benefits of other 
monitoring tool may diminish the need for paying dividends as a control tool. 
However, a decrease in managerial shares may give rise to agency costs (Rozeff, 
1982). In this regard, dividend payout could be used as a control mechanism that can 
subject the managers to capital market monitoring (Short et al., 2002), thus, 
supporting an inverse relationship between managerial ownership and dividend 
policy. Other studies have argued that the relationship between managerial 
ownership dividends may be positive (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2014; Gedajlovic et al., 
2005;  Kim, Rhim, & Friesner, 2007; Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2011). They noted 
managers who are directors on the board may influence a higher payout because of 
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liquidity and diversification and may not pursue investment projects that are not in 
line with the interests of shareholders. 
A dividend is a medium used as a monitoring tool by firm owners or as a medium 
that the managers use to enhance their welfare. Short et al. (2002) in their study 
revealed a negative link between dividend payout and managerial ownership and 
contended that a dividend serves as a monitoring tool. Farinha (2003), Karathanassis 
and Chrysanthopoulou (2005), and Chen et al. (2005) also reported a negative 
association in that firms with higher managerial ownership pay lower dividends. 
These findings confirmed the assertion of agency theory that suggested dividend 
payout as control mechanism. Using the costs minimization model of Rozeff, (1982) 
and consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, Manos (2003) also found an inverse 
relationship between insider ownership and dividends and suggested that bonding the 
managers with shares may help align their interests with those of outside owners. 
Evidence from the Nigerian market indicates that managerial shares are inversely 
related to dividend payout (Dandago, Farouk, & Muhibudeen, 2015; Miko & 
Kamardin, 2015). The studies found evidence confirming the results of previous 
studies that managerial ownership of the listed firms in Nigeria was negatively 
related to dividend payout. These findings alluded to the substitutability of 
managerial ownership and dividend policy particularly in the manufacturing sectors 
and among larger firms. The results, thus, are in agreement with the findings of 
Farinha (2003) and Florackis et al. (2015) regarding the alignment effect of 
managerial shareholdings from the United Kingdom and the United States 
respectively. Additionally, other studies that have found a negative relationship with 
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managerial shareholding include Indonesia (Rizqia & Aisjah, 2013) Jordan (Al-
Amarneh & Yaseen, 2014), and Pakistan (Ullah et al., 2012). 
However, Kumar (2006) examined companies in India using the panel data approach 
over the period of 1994-2000. The hypotheses of the study were tested using five 
different sets of models and showed that directors‘ ownership was significant and 
positively correlated to dividends in the first place but subsequently changed to 
negative when the variable is squared. Thus, a U-shaped relationship was 
documented. This finding provides evidence on the entrenchment effect, which 
relates with the tendency to aligning with the shareholders‘ interest at a certain level 
and then extracting benefits as the managerial holdings increases. The findings 
contradicted the evidence documented in Farinha (2003) and Florackis et al. (2015) 
who revealed a U-shaped relationship from negative to positive. Thus, they 
concluded that dividend is used by managers to maximize their welfare. 
Kim et al. (2007) documented a positive and significant association between 
dividend and managerial holdings. The evidence is in line with the managerial 
entrenchment argument, which posited that managers entrenched themselves by 
paying a higher dividend. The results is also in line with Jo and Pan (2009) who 
documented  that entrenched managers resulted in a higher dividend payout. 
Furthermore, Huda and Abdullah (2014) also demonstrated that, when the shares of 
the director‘s ownership increased dividends per share may also increase. The study 
used a hierarchical OLS regression model for the analysis and showed that director‘s 
ownership was positively related to dividends per share. 
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Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, and Hashimoto (2005) asserted that the positive association 
between managerial shares and dividends payout was the result of the insider owners 
who had an interest in residual income that may compel them to favour a more cash 
dividend policy. Vo and Nguyen (2014) also showed that managerial ownership and 
dividends are positively related and claimed that, when managers are exposed to risk 
due to debt, it is likely that they may compensate for the risk by influencing financial 
policies such as dividends through acquiring more shares in the firms. Likewise, 
Renneboog and Trojanowski, (2011) found that, when executive directors hold large 
stake, they tend to exert more  influence on the propensity to pay dividends. 
Evidence from the Europe revealed that shares held by executive directors were 
positively related to likelihood of paying dividends (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2014). The 
result indicated that executive shareholdings affect payout policies of firms and, 
hence, play a greater role in aligning the interests of managers and owners of the 
firm. Therefore, this leads to an increase in the likelihood of paying dividends, which 
is consistent with agency theory. 
However, other studies such as Mehrani, Moradi, and Eskandar (2011) found no 
evidence with regards to managerial ownership and dividend policy from the Tehran 
stock exchange. The results may not be surprising because the percentage holdings 
of managerial ownership are relatively very low and, in some instances, it tends to be 
zero. Therefore, this uniqueness may provide an insight into the insignificancy of the 
results. Another possible reason may be related to methodological issues. The study 
employed models (Fama & Babiak, 1968; Lintner, 1956; Waud, 1966) developed in 
the Unites States where agency conflicts are prevalent.  Similarly,  Gedajlovic et al. 
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(2005) also found an insignificant association between insider ownership and 
dividend payout among Japanese firms. Contrarily, Chen et al., (2005) found 
evidence from the Hong Kong stock exchange market that a negative association 
exists between managerial ownership and dividend payout. Similar evidence has 
been revealed by Afza and Mirza (2010) and Jensen et al. (1992) among United 
States and Pakistani firms. 
2.7.3 Summary of Literature Review on Ownership Structures 
Table 2.2 provides a summary of empirical studies that have investigated the 
relationship between ownership structures and dividend policy. 
Table 2.2  
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2.8 Blockholders Ownership 
Blockholder ownership is also another variable of importance in the structure of firm 
ownership, and, specifically, a controlling shareholder is considered to be a key 
among  a group of investors (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001). The current study 
considers blockholders as shares held by owners of firm comprise 5% and more, and 
the owners could be a corporate body or individual investors. The benchmark of 5% 
aligns with the corporate law in Nigeria that requires firms to disclose the ownership 
of any individual holding at least 5%. Similarly, the study focuses on blockholders 
because their coalition (alliance) may have influence on the corporate governance 
practices in Nigeria. 
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Blockholders and ownership concentration has been used in the literature 
interchangeable. The use of the two terms, therefore, common in the literature 
(Thomsen, Pedersen, & Kvist, 2006). Block ownership has been linked to various 
firm attributes to gain more of an understanding as to how block ownership impacts 
on firms. For example, block ownership may improve performance (Gugler, Mueller, 
& Yurtoglu, 2008), mitigate agency conflicts (Setia-Atmaja, 2009), facilitate third 
party take overs, influence share valuation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), enhance 
monitoring and affect dividend policy (Fairchild, Guney, & Thanatawee, 2013). 
Bozec and Bozec (2007) contended that block ownership places authority in the 
hands of leading shareholders that will translate into superior monitoring and reduce 
other forms of corporate controls that are likely to be instituted. Setia-Atmaja (2009) 
claimed that dividends function as a tool to alleviate agency conflicts between large 
controlling shareholders and minority. Similarly, dividends may also resolve 
conflicts of interest that may arise between owners and managers by limiting the 
amount of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). 
The statute regarding blockholders ownership in Nigeria describes any individual or 
corporate that directly or indirectly acquires 5% or more shares of a firm to be 
classified as a blockholder. The ownership structures of Nigerian firms are mostly 
blockholding with control in the hands of few individuals (Arowolo & Che-Ahmad, 
2017; Sanda et al., 2010). On the average, the degree of blockholders ownership is 
about 32.46% of equity holdings. Therefore, the expectation is that blockholders are 
likely to play a critical role by either controlling or exacerbating agency problems. 
Along this line, Ahunwan (2002) argued that in market such as Nigeria, a high 
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tendency for agency problems exists. Sanda et al. (2010) reported a non-linear 
association when they studied blockholders and the performance of Nigerian firms. 
Fairchild et al. (2013) posited that block ownership may provide a monitoring role in 
a firm. In this regard, the study suggested a positive association between block 
owners and dividend policy. However, Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) in their 
study contended that blockholders may reduce a firm‘s dividend payout as they are 
engage in controlling the managers. This argument is also in line with the studies 
such as  Desender et al. (2013) and Goergen et al. (2005) that direct monitoring 
exists from controlling shareholders, and other existing monitoring mechanisms 
may, therefore, be reduced. This indicates that the role of dividends as a control tool 
may tend to be reduced. 
Examining the effect of blockholders Chen et al. (2005) provided an insight into the 
association of blockholders ownership and its effect on dividend policy of listed 
firms on the Hong Kong market. The study claimed that in small businesses a 
significant and negative relationship prevailed between dividend payout and family 
ownership controlling up to 10% of a company‘s shares. The evidence suggested that 
family-controlled firms may extract resources using dividends as they are less 
monitored. Furthermore, the study found a positive effect for family blockholders 
with holdings between 10% and 35%. The study concluded that the non-linearity on 
the relationship might be an explanation for cash preference. 
In this line, Lam et al. (2012)  measured blockholders as the ratio of shares owned by 
the top 10 shareholders to examine their effect on cash dividends using data from 
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Chinese companies. The study established a significant and positive correlation 
between blockholders and dividend payout. The finding was confirmed from the 
evidence advanced by Fairchild et al. (2013) and Thanatawee (2014) that 
blockholder ownership is positively associated with dividend payout. The study 
further suggested that cash dividends are likely to be prevalent in closely held firms. 
From Malaysian settings, Ramli (2010) uncovered that a firm‘s dividend increases as 
the holdings of the largest shareholder increase. The explanation for the increase in 
the payout was related to the monitoring role of block holders. The finding is in 
accord with Fairchild et al. (2013) that large shareholders have incentive to monitor 
management and pay higher dividends. 
To further understand the relationship of dividends and blockholders some cross-
border evidence has been revealed. Truong and Heaney (2007) examined the 
association of the largest shareholder and dividend policy using data from 37 
economies around the world. The study revealed that blockholding is associated with 
paying more corporate dividends. Additionally, they reported that, when the largest 
shareholder is a financial institution the level of the dividend tends to be higher as 
opposed to when an insider has the largest shareholding in a firm. 
However, the shareholding of the largest shareholder was negatively linked to 
dividend payout at relatively low levels of holdings. The finding is in line with the 
traditional agency theory that ownership and dividends are substitute mechanisms for 
monitoring managers. The evidence of Grinstein and Michaely (2005) regarding the 
role of block shareholding and La Porta et al. (2000) also suggests that the legal 
system plays a major role in dividend determination. Although some evidence has 
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shown a positive effect of blockholders on dividend payout ranging from individual 
countries to international evidence, other authors have revealed either a negative or 
no relationship. 
For example, using a sample of Japanese companies Harada and Nguyen (2011) 
investigated blockholders and dividend policy. They showed that blockholder 
ownership was negatively related to dividends and thus, in line with their prediction. 
Likewise, Khan, (2006) from the United Kingdom market had similar results. The 
findings from these studies support the view  that blockholders serve as a substitute 
for dividends. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) found the stakes of the largest owner 
were associated with a decrease in dividends, while the second largest shareholder 
was associated with an increase in dividend payout. This evidence connoted the level 
of severity of agency problems relating to majority-minority conflicts. Similar 
evidence was also provided by Maury and Pajuste (2002) on the effect of 
concentrated ownership on dividend policy from Finland. The study indicated that 
the dividend payout ratio is negatively related to the control stake of the controlling 
shareholders. They concluded that the benefits enjoyed by these shareholders, which 
are not shared with minority shareholders, serve as an incentive to act in this manner. 
At times, corporate control is achievable indirectly through a pyramid or ultimate 
ownership among others. In this situation, the controlling shareholders may impose 
some of their thoughts on a firm, and this imposition will affect all corporate 
decisions. The study of  Renneboog and  Trojanowski (2007) found a negative 
association between dividend decisions and blockholdings. The study argued that a 
negative relationship is due to a pool of blockholders and that a blockholder prefers 
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firm to be more liquid instead of distributing cash dividends. The study also noted 
that, when the company is liquid, it be likely to undertake good and qualitative 
investment decisions. The finding agreed with the previous evidence of Mancinelli 
and Ozkan (2006) who studied the association between dividend policy and 
ownership structure based on the rent extraction argument in Italy. The study 
highlighted that, because the largest shareholders derive some personal benefits from 
the firm, they are less likely to pay dividends. This indicates that the largest 
shareholders in Italian firms favored lower dividend payout. 
Furthermore, Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) also revealed a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between blockholders and the likelihood to pay 
dividends. In more recent evidence, Liljeblom and Maury (2016) and Mehdi, Sahut, 
and Teulon (2017) found a negative association between propensity to pay dividends 
and blockholder ownership. The studies suggest that the negative findings may be 
because of lower agency costs. Chang, Kang, and Li (2016) suggested that the 
heterogeneity of the blockholders may be the main factor that drives the negative 
association. Blockholders may have different incentives and vary in their trading and 
monitoring. They added that blockholders may not use dividends to monitor a firm 
with a view to mitigating agency conflicts when other strong monitoring 
mechanisms are present in the firm.  From the above studies, the deduction can be 
made that block ownership is a vital tool to mitigate the free riding problem and, in 
turn, to alleviate agency conflicts. 
However, some have found no relationship. For example, Naceur, Gaied, and 
Belanes (2006) found no evidence for a relationship between dividends and 
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blockholders. The finding negated the evidence advanced by other studies such as 
Faccio et al. (2001), Khan (2006) and Maury and Pajuste (2002) that found an 
inverse relationship between dividend and ownership structures.  
2.8.1 Moderating Role of Blockholders Ownership 
Various agency models have shown that dividend payout is associated with the 
reduction or mitigation of agency conflicts between shareholders and the 
management. Basically, dividends payment may reduce the excess amount of free 
cash flow that is available to the managers (Jensen, 1986). As Easterbrook (1984) 
and Rozeff (1982) noted, the payment of dividends may subject firms to market 
scrutiny and monitoring particularly when its requires funds to finance its investment 
projects. Based on these facts, dividend payment is costly because it is associated 
with transaction costs for raising new capital or on the basis that dividends are tax-
inefficient for investors who pay tax or investors with a higher tax bracket. 
Moreover, Khan (2006) noted that agency models portray dividends as a substitute 
for the direct monitoring of managers by the owners in circumstances where the 
owners‘ monitoring is insufficient to address the prevailing agency problems. Reddy 
and Locke (2014) asserted that when the ownership structure of firms constitutes 
shareholders who are good monitors and are willing to do so, dividends may not be 
required for monitoring role. In this regard, firms may be less likely to pay dividend. 
On the other hand, where these shareholders are reluctant or found it costly to 
monitor managers or the block owners lack the monitoring skills, a higher dividend 
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payout may be needed to ensure the alignment of interests between shareholders and 
managers. Therefore, increasing the likelihood of paying dividends. 
Nonetheless, corporate shareholders are important in mitigating agency problems 
and, hence, in governance settings. Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009)  affirmed that 
measures put in place for protecting outside investors without considering a 
controlling shareholder may be inappropriate or even destructive to firms when 
controlling shareholders prevails. Hence, blockholder ownership is important in the 
firm as several corporate governance mechanisms will be irrelevant if they are 
ignored. La Porta et al. (2000) suggested that legal settings (a combination of laws 
and their enforcements) that provide strong protection to investors (shareholders and 
creditors) enables them to exact pressure on management to disgorge more cash. 
However, in countries with weak investor protection, block shareholders  may play a 
vital role in alleviating agency costs by forcing management to distribute available 
cash in the firm that may not be required for investing activities (Truong & Heaney, 
2007). 
However, Setia-Atmaja (2009) contended that blockholdings can either be a 
mechanism either for controlling or for aggravating agency conflicts. The largest 
shareholders act as a mechanism for monitoring managers in the sense that they 
exact pressures on the management to pursue goals, which maximize shareholders‘ 
value (Abdulmalik & Che-Ahmad, 2016; Arowolo & Che-Ahmad, 2017). In 
carrying out this task, the owners are likely to be provided a lower level of dividends 
because sufficient control mechanisms exist in the firm (Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006). 
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Consequently, blockholders present in a firm have an impact on the governance 
structures of firms.  This is because their stake in the firm may provide them with 
greater incentives to monitor because they may collect more information (Setia-
Atmaja, 2009). Similarly, expropriation may likely be too costly considering the 
blockholders reputation.  In an attempt to protect their reputations, in the presence of 
any dealings that may undermine or endanger their reputational status, blockholders 
may tend to abstain from those dealings, for example, expropriating minority 
interests as Truong and Heaney (2007) discussed, although some studies have 
indicated that blockholders may expropriate the interests of other shareholders in the 
firm through dividends  (Chen, Firth, & Xu, 2009; Fairchild et al., 2013; Lv, Li, & 
Gao, 2012). However, this is unlikely to occur when their wealth and reputation is 
considered. This is because the blockholders‘ wealth may be adversely affected as an 
outcome of the expropriation, which may lead to a decrease in firm value (Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Truong & Heaney, 2007). 
Drawing from these arguments, the study used blockholders ownership to moderate 
the relationship between the board characteristics and the propensity to pay 
dividends. In line with this, Setia-Atmaja (2009) found negative and significant 
evidence of the moderating effect of blockholders on the relationship between 
independent directors and firm value. The result implies that blockholders have a 
greater incentive to monitor management, and this is likely substitute for role of 
independent directors in monitoring. 
Blockholders have a greater incentive to monitor management, which, in turn, leads 
to the tendency for using dividends as a monitoring mechanism consistent with 
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agency theory. In countries with weak legal protection the largest shareholders may 
offer an important control mechanism through their voting power to pressure 
managers to distribute excess cash. This action, in turn, alleviates potential agency 
problems (Truong & Heaney, 2007). Furthermore, dividend payout  increases when 
the holdings of the blockholders increase (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003). 
The legal framework of Nigeria emanated from the United Kingdom like other 
British colonies and is expected to be strong because the legal system is based on 
common law as compared to civil law. La Porta et al. (2000) claimed that a strong 
legal regime with a combination of laws can protect investors. Therefore, it is 
possible to employ blockholders as a moderator and tested this relationship in the 
Nigerian context. 
Consequently, because of the interests blockholders have in firms, it is expected that 
they will actively participate in monitoring the managers in the Nigerian market. 
This could be done through ensuring flow of important information exchange from 
managers to directors on board that can enhance monitoring and strategic advice. 
Furthermore, blockholders might maintain strong relationship with directors on 
board directly or through their representatives on boards (for example, female 
directors and financial expertise), thus provides additional avenues for obtaining the 
necessary information on the firms. Thus, these directors may work together for the 
enhancement of corporate monitoring and the reduction of agency conflict. 
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2.8.2 Summary of the Literature Review on Blockholders Ownership 
Table 2.3 provides summary of empirical studies that have investigated blockholders 
ownership and dividend policy. 
Table 2.3  
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2.9 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter provides an overview of dividend policy and the Nigerian environment. 
It discusses the underpinning theories used for the study. The chapter reviews studies 
on the propensity to pay dividends, empirical evidence has been offered on the 
relationship between board characteristics, ownership structures and dividend policy 
followed by a summary of the studies in tabular form. 
Despite the extant literature on firm‘s dividend policy pattern and how other factors 
influence dividend policy remains a contentious issue in the accounting, finance, and 
management literature (Al-malkawi et al., 2010) probably as a result of its sensitivity 
to numerous factors (Baker & Weigand, 2015). In the light of this, evidence has 
shown that a firm‘s likelihood of paying a dividend has been reduced (Fama & 
French, 2001). However, the literature on the propensity to pay dividend has 
revolved around firm characteristics initially used in Fama and French (2001) that 
include profitability, firm size, growth opportunity. 
Subsequent studies have included other factors such as dividend premium (Baker & 
Wurgler, 2004b), retained earnings (DeAngelo et al., 2006) agency costs (Denis & 
Osobov, 2008) and systematic and idiosyncratic risks (Hoberg & Prabhala, 2009). 
However, board characteristics and ownership structures have received less attention 
on the subject. Therefore, it is meaningful to examine how board characteristics 
affect the propensity to pay dividends. Likewise, the literature has indicated the 
importance of ownership structures of firms in determining their dividend policies. 
Hence, the study also included foreign, managerial and blockholders ownership. 
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In addition to the above, the literature also said that a firm‘s governance mechanisms 
tend to depend on its ownership structures (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009). The study 
also tests the effect of blockholders as a moderator on the relationship between board 







RESEARCH METHODOLOGY                                                   
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter includes the research methods employed in conducting this study. First, 
it discusses the research framework and the develops hypotheses based on previous 
evidence and supported by theories. Second, it elucidates the research design and the 
population of the study, sources of data, techniques of data analysis, statistical tools 
of analysis and the research model. 
3.2 Research Framework 
The propensity to pay dividends was first empirically examined by Fama and French 
(2001) who reported that firms in the US market were less likely to pay dividends. 
Other studies such as Ferris et al. (2006), Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), and Fatemi 
and Bildik (2012) also found similar evidence that firms exhibited less of a 
likelihood to pay dividends. These studies concluded that the decrease in paying 
dividends was largely was associated with firm characteristics that included 
profitability, firm size, and investments growth. However, some other literature 
refuted the decline in the payment of dividends (Chetty & Saez, 2005; DeAngelo et 
al., 2004, 2009; Eije & Megginson, 2008; Gwilym, Seaton, & Thomas, 2004; Julio 
& Ikenberry, 2004). They claimed that over the years the aggregate real dividends 
have risen. Furthermore, Andres et al. (2009) noted that  no generally established 
explanation exists at present detailing with the propensity-to-pay dividend 
phenomenon or the likelihood to pay dividends. 
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The phenomenon has also been extended using governance and ownership structures 
of the firm on how it affects propensity to pay dividends. For example, Sharma 
(2011) investigated the influence of independent directors and their features on the 
propensity to pay dividends and revealed a positive correlation between the 
propensity to pay dividend and directors independence and tenure. McGuinness et al. 
(2015) showed little support for the influence of gender on dividend policy, but CEO 
tenure was positively associated with corporate cash dividends. Along this line, 
Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms (2016) revealed that gender influenced the level of 
dividends. Subba (2015) concluded that corporate governance was positively 
associated with the likelihood of firm paying dividend. 
Blockholders comprise shareholders who hold a significant portion of shares in the 
firm. The holdings provide the blockholders with an incentive to collect more 
information and monitor the management in addition to the monitoring role of the 
board. Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) argued that interdependency was present 
between blockholders and the board of directors.  Hence, the existence of 
blockholders in a firm may influence the monitoring aspect of the board.  
Accordingly, introducing blockholders ownership as a moderating variable will offer 
additional information on how a board impacts the propensity to pay dividends. 
Very limited empirical findings exist on the association between the propensity to 
pay dividends and corporate governance around the world with no such evidence in 
sub-Saharan African and likewise in Nigeria. Further, the existing studies that have 
used governance and ownership structures do not adequately construct the propensity 
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to pay dividends variable as documented in the literature (Fama & French, 2001; 
Fatemi & Bildik, 2012). 
Instead of the modelling, they tend to use a raw figure to indicate whether a firm 
pays dividend or not. To fill this gap, this study considers those firm specific 
characteristics (ROA, firm size and investment growth) that have been consistently 
used in the literature to predict dividend payers. The framework for the modelling of 
the propensity to pay dividends is shown below as Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 Framework for propensity to pay dividends model 
Furthermore, the study investigates how board characteristics and ownership 
structures of a firm affect a company‘s propensity to pay dividends. Moreover, the 
study also examines the moderating role of blockholders ownership on the 
relationship between board and propensity to pay dividends. The research framework 
is depicted in Figure 3.2 below. 
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Figure 3.2 Research framework 
The study uses resource dependence theory (RDT) and agency theory (AGT) to 
underpin the variables of interest. From the above framework, this study therefore, 
adopts resource dependence theory to underpin the relationship between board size, 
board diversity, financial expertise, CEO tenure and propensity to pay dividends. 
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composition, CEO tenure, foreign managerial ownership, and blockholders 
ownership and propensity to pay dividends. 
3.3 Hypotheses Development for the Study 
In this section, the hypotheses of the study are developed based on the gap found in 
the existing literature reviewed. Besides the evidence from the literature, the 
hypotheses development is also supported by relevant theories such as agency and 
resource dependence theories. The hypotheses are developed to test the effect of 
board characteristics and ownership structures on the propensity to pay dividends 
and the moderating effect of blockholders ownership on board characteristics. 
3.4 Board Characteristics 
Corporate governance mechanisms are simply classified into internal and external 
mechanisms. The internal mechanisms include the characteristics of the board and 
ownership structures. The external mechanisms are determined by factors outside the 
firm such as legal protection and takeover rules (Man et al., 2013). Board 
characteristics fall under the category of internal governance mechanisms (Bekiris, 
2013). Corporate governance mechanisms are instituted to check any abuse that are 
anticipated from the management or to mitigate the agency problems that are 
exhibited in modern corporate bodies. The board members are elected when a 
vacancy exists by the owners of the company known as the shareholders. The board 
acts on their behalf in running the activities of the company. The board members are 
expected to carry out their tasks effectively in monitoring the managers and 
providing resources to the company. Any short fall against their responsibilities 
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means that the board members stand a chance of being voted out, and new members 
will be elected (Man et al., 2013). 
Wan and Ong (2005) considered a primary distinction of the board structure to be 
that between directors who occupy management positions in a firm and those who do 
not. In other words, this reflects the compositional dimension of the board that 
monitors the activities of the management. This role makes board characteristics to 
be an important mechanism in controlling managers and greater firm value (Ntim et 
al., 2012). The board characteristics that considered for this study are: board size, 
board composition, board diversity, board member financial expertise and CEO 
tenure. 
3.4.1 Board Size 
The size of the board refers to the number of directors who occupy the board of a 
firm, and they comprise executive, non-executive, and independent directors. Studies 
regarding board size are twofold. The first group of researchers considered a small 
number of directors (small size) to be effective, provides better monitoring role and 
are less likely to have free riding problems (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996), which 
supports the agency theory. The second group favors larger boards. For example, 
Certo (2003),  Dalton et al. (1999) and  de Villiers et al. (2011) argued that larger 
boards may include heterogeneous directors who are rich in resources and may 
provide various services needed by firms. 
Besides the two afore mentioned groups, there are other scholars who are in the 
middle of the debate. These authors claim that size of the board should depend on the 
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complexity of a company‘s operation and other activities (Boone et al., 2007; Coles 
et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008). 
Relationship between board size and dividend policy is somehow not clear. Studies 
have reported mixed findings. For instance, Subramaniam, Suppiah and Shaiban 
(2014) tested the dividend policy of the top market capitalized companies listed on 
the Bursa Malaysia. The result indicated that dividend payout is significantly and 
negatively associated with board size. Likewise, Abor and Fiador (2013) reported 
sufficient evidence from the listed Nigerian firms that negative association between 
size of the board and dividend policy prevails. On whether, to pay or not to pay, 
Abdelsalam et al. (2008) based on the Egyptian market found negative but 
insignificant relationship between decision pay dividends and board size. However, 
evidence from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) markets as studied by Mehdi, 
Sahut and Teulon (2017) indicates that board size and firms‘ decision to pay 
dividends are negatively correlated. The authors argued that directors on board 
become more effective particularly during financial crisis. Hence, the directors 
favour investing the generated income internally rather than paying dividends and 
makes them to be risk averse in this scenario. 
However, other studies have reported that positive association between board size 
and decision to pay dividends. Chen et al. (2011) analyzed the propensity to pay 
dividends in A-Shares Chinese listed firms. The study found that board size had a 
strong impact in determining the propensity of the companies to pay cash dividends. 
The finding is in line with Officer (2006) and Boumosleh and Cline (2015) that 
indicated, when the size of a board is large, then a firm shows a higher likelihood of 
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paying dividends. In a recent evidence from Turkish firms, Al-Najjar and 
Kilincarslan (2016) examined board size and propensity to pay dividends from 2003 
through 2012 using unbalance panel data. Consistent with the prediction, the study 
indicates a strong and positive relationship between board size and the likelihood of 
a firm to pay dividends and is in line with Idris et al., (2017). These findings were 
also observed by other studies such as Prasanna (2014)  and  Iqbal (2013)  from India 
and Pakistan respectively. The studies indicate that a firm with large boards have 
higher likelihood to pay dividends than those with a small board. 
Consistent with resource dependence theory, Dalton et al. (1999) argued that larger 
boards may bring more skill and knowledge and provide valuable advice. However, 
the agency theorists argued that larger boards are associated with weak governance 
practices. It is evidently found that firms with larger boards are poor in terms of 
decision making and are less effective  (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) and likely to 
use dividend for example, as a monitoring tool and contain the opportunistic 
behaviours of the management and the CEO in particular (Chang & Dutta, 2012). 
Thus, there is greater need to encourage the payment of dividend as the size of the 
board increases to complement the efforts of the directors on board. In agreement 
with the following findings of Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016), Iqbal (2013); 
Prasanna (2014) and Chen et al. (2011) this study hypothesized that: 




3.4.2 Board Composition 
Board composition in the context of this study refers to the proportion of non-
executive directors to the total number of directors. The agency theory suggests that 
the primary role of the board is to monitor the management with a view to aligning 
their interests with those of the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, 
the resource dependency theory indicates, that besides the monitoring role of the 
board, they also provide firms with advice and linkages to the external environment 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Considering these two theoretical views, the argument 
could be made that outside directors are hired with a view to monitor and provide 
resources to the firm. Firms may likely not appoint the directors based on filling up 
the board seats with outside directors. The outside directors must have demonstrated 
their competences in terms of monitoring and their abilities and, on the other hand, 
they are heterogeneous, which allows a firm to benefit from their expertise (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003). Outside directors are expected to be critics and bring independent 
opinions to the board that they serve on and contribute to the diversity in terms of 
skills and expertise of the directors, which, will in, turn lead to greater performance 
of the firm (Abdul Latif et al., 2013). 
Previous studies have examined the effect of board composition (measured as the 
number of outside or external directors) on the board of a company and dividend 
policy. The findings have indicated that the presence of greater number of outside 
directors provides better protection to the shareholders and, hence, increases the 
level of dividends (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010). The implication of this is that 
outside directors may reinforce their monitoring activities by paying more dividends, 
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which could also provide them with an incentive to protect their reputations and 
avoid legal liabilities (Desender et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, empirical evidence on the association between outside directors 
on board and the propensity to pay dividends is relatively little and inconsistent. 
Iqbal (2013) examined the effect of governance practices on the decision to pay 
dividends among the Pakistani non-financial listed firms. The study covers 77 firms 
for a period of five years. The result indicated a strong negative relationship between 
outside directors on board and the decision to pay dividends. The study further 
concluded that the finding is likely to be linked to the existing situation where the 
Pakistani code of corporate governance did not clearly make provisions on the 
expected role that the outside directors should play in monitoring the managers, 
therefore, resulting on their ineffectiveness. This evidence is also in agreement with 
the findings of Abdelsalam et al. (2008) that reported negative and insignificant 
relationship between outside directors on board and the probability of a firm to pay 
dividend among the top capitalised Egyptian firms.  
In an international study from the European markets with larger sample of 6,982 
firm-year observations, De Cesari and Ozkan (2014) documented statistically 
significant effect between board independence and firms decision to pay dividends. 
The result indicated that independent directors on board are substitute for dividend 
payout. Similarly, Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009) who study the UK firms also 
revealed a negative association between the presence of outside directors on boards 
and decision to pay dividends. Hence, the evidence is consistent with their prediction 
that outside directors on board play substitution role to dividend policy. These 
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findings are also consistent with Benjamin and Zain (2015) who reported negative 
and statistically significant association between outside directors and the level of 
dividend payout among the Malaysian firms. 
Contrary to the above findings, Hu and Kumar (2004) were pioneers in examining 
the association between outside directors on board and the propensity to pay 
dividends. The study found that outside directors on and board have positive and 
strong influence on the propensity to pay dividends. The study posited that outside 
directors that accounted for a 40% threshold of the board positively affected the 
likelihood of paying dividends.  Further,  Sharma (2011) also explored this 
relationship from the US market in a correlational analysis. The study revealed that a 
board with greater independence was positively and significantly associated with the 
propensity to pay dividends.  
Similarly, Prasanna (2014) and Boumosleh and Cline (2015) also showed support for 
the previous evidence that, when a board has a greater percentage of outside 
directors, the firm is more likely to pay dividends. The study of Chen et al. (2011) 
also provided strong evidence supporting the positive association between board 
composition and likelihood of dividend payment among firms in Australia and China 
respectively. More recently, Idris, Ishak, and Hassan (2017)  indicated that outside 
directors from non-financial listed firms in Nigeria exhibited a higher likelihood to 
pay dividends. Consistent with  Chen et al., (2011), Hu and Kumar (2004), Idris et 
al. (2017), Prasanna (2014) and Sharma (2011), this study hypothesized that: 
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H2: There is positive relationship between board composition and propensity to pay 
dividends. 
3.4.3 Board Diversity 
Board diversity in this study relates to the number of female directors on the board. 
Studies on gender diversity are also linked to agency (Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 
2016) and resource dependency theories (Ali et al. 2014; Hillman, Shropshire, & 
Cannella, 2007). The agency theory suggests that the management of firm may likely 
behave in a manner contrary to the interests of the owners (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) and may create empire building through the use of free cash flow, which 
opposes value-addition projects (Jensen, 1986) However, female on board can 
control this behavior (Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2016). Board diversity (female 
on board) has become a topical issue in many countries (Adams, Haan, Terjesen, & 
Ees, 2015) and could be attributed to the limited representation on the top 
management level despite the role that they play in mitigating agency problem. 
Hwang et al. (2013) also noted the reduction of free cash flow is greatly associated 
with dividend payment, which could reduce the exploitation of the minorities. 
Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms (2016) concluded that dividend payout reduces the 
level of retained earnings and, hence, affects the use of the retained earnings to 
finance firm projects. Jurkus, Park and Woodard (2011) also indicated that a greater 
percentage of female directors reduces agency costs when there is no strong external 
monitoring mechanism. The reduction of the agency problem enables firms to reduce 
the tendency of overinvestments. 
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Adams and Ferreira, (2009) documented having females on a board immensely 
contributes to board decisions and that females are highly committed. They tend to 
have a higher attendance for board meetings than male directors and occupy seats on 
monitoring-related committees. This indicates that their relevance and effectiveness 
in those areas. Hence, gender diversity provides for greater board functioning 
(Hillman, 2014). Similarly, the inclusion of female directors on a board could signal 
an improvement in the monitoring capacity in a firm on one hand. On the other hand, 
their presence also indicates the tendency of a firm to have greater access to 
information that may enhance its value and having divergent perspectives relative to 
issues arising within the board (Larkin, Bernardi, & Bosco, 2013; Mordi & Obanya, 
2014). 
The role of female directors on a board may go beyond mitigating agency conflicts 
between principals and agents (Bilimoria, 2000 in Huse & Solberg, 2006). The 
resource dependence theory suggests that the outside environment of an entity may 
affect its performance since there is absence of resourceful directors who could link 
the firm with its environment. This absence may diminish the performance of such 
an entity and thus affect firm outcomes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). One possible 
way to mitigate such a problem is to have directors who can provide a link with other 
entities and thus bridge the gap between the two entities in obtaining resources 
(Hillman et al., 2007). In this sense, entities need a gender diverse board as this 
diversity provides for important functions such as strategic decision making, which 
is one of the functions of the board (Ali et al., 2014). 
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A board with  gender diversity is also beneficial as it  allows the integration of a 
broad range of information that will facilitate well-informed judgements among 
members (Hillman et al., 2000). Additionally, the behaviour of female directors may 
well vary from that of male directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Hence, having a 
board with females may probably enhance corporate policies. In line with agency 
theory, gender diversity may serve as a tool to control managers and may tend to 
reduce agency costs (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). 
Extant evidence on gender and dividend policy are also inconsistent. McGuinness et 
al. (2015) using Chinese firms revealed negative correlation between two or more 
female directors on board and dividend policy. Jurkus et al. (2011) also indicated 
that gender diversity has strong negative association with dividend payout. Similarly, 
Florackis et al. (2015) argued that in a low leverage firms, female directors on board 
tend to influence dividend payout negatively. Additionally, in a recent and 
international study on three emerging markets conducted by Saeed and Sameer 
(2017) showed that female directors on board have negative impact on dividend 
policy. They argued that female directors are conservative when it comes to 
institutional uncertainty and therefore, do not deviate from the status of existing 
business environment. However, evidence from Malaysian listed as provided by 
Hamzah and  Zulkafli (2014) failed to find any strong relationship between females 
on board and dividend payout. 
Conversely, Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms (2016) found women directors to have a 
significant positive effect on dividend policy of firms. Along this line, Byoun et al. 
(2016) compared gender and non-gender diverse boards and found that gender 
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diverse boards tend to pay higher dividends. It is expected that the female directors 
may display their expertise and increase the monitoring role of the board as their 
percentage increases. The association of female directors was also explored by Idris 
et al. (2017) in Nigeria.  
Consistent with the previous literature, the study found a positive and strong 
relationship between females on board and the propensity to pay dividends.  The 
study argued that female directors contribute immensely despite the fact of being 
perceived as low-status individuals. Female directors, in addition, help mitigate 
agency problems by advocating the payment of dividends when they are appointed to 
the board. Al-Rahahleh (2017) also found evidence supporting previous studies that 
females on the board tend to reduce agency conflicts by paying more dividends in 
the Jordanian firms. In line with Idris et al. (2017), Al-Rahahleh (2017), Pucheta-
Martínez and Bel-Oms (2016) and Byoun et al. (2016), it is hypothesized that: 
H3: There is positive relationship between board diversity and propensity to pay 
dividends. 
3.4.4 Financial Experts on Board 
The board of directors are topmost body that oversees the affairs of a firm. They 
design the policies of the firm in addition to their monitoring role and providing 
connections that benefit the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). According to Jensen 
(1993), shareholders can benefit from heterogeneous boards in the form of 
monitoring as well as advisory services that will improve firm resources and resolve 
problems faced by firms and corporate strategy development. He added that a 
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financial expert is particularly required by firms for corporate planning and 
determining issues that are likely to influence corporate value. The emphasis of 
agency theory on the financial expertise of an outside director is based on the 
premise that they are a monitoring mechanism that could reduce agency-related costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). The resource dependence perspective 
considers a board as a network that may provide management with valuable 
resources for the betterment of the firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The theorists 
have argued that firms are linked to the critical resources which they require by a 
resource based director. However, when such resource based director is absent the 
needed linkages may not be provided. 
Empirical evidence has indicated that a director with financial expertise is valuable 
and able to mitigate earnings management both at the board and at committee levels 
(Cunningham, 2008; Kibiya et al., 2016). Jeanjean and Stolowy (2009) contended 
that financially expert directors could play three important roles, which are corporate 
monitoring, the ability to offer advice to the CEOs and providing easy to access 
financial resources what, in turn, provides assurance to both potential investors and 
creditors. Financial expertise and its related areas such as finance, investment 
analysis, and banking, among others, are of paramount importance to a firm. They 
contribute a great deal to the policies relating to finance and investments. To execute 
these tasks, experts in finance and related areas are needed. This is not surprising that 
the post Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a have created higher demand for the financial 
expertise (Linck et al., 2009). Similarly, Defond, Hann, Xuesong and Engel (2005) 
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revealed that the market reacts favorably to the stock of a firm that have appointed a 
new director with financial expertise. 
Moreover, Güner et al. (2008) provided strong support that firms with financial 
expert on the board, experience a reduction of investment sensitivity to cash flow. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) noted that financial experts dedicated larger parts of their 
time in advising a firm. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) showed that firms having 
financial experts tend to hold little cash mainly because of unforeseen future events. 
Therefore, financial expertise on a board may likely use dividend payout to address 
agency conflicts in the firm. Kibiya et al. (2016) showed that financial experts 
enhance monitoring of managers by reducing fraudulent accounting practices, which, 
in turn, improves the quality of financial reporting. Consequently, Custodio and 
Metzger (2014) found evidence that a financially expert director on a board is 
positively related to dividend payout. 
Therefore, drawing from this, financial experts on a board may also encourage 
paying out dividends as a means of addressing agency conflicts because a dividend 
payout is one the numerous mechanisms used to address agency conflicts. Further, 
paying more dividends may also strengthen the monitoring role of the financial 
experts, which may, in turn, protect his reputational capital. Thus, consistent with the 
resource dependence theory. Thus, the hypothesis is stated as: 
H4: There is positive relationship between financial expertise on a board and 
propensity to pay dividends. 
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3.4.5 CEO Tenure 
The separation of control from ownership gives rise to agency problems between the 
principal and agent (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Corporate dividends are considered 
one of the mechanisms that can address such agency costs (Farinha, 2003). Agency 
theorists have suggested that the distribution of dividends will reduce the level of 
free cash flow available in the hands of a manager thereby making him to rely on 
external financing (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Rozeff, 1982). Therefore, a 
dividend may also be used to discipline CEOs with longer tenure. Because a firm 
will be forced to raise funds in the market as the need arises, that CEO will be 
subjected to market monitoring. 
Empirical evidence has revealed that a longer tenure of a CEO may be associated 
with governance issues. McGuinness et al. (2015) documented that CEOs with 
longer tenure tend to be entrenched and become more powerful influencing 
corporate decisions and thus aggravating the agency costs. Orens and Reheul (2013) 
argued that CEOs tend to influence the selection of directors to be appointed to the 
board and to build personal relationships that may be hard for the board to monitor 
or to fire a CEO because he or she has gained more power or reputation through a 
longer tenure with the firm (Ghosh & Sirmans, 2006; Hu & Kumar, 2004). Thus, 
he/she may decide that paying dividends might not decrease his/her reputation. 
Similarly, Ishak et al. (2012) found CEO power to be a source of entrenchment in 
companies and that firing him or her on the basis of underperformance then becomes 
difficult. Therefore, board independence diminishes with the longer tenure of a CEO 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998) and may provide managers the opportunity to waste 
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free cash flow. The longer CEO stayed in his/her position, the lower are chances to 
actively respond and react to changes within his external environment (Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991).  
In an examination of CEO tenure and dividend payout, Boumosleh and Cline (2015) 
and Boumosleh (2012) revealed that CEO tenure influences dividend payout 
negatively. Along this line, Sharma (2011) found a negative but statistically 
insignificant association between CEO tenure and the propensity to pay dividends. 
However, evidence revealed by Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) suggested that CEO 
tenure and dividend were positively and significantly related. In line with this 
evidence, McGuinness et al., (2015) and Feng et al. (2007) documented positive and 
significant evidence on the relationship between CEO tenure and probability to pay 
dividend. They indicated that a CEO having longer tenure may pay more dividends 
to entrench themselves.  
CEO with longer tenure, CEO with longer tenure, are rich in resources and provide  
better services needed by firm (de Villiers et al., 2011). This is because the CEO are 
more likely to handle environmental contingencies. For example, the greater the 
CEO developed contacts and ties with element of the environment the higher the 
skill the CEO has in handling environmental contingencies that may affect the firm 
(Finkelstein, 1992; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). Hence, consistent with the 
resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) that longer tenure provides 
avenues for directors to acquire more firm specific knowledge that enable them to 
discharge their duties effectively. Based on the theoretical and empirical findings, 
the study hypothesized that: 
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H5: There is positive relationship between CEOs tenure and propensity to pay 
dividends. 
3.5 Ownership Structures 
Ownership structures became a topical issue shortly after the work of Berle and 
Means (1932). They described the basis of agency problems in modern corporations 
as ownership and control become separated. In this regard, a mechanism such as a 
dividend payout is required to control agency costs.  In addition, investors tend to 
show their preference for a firm that pays  dividends (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005; 
Hassan, 2015). Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) in their survey indicated 
that managers tend to pay dividends to attract institutional investors. In this section, 
the study considers the second research question and hypothesizes the relationship 
between foreign, managerial, and blockholders ownership and the propensity to pay 
dividends. 
3.5.1 Foreign Ownership 
Foreign ownership according to Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010) is the ratio of shares 
held by foreign investors of the total outstanding shares of a firm. Researchers have 
used several theories in an attempt to understand various classes of investors 
regarding corporate dividend policy in firm settings (Baker & Wurgler, 2004a; 
Bhattacharya, 1979;Jensen, 1986; La Porta et al., 2000). However, Gedajlovic, 
Yoshikawa and Hashimoto (2005) argued that the objectives or motives of the 
investor need to be considered in explaining their behaviour towards dividends. They 
added that there may be significant differences regarding the motives of market 
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investors because of tax and regulatory treatments. The market investors comprise 
investment trust, foreign investors and pension funds (Gedajlovic et al., 2005). 
The relationship between foreign shareholdings and dividend is explained by agency 
theory. The theory suggested that a dividend payout is used to align the interests of 
shareholders with those of managers. Foreign shareholders are considered as market 
investors as their primary investment motive is to obtain equity return Gedajlovic et 
al. (2005). Thus, these market investors may demand that a firm pays a dividend. 
Empirically, the relationship between foreign ownership and the propensity to pay 
dividends has also been tested. Jeon et al. (2011) indicated support for the 
preferences for dividends by foreign investors. The studies documented a positive 
and significant correlation between foreign ownership and the propensity to pay 
dividends in Korean markets. The study suggested that foreign shareholders have a 
strong incentive to monitor management in firms given their large holdings and 
investment styles. 
The findings above also lend support to prior evidence documented by Baba (2009) 
that foreign ownership and the propensity to pay dividends are positive and strongly 
related. The study suggested that, because of the greater information asymmetry that 
a foreign investor may face, there is a greater tendency for them to pressure 
management to pay dividends. Consistent with the monitoring role, foreign 
shareholders could exact pressure on the firm management to disgorge free cash flow 
because of fear for empire building by the management (Jensen, 1986). Consistent 
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with this argument and the findings documented by Baba (2009) and Jeon et al. 
(2011), it is, therefore, predicted that: 
H6: There is positive relationship between foreign ownership and propensity to pay 
dividends. 
3.5.2 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership refers to the fraction of interest held by the executive directors 
(Ishak, 2010; Pucheta-Martínez & López-Zamora, 2017). Managerial ownership 
tends to alleviate agency problems, which are common among firms (Florackis et al., 
2015). Evidence has revealed that the shareholding level of management may go a 
long way to align with the interests of outside owners (Al-Gharaibeh et al., 2013).  
Hence, this suggests that managers can engage in advancing policies that are 
beneficial to all shareholders of the firm. Therefore, this study considers managerial 
ownership as a stake control by executives who are board members and are referred 
to as executive directors. 
Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, and Hashimoto (2005) asserted that the positive association 
between managerial shares and dividends payout is a result of the fact that insider 
owners have an interest in residual income, which, therefore, may compel them to 
favour a greater cash dividend policy. Vo and Nguyen (2014) also showed that 
managerial ownership and dividends were positively related and claimed that, when 
managers are exposed to risk due to debt, it is likely that they will compensate for 
the risk by influencing financial policies such as dividends through acquiring more 
shares in the firms. Kumar (2006) documented evidence from the Indian market that 
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directors‘ ownership was significant and positively correlated to dividends. 
Likewise, Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) found that, when executive directors 
hold large stakes, they tend to exact more influence on the propensity to pay 
dividends.  
Evidence from Europe has revealed that shares held by executive directors are 
positively related to the likelihood of paying dividends (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2014). 
The result suggests that executive managerial shareholding affects payout policies of 
firms and, hence, plays a greater role in aligning the interests of managers and 
owners of the firm. Therefore, managerial ownership leads to an increase in the 
likelihood of paying dividends, which support bonding relationship (agency theory). 
Based on the empirical evidence from Renneboog and Trojanowski, (2011), Vo and 
Nguyen (2014) and De Cesari and Ozkan (2014), this study hypothesized that: 
H7: There is positive relationship between managerial ownership and propensity to 
pay dividends. 
3.5.3 Moderating Role of Blockholders Ownership on Board Characteristics 
Consistent with Ishak (2010); Thomsen et al. (2006) and Sanda et al. (2010), this 
study considered block holding ownership to be the percentage of stocks held by 
individual or corporate entities with a minimum of 5% shareholding. Block 
ownership and ownership concentration are used interchangeably (Thomsen et al., 
2006). The conflict of interest subsides between principal and agent in modern 
corporate settings because control and ownership are separated, (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). In a widely held corporations, there is less likelihood for the owners to exact 
 
 156 
control on insider because of the free riding problem (Rozeff, 1982). However, the 
interest of blockholders in a firm provide an incentive which necessitates the need to 
critically monitor managers and therefore, mitigate agency problems. Bozec and 
Bozec (2007) argued that the best way to control agency costs is when large 
blockholders emerge in a firm. They added that investors tend to gain more influence 
on management when their holdings are block. 
In contrast, Goergen, Renneboog, and Correia da Silva (2005) noted agency costs 
that become higher in firms in which the controlling owner is government compared 
to the settings in which the family or others have a block holding. They concluded 
that in government-controlled firms, the source of higher agency costs is due to 
indirect control by citizens; thus, the payment of higher dividends will mitigate such 
a problem. Conversely, agency costs tend to be lower when there are blockholders in 
the firm indicating a substitution effect between blockholders and dividends payout 
(Arko et al., 2014). 
Blockholders may control for opportunistic managers in the firm and serve as 
substitute for other monitoring tools. Consistent with this view, Renneboog and 
Trojanowski (2007) found a negative relationship between dividends and 
blockholders ownership indicating that large blockholders reduce the payment of 
dividends in firms. Similarly, Harada and Nguyen (2011) from Japan, investigated 
blockholders and dividend policy and showed that blockholder ownership is 
negatively related to the decision to pay dividends.  
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Additionally, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) reveals that the stakes of the largest owner 
are associated with a decrease in dividend payout. Similar evidence is also 
documented by Maury and Pajuste (2002) in that shareholders with significant 
holdings are associated with a lower dividend payout.  The evidence is also in line 
with Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) that firms with blockholders are less likely 
to pay dividends.  In international evidence, Truong and Heaney (2007) revealed a 
non-linear relationship between the largest share holdings and dividend payout. The 
study indicated that at lower level of ownership (that is below 10%) there is less 
need for a dividend as monitoring tool. When the shares held by the largest 
shareholders increase dividends become a complementary monitoring mechanism 
suggesting a positive relationship. Also, Arko et al. (2014) find support for the 
negative relationship between blockholders and propensity to pay. They posited that 
blockholders in the form of institutions have lesser need for dividends to be used in 
controlling the managers. 
In recent evidence, Liljeblom and Maury (2016) and Mehdi, Sahut, and Teulon 
(2017) found a negative association between the propensity to pay dividends and 
blockholders ownership. These studies suggest that the negative findings may be the 
result of lower agency costs. Chang, Kang, and Li (2016) suggest that the 
heterogeneity of the blockholders may be the main effect that drives the negative 
association. The blockholders may have different incentives and vary in their trading 
and monitoring. The study added that blockholders may not use dividends to monitor 
the firm with a view to mitigating the agency conflict when there are other strong 
monitoring mechanisms in the firm when they engage in monitoring directly. 
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Consistent with the previous studies (Arko et al., 2014; Hu & Kumar, 2004; 
Liljeblom & Maury, 2016; Mehdi et al., 2017; Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2011). 
H8: There is relationship between blockholders ownership and propensity to pay 
dividends. 
Dividend policy is important because it involves a substantial amount of cash layout 
and has attracted the attention of various firm stakeholders. Baker and Weigand 
(2015) argued that no set of universal factors affecting dividend policy is appropriate 
for all firms. This made dividend policy a fertile area of investigation because the 
puzzle has not yet been solved. However, evidence regarding the effect of board 
characteristics on dividends is inconclusive (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009) because 
other firm-specific factors are neglected; one of them could be blockholders. In their 
study, Desender et al. (2013) suggested further investigation on the interaction of 
blockholders and corporate governance practices. Previous studies have documented 
reasons for including moderating variable(s). These factors include the complexity of 
behavior, a manipulation check, specificity of effects (MacKinnon, 2011), and 
inconsistency (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) argued that the effect of various key governance 
mechanisms largely depends on a firm‘s ownership structure. Drawing from 
Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) the association of board characteristics and the 
propensity to pay dividends may be affected by firm‘s blockholders. Evidence has 
shown that blockholders have an effect on corporate governance in either mitigating 
or exacerbating agency problems (Reddy & Locke, 2014; Setia-Atmaja, 2009). In 
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countries with weak investor protection, block shareholders have a vital role in 
alleviating agency costs by the forcing management to pay dividends (Truong & 
Heaney, 2007). This is because blockholders have greater incentives and the power 
to monitor management (Setia-Atmaja, 2009). 
Evidence from Nigeria have also been established on monitoring role of 
blockholders (Abdulmalik & Che-Ahmad, 2016; Arowolo & CheAhmad, 2017; 
Sanda et al., 2010). Blockholders ownership is considered to be of importance as it 
allows the controlling shareholders take the responsibility of monitoring the firm 
which will in turn help in addressing agency related problems between managers and 
the owners of the firm (Sanda et al., 2010).  
In a study by Arowolo and Che-Ahmad (2017) reported that blockholders ownership 
in Nigeria are dominated by institutional and individuals. The institutional 
blockholders have the largest stake in the listed firms. Therefore, dominating most of 
the listed firms on the NSE. The study further revealed that the institutional 
blockholders in the market has a mean value of 47.41% compared with individual 
blockholders scoring a value of 8.44%. In this regard, it is expected that the 
institutional blockholders may have more influence on firms than the individual. 
Also, Arko et al. (2014) found that majority of the shareholders in the Nigerian 
market are the institutional and account for a mean value of 53.36%. 
Given the amount of block holdings in firms, it is therefore, expected that these 
shareholders may play enormous role in dealing with agency conflict. In doing so, 
they may institute stronger monitoring tool to safeguard their interest in the firm and 
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promote good corporate values that will increase performance of the firm. 
Constituent with this view, Arowolo and Che-Ahmad (2017) shows that 
blockholders are significantly related to the monitoring mechanisms. The study 
added that institutional blockholders in Nigeria are more likely to institute more 
monitoring mechanisms than the individual blockholders. This is because the 
institutional blockholders tends to be more knowledgeable as compare with 
individual.  
Additionally, Farouk and Bashir (2017) documented inverse association between 
blockholders and earnings management in Nigeria. The finding implied that 
blockholders reduces manipulative accounting by participating actively in the 
monitoring of the managers and therefore, mitigating agency problems. 
consequently, evidence has also been found on the strong monitoring of blockholders 
in firms.   Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad (2016) revealed that blockholders are related 
to the enhancement of board monitoring and reduction of audit fees among the listed 
firms in Nigeria. The results further suggested that the monitoring of blockholders 
could lead to the reduction of agency problem between owners and the managers. 
The agency theory can explain the association between blockholders and boards of 
directors. The theory suggested that agency conflicts are minimized when the 
interests of managers and principals are aligned through managerial ownership 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Likewise, the presence of blockholders in a firm may 
improve corporate governance monitoring because they hold a sizable portion of the 
firm‘s shares. Thus, having greater holdings may enable blockholders to have more 
power to influence a firm‘s governance and exact pressure on the management to act 
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in accordance with the interests of the shareholders (Setia-Atmaja, 2009). However, 
some studies have indicated that blockholders might expropriate the minority 
shareholders (How, Verhoeven, & Wu, 2008; Lv et al., 2012). How et al. (2008) 
suggested further that the intensity of lowering the propensity to pay dividends is 
greater with shareholders controlling larger number of shares. 
However, the incentive to maintain their reputations means that blockholders could 
negate the expropriation of the wealth of the firm at the expense of the minority 
shareholders. Moreover, the consequences of their actions could affect the entire 
firm, and, therefore, the wealth of blockholders could adversely be affected. Hence 
the blockholders may engage in monitoring the management. 
Evidences revealed have shown blockholders may influence board characteristics 
(Bekiris, 2013; Boone et al., 2007; Dahya, Dimitrov, & McConnell, 2008; Hu & 
Kumar, 2004; Lasfer, 2006). Thus, the argument can be made that blockholders can 
moderate the role played by the board in firm corporate governance.  Lasfer (2006) 
revealed a negative association between blockholders and board size. However, 
Bekiris (2013) indicated that board composition and blockholders is positively 
related demonstrating that a firm with a higher number of independent directors is 
likely to attract blockholders. Similarly, Dahya et al. (2008) documented a positive 
association between the composition of a board and blockholders particularly in 
countries with weak investor protections. Therefore, suggesting that the blockholders 




However, evidence regarding the effect of board characteristics on dividends is 
inconclusive (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009) because other firm-specific factors are 
neglected; one of them could be blockholders ownership. Based on the previous 
studies and from the perspectives of agency theory and resource dependence theory, 
blockholders is expected to moderate board characteristics and therefore, discussed 
and hypothesized in the following paragraphs. 
Extant literature has unveiled that more investigation is required regarding the 
relationship between board size and propensity to pay dividends. Abdelsalam et al. 
(2008) from Egypt found negative but insignificant relationship between decision 
pay dividends and board size. Evidence from the GCC markets as studied by Mehdi, 
Sahut and Teulon (2017) indicates that board size and firms‘ decision to pay 
dividends are negatively correlated. In contrast, the findings of Officer (2006) and 
Boumosleh and Cline (2015) indicated that when the size of a board is large, then a 
firm shows a higher likelihood of paying dividends. So the study from Turkish firms 
by Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016) also documented that board size and likely to 
pay dividend are positively related. Studies on corporate governance have shown that 
good corporate governance practices is associated with paying more dividends 
(Jiraporn et al., 2011). Therefore, it is expected and consistent with Baron and Kenny 
(1986)  that the mixed results could be resolved with the introduction of a 
moderating variable for instance, blockholders ownership. This is because the 
blockholders have more incentive to monitor the firm and ensure good corporate 
governance practices. This study thus, hypothesized that: 
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H9: Blockholders moderates the relationship between board composition and 
propensity to pay dividends. 
It is conceivable from the theory and previous study that agency conflict could be 
addressed when greater control in put in place and when blockholders have 
monitoring role in the firm (Abdulmalik & Che-Ahmad, 2016; Arowolo & Che-
Ahmad, 2017). Consistent with this view, the current study employed blockholders 
ownership to moderate the mixed evidence revealed by extant literature on board 
composition and propensity to pay dividend. For instance, Iqbal (2013) and Al-
Najjar and Hussainey (2009) reported a strong negative relationship between outside 
directors on board and the decision to pay dividends from Pakistan and UK 
respectively. further, Abdelsalam et al. (2008) found insignificant relationship 
between board composition and decision to pay dividends. However,  Hu and Kumar 
(2004) and Sharma (2011) found that outside directors on and board have positive 
and strong influence on the propensity to pay dividends. In line with the finding of  
Idris et al. (2017) who indicated that the presence of outside directors from non-
financial listed firms in Nigeria increases the higher likelihood of a firm to pay 
dividends. In this regard, blockholders ownership could strengthen and reinforce the 
monitoring role of outside directors on board that are primarily hired to protect the 
interest of the shareholders and other firm stakeholders. Thus, this study 
hypothesized that:  
H10: Blockholders moderates the relationship between board size and propensity 
to pay dividends. 
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Studies have indicated that paying dividends reduces the intensity of the agency 
conflict between owners and managers (Saeed & Sameer, 2017). It is worth noting 
that the managers should be influenced to pay more dividends in such a situation 
where firms can withstand to pay but the firms exhibit less likely to pay the 
dividends to shareholders. To encourage such payment of dividends is to provide 
opportunity to some specific directors to be among the board members with distinct 
features and experience among others. These types of directors for instance female 
can be rich in resources and thus, impact on various financial decisions the board 
may consider in which dividend payout is one of them. On the other hand, 
blockholders has been considered very useful in addressing agency conflict 
particularly in Nigeria (Abdulmalik & Che-Ahmad, 2016; Arowolo & Che-Ahmad, 
2017). They documented that blockholders demand higher monitoring which help in 
reducing the opportunistic behavior of managers in firms. In addressing the 
opportunistic behavior female directors on board has been considered to provide 
such services (Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2016). 
Evidence on board diversity and dividend policy remains unclear and mixed. 
McGuinness et al. (2015) using Chinese firms, documented negative correlation 
between directors on board and dividend policy. Similarly, Jurkus et al. (2011) found 
evidence that gender diversity and dividend payout are negative related. Saeed and 
Sameer (2017) also concur these findings from three emerging economies. 
Suggesting that female directors reduces the level of dividend payout. Contrarily, 
Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms (2016) and Pucheta-Martínez and López-Zamora 
(2017) found women directors to have a significant positive effect on dividend 
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policy of firms. Also, Byoun et al. (2016) reported that boards with female directors 
tend to have higher likelihood of paying dividends. Consequently, Idris et al. (2017) 
revealed strong evidence that the probability of paying dividends tends to be higher 
as female directors is among the board members. From these findings, it could be 
seen that the association of gender and dividend policy is mixed. However, Baron 
and Kenny (1986) have suggested the use of moderating variable that can solve the 
existing inconsistency. Therefore, introducing blockholders on the relationship as 
moderator may provide additional information. The study thus, hypothesises that: 
H11: Blockholders moderates the relationship between board diversity and 
propensity to pay dividends. 
As noted in the paragraph above on gender, that including directors on the board 
with peculiar experience, for instance, directors with financial expertise is likely to 
change the way other board of directors handles financial issues including those that 
relate to dividend payout. In line with resource dependence theory, directors with 
financial expertise may plays major role in monitoring the managers since he or she 
is rich in resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and may like to demonstrate his 
expertise in executing the services for which he or she was appointed for. Consistent 
with this argument, empirical findings have indicated that a director with financial 
expertise is valuable and able to mitigate earnings management both at the board and 
at committee levels (Cunningham, 2008; Kibiya et al., 2016). Jeanjean and Stolowy 
(2009) reported that financially expert directors are associated with greater corporate 
monitoring, valuable advice to the CEOs and access financial resources. The 
monitoring effectiveness of financial expert directors may likely to be superior in 
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firms controlled by large owners. This is because blockholders may not require much 
of other monitoring mechanisms (Desender et al., 2013) for instance, dividends since 
they are likely to be engaged in direct monitoring with a view to mitigate agency 
problems (Arowolo & Che-Ahmad, 2017). Support has been found from the US 
market that blockholders are positively related with directors financial expertise 
(Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2009). Also, the abilities and incentive of the board members 
are likely to be influenced by the blockholders (Desender et al., 2013). 
However, the presence of financial expert directors may use more other monitoring 
mechanism (for example, dividends) to reinforce his or her monitoring role which 
will in turn protect his reputational capital. Thus, consistent with the resource 
dependence theory. Consequently, it is unclear as to how the financial expert 
directors will influence likely to pay dividends in firms with blockholders of 
different classes of shareholders with a view to protect his reputational capital and 
address agency conflict. Therefore, the study hypothesized that: 
H12: Blockholders moderates the relationship between financial expertise on board 
and propensity to pay dividends. 
Support for the relationship between CEO tenure and propensity to pay dividends is 
inconclusive. For example, Boumosleh and Cline (2015) revealed that CEO tenure 
influences dividend payout negatively. Consistent with their study, Sharma (2011) 
found negative but statistically insignificant association between CEO tenure and the 
propensity to pay dividends. Nevertheless, evidence revealed by Ghosh and Sirmans 
(2006) suggested that CEO tenure is associated with an increase dividend payment. 
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The finding agrees with McGuinness et al., (2015) who documented positive and 
significant evidence on the relationship between CEO tenure and likely to pay 
dividends. They indicated that CEO having longer tenure may pay more dividends to 
entrench themselves from shareholders threat that include firing.  
However, from the resource dependence theory perspective,  evidence has revealed 
that longer tenure may provide CEO with greater advantage to offer better services 
that the firm need (de Villiers et al., 2011; Finkelstein, 1992; Hillman et al., 2009). 
Thus, capable of dealing with contingent environmental matters that pose challenge 
to the success of the firm and enhancing greater firm value.  
Given these inconsistent evidence as discussed above, it could be possible that these 
studies disregard the role of controlling shareholders in the firm. Bebchuk and 
Hamdani (2009) posited that the firms‘ corporate governance practices may be 
destructive if the role of the blockholders within the firm are ignored. One the roles 
could be providing monitoring services as they have strong incentive to do so. In line 
with this view, Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) found strong evidence that 
blockholders are less likely to use dividend in addressing agency problems. Arko et 
al. (2014) supported this evidence and posited that blockholders in the form of 
institutions have lesser need for dividends to be used in controlling the managers. 
Therefore, it possible that blockholders can enhance the monitoring role of dividends 
therefore, resolving the inconsistency of the previous findings (Baron & Kenny, 
1986). Hence, the study hypothesized that: 
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H13:  Blockholders moderates the relationship between CEO tenure and propensity 
to pay dividends. 
3.6 Control Variables 
To have a clear view on the influence of the predicting variables on the outcomes, 
the study employs control variables that include firm age, firm size firm leverage, 
sales growth and retained earnings. The selection is based on their suitability to the 
issue at hand, which is the propensity to pay dividends, and these control variables 
had been tested in the previous literature of dividends payout. 
3.6.1 Firm Age 
Firm age is measured as the number of years that a firm has been on the floor of a 
security market. Nnadi, Wogboroma, and Kabel (2013) found evidence relating to 
the importance of business age in the African markets. In line with their hypothesis, 
they showed that the age of the firm is positive and significantly correlated with 
dividend payout. They pointed out that as the firm reached a matured stage, its 
growth tends to shrink, and this leads to a reduction in the firms‘ capital 
expenditures. Therefore, this necessitates that a firm makes dividend payments. Jo 
and Pan (2009) noted that a likely likelihood to distribute dividends to their 
shareholders is more prevalent in matured firms rather than in growing firms. 
Consistent with this view, von Eije and Megginson (2008) and Hu and Kumar (2004) 
showed age of the firm to be significant and positively correlated to the probability 
of companies paying dividends. Similarly, Fama and French (2001) argued that 
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dividend-paying firms are likely to be older and more matured. In contrast, Bokpin 
(2011) found a negative association between dividend and age of the firm. He argued 
that younger and new businesses have greater chances of paying dividends in Ghana. 
3.6.2 Firm Size 
Firm size is also among the key determinants of dividend policy and is regarded as a 
one of the agency cost variables and could be higher in firms that are classified as 
being large (Farinha, 2003; Lv et al., 2012). Firm size could be measured as the 
logarithm of total assets (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Sharma, 2011) or the 
logarithm of market capitalization (Farinha, 2003). Both agency conflict related type 
issues are likely to dominate larger firms, which may induce the continuous 
distribution of dividend (Benito & Young, 2003) which can help in controlling 
agency conflict. 
Chen et al. (2011) found firm size to be significantly and positively related to 
dividends. The result is in line with some prior findings (Ferris et al, 2006; Ho, 
2003). In addition, Yarram and Dollery (2015) tested Australian data and showed 
that firm size affected dividend policy positively. Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) 
also revealed positive association between dividend payout and firm size using 
Canadian data. The result indicated that larger firms have a greater tendency to pay 
dividends than small firms. 
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3.6.3 Firm Leverage 
Prior studies have also examined the relationship of frim leverage on corporate 
payout and suggested an inverse relationship between leverage and dividend policy. 
In accordance with the prediction, Al-Najjar (2009) and Eije and Megginson (2008) 
supported the negative relationship between leverage and dividend policy. The 
results show that investors received fewer dividends when the level of a firm‘s 
indebtedness increases. Benito and Young (2003) showed that an increase in the 
level of leverage may likely affect the tendency of a firm to omit its dividend. 
3.6.4 Sales Growth 
Another important factor in dividend decision is sales growth. The dividend policy 
literature has established the relationship between dividends and investment 
opportunity or sales growth (DeAngelo et al., 2006; Fama & French, 2001; Grullon 
et al., 2011). The studies have argued that firms in their early lifecycle experience 
growth and, thus, pay little or no dividend because of their cash requirements to 
finance new projects. Grullon et al. (2011) and DeAngelo et al. (2006) also showed 
that growth in sales was negatively related to the propensity to pay dividends. This 
indicates that firms with a higher growth in sales are less likely to pay dividends to 
shareholders. However, Arko, Abor, Adjasi and Amidu (2014) found growth firms to 
be positively related to propensity to pay dividends. The study contended that growth 
firms may likely use dividends to make their equity issues more attractive. 
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3.6.5 Retained Earnings 
The dividends of a firm may be affected by the availability of its retained earnings 
(Francis et al., 2011). Matured firms are believed to have more abundant amount of 
cash than non-matured ones. Matured firms are more generous than others regarding 
cash distributions in the form of dividends. DeAngelo et al. (2006) examined the 
tendency of a firm to pay dividends using retained earnings as measure of a firm‘s 
life cycle. They documented that matured firms had a greater tendency to be a 
dividend payer than less-matured firms. Again, Francis et al. (2011) noted that 
retained earnings measured as retained earnings to total capital is a powerful proxy 
when analysing the likelihood dividend payment. 
3.7 Research Design 
This study is quantitative in nature and employs a correlational research design to 
investigate the direct effect of board characteristics and ownership structures on 
propensity to pay dividends and moderating effect of blockholders ownership on the 
relationship between board characteristics and propensity to pay dividends. The 
predictive relationship between the variables was the focus during the analysis. This 
is because merely a statistical association among variables may not have much value 
as this association is likely to lead to spurious findings (Antonakis, Bendahan, 
Jacquart, & Lalive, 2014). 
3.8 Population of the Study 
The study population comprises all non-financial firms listed on the NSE Market 
spanning from the years from 2009 to 2015. The choice of 2009 was encouraged 
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because there was substantial decline in the payment of dividends in Nigeria 
(Abdulkadir, 2015). Moreover, the period was also chosen to ensure that all firms 
used in the study had data available for the consecutive period and last, 2009 marked 
the year when the committee of the NCCG submitted its final reports on the new 
code. The ending year, which is 2015, is due to the fact that the study uses 
probability models (logit regression) which requires large data set (Pallant, 2011) 
and to obtain data from recent annual reports. 
The study focuses only on non-financial firms listed on the NSE for the following 
reasons. Firstly, studies have established that for example  Baker, Dutta, and Saadi 
(2008) have found that factors affecting dividend policy vary from financials and 
non-financial firms likewise, in terms of industry classifications. Therefore, they 
suggested that the investigating dividend policy should consider partitioning firms by 
industry and their firm specific characteristics. Doing this classification, will permit 
a clearer view on the phenomenon under investigation.  
Secondly, financial listed firms in Nigeria have a separate code administered by the 
CBN and Nigerian Insurance Commission (NAICOM) and the provisions therein 
differs. For example, the NCCG 2011 provides that each firm should have at least 5 
directors on the board and no upper limit. On the other hand, the CBN code of 
corporate governance requires banks to have a minimum of 5 and maximum of 20 
directors seating on board. Moreover, the NCCG requires firms to have at least one 
director as independent whereas, CBN code of corporate governance requires at least 
2 independent directors on board.   
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Thirdly, CBN requires financial firms to adequately make some provisions with 
regards to; minimum capital adequacy ratio; meet up with cash reserve either low or 
moderate and a non-performing loan ratio not exceeding 5% before it will be 
allowed to pay dividend by the CBN. However, for the non-financials listed firms, 
there is no such provisions.  Lastly, none of the prior studies on propensity to pay 
dividends (for example, DeAngelo et al., 2004; Fama & French, 2001; Fatemi & 
Bildik, 2012; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Kim & Kim, 2013; Sharma, 2011) combines 
financial and non-financial firms in their studies. Among the non-financial firms, 
only firms with available information on financial, board characteristics and 
ownership structures required for the analysis were selected for the ten sectors2 of 
the NSE. 
Corporate governance and ownership variables were collected from annual reports 
filed with NSE at the corporate offices in Kaduna and Kano. Information regarding 
the financial variables were also extracted from the published annual reports of the 
various firms used in this study. 
3.9 Data Collection Sources and Methods 
The primary source of data used in this study was the published annual reports of the 
listed firms. These data were hand collected from the published annual reports of the 
firm filed with the NSE and the website of the sampled firms. All the variables for 
board characteristics and ownership structures variables used in the study were hand 
collected. For the board, these variables are board size, board composition, board 
                                                     
2 Agriculture, Conglomerates, Construction/Real Estate, Consumer Goods, Healthcare, ICT, 




diversity, financial expertise on the board, CEO tenure, and, for the ownership 
variables, they include, foreign, managerial and blockholders ownership. Likewise, 
the financial variables that were used for modelling the propensity to pay dividends 
and control variables were also hand collected. The financial variables include 
dividend payout, return on assets, market to book value of an equity as a proxy for 
investment growth, firm age, firm size, firm leverage, sales growth and retained 
earnings. 
3.10 Techniques for Data Analysis and Statistical Tools 
Several techniques are used in the analysis of the data. In the first place, the study 
employs descriptive statistics, which comprise the mean, the minimum, the 
maximum, and the standard deviation of the sample variables. The study also uses 
Pearson correlation in examine the bivariate relationship among the variables under 
investigation. This is done to have preliminary information about the relationship of 
the variables. The correlation is also used to detect any form of statistical 
significance and correlations that may lead to the issue of multicollinearity within the 
explanatory variables (Yarram & Dollery, 2015). 
Additionally, diagnostic tests are also conducted using variance inflation factors 
(VIF) to test for multicollinearity. The study also uses t-tests to analyze the 
differences between dividend and non-dividend payers consistent with the propensity 




This research uses logit regression analysis to investigate the propensity to pay 
dividend. Previous studies have used panel logit or pool logit regression models in 
their analysis (Chang, Kang, & Li, 2016; Fatemi & Bildik, 2012; Hoberg & 
Prabhala, 2009; Kim & Kim, 2013). 
However, this study used panel regression for the binary logit model because the 
data was collected from various firms across different period of time. The panel 
regression analysis has numerous advantages over pooled regression analysis. The 
panel data accounts for the individual heterogeneity of the firms. Baltagi (2005) 
contended that panel data control for heterogeneity and seem to be more informative, 
account for more reliability and degrees of freedom, have increased efficiency and 
have less collinearity among the variables under investigation. 
Conversely, pooling the data that was obtained from different firms and across 
different time may lead to bias due to unobserved firms‘ individual heterogeneity. 
This is because the pooled regression ignores any differences that may arise due the 
characteristics of unit in the sample. Although some procedures have been offered 
for instance, to test for the equality of the coefficients as to whether to pool the data 
or not to pool. Nevertheless, this procedure (pooled coefficients) has been criticized 
by some scholars. For example,  Andres, Golsch, and Schmidt (2013)  and Maddala, 
Trost, Li, and Joutz (1997) contended that it is not realistic to assume that the slope 
of the coefficients in the pooled regression is homogeneous as the differences in the 
features of individual entity in this case firms with regards to panel data cannot be 
disputed. Thus, according to Podestà (2002) the conclusion that may be drawn from 
the use of pooled coefficients estimates may be unjustified. Consequently, panel data 
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models can address those shortcomings that surround the use of the pool regression 
model (Baltagi, 2005). Therefore, the current study uses panel data regression 
models to account for the unobserved individual firms‘ heterogeneity. 
Basically, Baltagi (2005) stated that there are two commonly approaches to panel 
data analysis, fixed effects and random effects models. The fixed effects models 
consider the fact that every cross section has distinct features that are correlated with 
the regressors. This distinct feature of each cross-section is depicted by a subscript i 
on the intercept. The subscript i provides that a difference exists across the firms or 
entities under investigation only and do not extends across the timing. Hence, the 
fixed effects model in this case control for the time in-variant of entity‘s 
characteristics (Gujarati, 2004). This means that the intercept of fixed effect models 
varies whereas the slope coefficients do not change across entities or firms. 
On the other hand, the assumption of random effects models is that the regressors of 
the model are uncorrelated with the individual specific effects. A time invariant 
observation is also included in the random effects model. However, random effects 
model negates to consider the model‘s intercept as static as it is obtainable in the 
fixed effects model. The intercept here is considered as a random variable having a 
mean value of (β) beta. The difference in the intercept value for the individual entity 
or firm is reflected in the error term of the model instead of the subscript. 
Accordingly, beta (β) and error term are used to show the cross-sectional mean value 
of the intercepts and deviation of the intercept from its mean value respectively. 
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To select between fixed effects and random effects model, a test is conducted known 
as Hausman test. This test allows the researcher to decide on the appropriate model 
to be reported with consistent estimates between fixed and random effects models. 
Greene (2012) noted that the rational of the using the Hausman test in panel 
regression model is to detect whether the result are inconsistent with the assumption 
on random effects model. The null Hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the 
estimated random and fixed effects coefficients are consistent. If the p-value is 
statistically insignificant that is having probability greater than 5% then it is better 
and safer to use random effects results. However, if the result from Hausman test 
shows that the probability is statistically significant, in this scenario, the fixed effects 
results is the appropriate and it should be the result to reported. 
Conversely, for the cleaning of the data, this study winsorizes all the continuous 
variables at 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the potential effect of outliers and is in 
line with Grullon, Paye, Underwood, and Weston (2011). Regarding the statistical 
tool of analysis, the study uses Stata in conducting the various tests and for the panel 
logit regression analysis. For robustness check, the study uses random panel logit 
throughout the binary estimation models. Except for the linear model, in which the 
study uses dividend to total assets as an alternative measure of the dependent 
variable. In this case, panel corrected standard error (PCSE) estimation is used which 
allows for addressing any potential threat of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in 
the disturbances (Beck and Katz, 1995). 
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3.11 Univariate Analysis 
In examining the propensity to pay dividends, univariate analysis was conducted 
using board characteristics, ownership structures, and firm characteristics. The 
analysis allows the study to examine whether firms may be classified based on their 
dividend status, that is dividend payers and non-dividends payers, and whether they 
differ from each other based on firm characteristics, governance and ownership 
structures. 
3.12 Dependent Variable Estimation 
The study constructs the dependent variable by adopting the Fama and French (2001) 
propensity to pay dividends model and is shown as Model 1. The sample firms used 
during the construction of the dependent variable is 89 firms every year. The 
following steps explained the process the current study follows to construct the 
dependent variable. 
First, the study identifies three firm characteristics that were previously used in the 
literature of the propensity to pay dividends (Fama & French, 2001; Fatemi & 
Bildik, 2012; Ferris et al., 2006; Tangjitprom, 2013). These characteristics include 
return on assets, firm size, and growth opportunities. Return on assets is measured 
using profit before interest and tax scaled by total assets. Firm size is obtained by 
taking the logarithm of total assets whereas, investment growth opportunities are 
measured by the market value of the total capital to the book value of total assets (the 
market value of total capital is determined as book value of total assets less book 
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value of equity plus market value of equity). The model that incorporated these three 
variables is shown as Model 1. 
Second, annual logit regressions are run over the sample period of 7 years. The 
dependent variable is 1, if a firm pays dividend in a year and 0 if otherwise. The 
explanatory variables are return on assets, firm size, and growth opportunities. In 
line with previous literature such as Tangjitprom (2013) and Ferris et al. (2006), the 
coefficients are then averaged based on the sampling period (7 years). 
Third, to identify a payer, the values of the firm characteristics for each year are 
fitted into Model 1 that has average coefficients and therefore, computed by 
summing together such that the values of y* can be obtained. 
Fourth, following Hu and Kumar (2004), Officer (2006) and Tangjitprom (2013) a 
probability score is obtained for every firm in each year with the help of excel sheet 
in estimating the probability function (Prob.=e y*/1+ey*). Further and consistent with 
the propensity to pay dividends literature, a firm is predicted to be a dividend payer 
when its predicted probability score is equal to or greater than to 50% and if it did 
pay a dividend in that year this is coded as ‗1‘, and otherwise ‗0‘. Following this 
process will allow the study to ascertain the effectiveness of the board characteristics 
and the type of ownership used in the study. Therefore, the logit regression model is 
adopted from Fama and French (2001) and is depicted as follows: 
Yit = β0 + β1ROAit + β2FSIZEit + β3INVSTit + Eit ……………………………. (1) 
Where Y = an indicator variable one if firm pays a dividend and zero otherwise 
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ROA = Return on Assets 
FSIZE = Firm size 
INVST = Investment growth 
β0 – β3 = Coefficients of the logit model 
E = error term 
3.13 Research Model 
This study investigates the relationship between propensity to pay dividends, board 
characteristics and ownership structures in non-financial firms listed on NSE. The 
variables for the study comprise dependent, independent, moderating and control 
variables. The dependent variable is the predicted probability score is equal to or 
greater than 50% and if it did pay a dividend in that year this is coded as ‗1‘, and 
otherwise ‗0‘ which is obtained from Model 1. This measurement is in line with the 
previous empirical studies on the propensity to pay dividends (Denis & Osobov, 
2008; Fama & French, 2001; Fatemi & Bildik, 2012; Hu & Kumar, 2004; Kim & 
Kim, 2013; Tangjitprom, 2013). 
Model 2 is designed to answer research question one and two of the study, and it is 
shown as follows: 
PPDit = β0 + β1BSIZEit + β2BCOMPit + β3BDIVERit + β4FINEXPit + β5CEOTit + 
β6FOREOit + β7MANOit + β8BLOCKHit + β9FAGEit + β10FSIZEit + β11FLEVit + 
β12SGWRTit + β13RETEit + Eit………………………. (2). 
This study also investigates the interaction effect of blockholders on the relationship 
between the propensity to pay dividends and board characteristics in non-financial 
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listed firms.  Thus, Model 3 of this study is set to answer research question three and 
is depicted as follows: 
PPDit = β0 + β1BSIZEit + β2BCOMPit + β3BDIVERit + β4FINEXPit + β5CEOTit + 
β6FOREOit + β7MANOit + β8BLOCKHit + β9BSIZE*BLOCKHit + 
β10BCOMP*BLOCKHit + β11BDIVER*BLOCKHit + β12FINEXP*BLOCKHit + 
β13CEOT*BLOCKHit + β14FAGEit + β15FSIZEit + β16FLEVit + β17SGWRTit + 
β18RETEit + Eit………………………. (3). 
Following Baron and Kenny (1986) the interaction terms were constructed by 
obtaining the product of the independent variables values of interest (board size, 
board composition, financial expert on board and CEO tenure values) and the 
moderating variable values (blockholders ownership). For example, if the value of 
board size for a period is 5 and for blockholders ownership is 0.45, the product result 
will be 2.25 (5*0.45). The same procedure was followed to obtain the values of the 
other interaction terms used in this study. 
Table 3.1 below contains the full information of the acronyms used in the models as 
well as the measurement of each variable in addition to the source of each variable. 
Table 3.1  
Variable Definition and Measurement for the Study  
Acronym Definition  Variable measurement Prior Studies 
PPD Propensity to pay 
dividends 
 
The dependent variable is the 
predicted probability score is 
equal to or greater than to 50% 
and if it did pay a dividend in 
that year this is coded as ‗1‘, 
and otherwise ‗0‘.  
Yit = β0 + β1ROAit + β2FSIZEit 
+ β3INVSTit + Eit 
 
Fama & French, 
2001; Fatemi & 
Bildik, 2012; 
Ferris et al., 2006; 
Hu & Kumar, 







Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Acronym Definition  Variable measurement Prior Studies 
BSIZE Board size Total number of 




de Villiers et al. 
(2011) 
BCOMP  Board 
composition  
Percentage of outside 
directors on the board   
Abor and Fiador 
(2013) 
BDIVER Board diversity Percentage of female 
directors on board   
Pucheta-Martinez 
and Bel-Oms (2016) 
FINEXP Professionals on 
the board 
Percentage of financial 
experts on the board 
(accounting, finance 
and business) 




CEOT CEO Tenure   Number of years spent 
as CEO in the firm  
 
Feng et al. (2007)  
McGuinness et al. 




Proportion of shares 
held by foreign 
investors to the total 
number of shares in 
issue  
Jeon et al. (2011),  




The proportion of the 
number of shares held 
by executive directors 
divided by the total 
number of firms shares 
Ishak (2010), Burg, 




BLOCKH Blockholders  The owners of at least 
5% shares of the firm   
Thomsen et al. 
(2006), Sanda et al. 
(2010) 
BSIZE*BLOCKH Interaction term of 
board size 
Board size value 
multiply by the value of 
blockholders ownership 
Baron and Kenny 
(1986) 
BCOMP*BLOCKH Interaction term of 
board composition 
Board composition 
value multiply by the 
value of blockholders 
ownership 







Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Acronym Definition  Variable measurement Prior Studies 
BDIVER*BLOCKH Interaction term of 
board diversity 
Board diversity value 
multiply by the value of 
blockholders ownership 
Baron and Kenny 
(1986) 
FINEXP*BLOCKH Interaction term of 
financial experts  
Financial experts value 
multiply by the value of 
blockholders ownership 
Baron and Kenny 
(1986) 
CEOT*BLOCKH Interaction term of 
CEO tenure 
 
CEO tenure value 
multiply by the value of 
blockholders ownership 





Firm age  The number of years the 
firm has been listed on the 
stock exchange 
Hu and Kumar 
(2004) 
FSIZE Firm size  The logarithms of total 
assets at the end of firm‘s 
accounting year 
Sharma (2011) 





SGWRT Sales growth  Current sales less previous 
sales divided by previous 
sales 




RETE Retained earnings  Retained earnings to total 
capital 
Francis, Hasan, 
John and  Song 
(2011),  
Bulan and Tanlu 
(2007) 
ROA Return on assets Return on assets is 
measured using profit 
before interest and tax 
scaled by total assets.  
Fama and French 






Market value of the total 
capital to the book value 
of total assets 
Fatemi and Bildik 




3.14 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter discusses the research framework and the research methodology. The 
hypotheses developed are based on the association between board characteristics, 
ownership structures and the propensity to pay dividends in the Nigerian setting 
moderated by blockholders ownership. The board characteristics used in this study 
comprise board size, board composition, board diversity, financial expertise on board 
and CEO tenure. Regarding the ownership structures, the variables under 
consideration are foreign and managerial ownership as the independent variables 
while blockholders is used as a moderating variable. The hypotheses in this study are 
based on agency and resource dependency theories findings from the previous 
literature. The chapter also discusses the control variables that are used in the study. 
The study uses a correlational research design, focusing on non-financial sectors as 
the population. The study period covers the yeas from 2009 to 2015 based on the 
availability of relevant information needed to test the model. The chapter also 
provides information on the techniques and tools of analysis and the measurement of 








RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS                                                                      
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the data analysis and discusses the results of the study. At the 
beginning, it provides the population and sample classification in detail. Following 
this are descriptive statistics of the study and multivariate analyses for testing the 
research hypotheses. It also presents the results from diagnostic test relevant to the 
focus of study. The last part of the discussion presents the summary of the chapter. 
4.2 Population of the Study 
The total number of listed firms on the main market of the NSE market during the 
period of study was found to be 158 firms. Of this figure, 53 firms are financial firms 
representing 33.5% and 105 firms are the non-financial firms listed representing 
66.5%. From the total of 105 non-financial listed firms, 16 firms were further 
excluded due to missing information. This exclusion scaled down the sample size of 
the study to only 89 non-financial firms, which represents 53.6% of the total listed 
firms. The details of the sample size are shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 
Population and Sample for the Study 
Population during the period 2009-2015 Unit % 
Total listed firms in Nigeria Stock Exchange 158 100 
Less: Financial firms 53 33.5 
Total non-financial firms 105 66.5 
Less: Firms with missing information 16 15.2 
Total Sample for the study 89 53.3 
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Table 4.2 shows the total of 89 firms obtained from 10 different sectors of the NSE. 
The consumer goods sector has the highest number of firms with 18 firms 
representing 20.2%. Next is the services sector with 16 firms, which accounts for 
18% followed by industrial goods with 14 firms, which accounts for 15.7%. The rest 
are oil and gas having 9 firms representing 10.1%; healthcare 8 firms representing 
9%; ICT has 7 firms representing 7.9%; conglomerate 5 firms representing 5.6%; 
agriculture, construction and natural resources with 4 firms each, which accounts for 
4.5% each. 
Consequently, the firm-year observations of this study are 623 for the 7-year period 
(2009-2015). During the filtering process, the study uncovered 27 observations, 
which were categorized as outlier cases and are excluded from the analysis. Finally, 
this left the study with 596 firm-year observations. Table 4.2 present the details of 
the sample. 
Table 4.2  
Sectorial Classification of the Firms 




Agriculture 1 4 4.5 28 
Conglomerates 2 5 5.6 35 
Construction/real est. 3 4 4.5 28 
Consumer goods 4 18 20.2 126 
Healthcare 5 8 9 56 
ICT 6 7 7.9 49 
Industrial goods 7 14 15.7 98 
Natural resources 8 4 4.5 28 
Oil and gas 9 9 10.1 63 
Services 10 16 18 112 
Total firms/observations  89 100 623 
Less: Outlier cases 27 
Final observations for the study 596 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics in this study includes the mean, the standard deviation, the 
minimum and the maximum values of variables used in this study. These statistics 
give a brief description of the propensity to pay dividends, which is the dependent 
variable. The rest includes a description of board structures, ownership and the 
control variables adopted for the study. Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics. 
Table 4.3  
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample Firms 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PPD 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
BSIZE 8.62 2.15 5.00 15.00 
BCOMP 0.69 0.12 0.33 0.90 
BDIVER 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.40 
FINEXP 0.44 0.16 0.17 1.00 
CEOT 7.55 6.80 1.00 33.00 
FOREO 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.87 
MANO 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.63 
BLOCKH 0.56 0.21 0.05 0.97 
FAGE 21.30 12.86 1.00 44.00 
FSIZE (Naira)  39.30 85.40 124.66 592.00 
FLEV 0.53 0.21 0.14 0.90 
SGRWT 0.12 0.30 -0.88 0.88 
RETE 0.55 0.19 -0.04 0.95 
Note: PPD=propensity to pay dividends; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition; BDIVER=board 
diversity; FINEXP= financial experts on board; CEOT=CEO tenure; FOREO=foreign ownership; 
MANO=managerial ownership; BLOCKH=blockholders ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; 
FLEV=firm leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; and RETE=retained earnings to total capital. 
From the Table 4.3 the average and the standard deviation of the propensity to pay 
dividends are 52% and 50% respectively. The minimum value is zero while the 
maximum is 1. The board size, which is a count variable has a mean value of 8.6 and 
standard deviation of 2.1. The table also shows a minimum of 5 members sitting on 
the board with a maximum of 15 members. This means that the sample firms comply 
with the 2011 NCCG that requires firms to have five directors as minimum sitting on 
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the board. Regarding the board composition, the mean value and standard deviation 
are 69% and 12% respectively. The mean value of board composition is slightly 
lower as compared to the mean of 70.4% documented from the United States 
(Sharma, 2011). The minimum value for the outside directors on board is 33%. This 
implies that some firms do not comply with the NCCG 2011 that mandates firms to 
have a majority of outside directors occupying the board. Females on the average 
account for only 8% with a variability of 9%. However, the statistics here indicates 
that non-financial firms in Nigeria have a higher score of female directors on board 
compared with the mean value of 7.8% reported from Spanish listed firm (Pucheta-
Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2016). However, some Nigerian firms had 0% with regard to 
female representation on the board whereas, some firms had a remarkable female 
representation their boards of up to 40%. 
Financial expertise on board of the sample firms has a mean value of 44% relative to 
board size with a standard deviation of 16%. The minimum value for financial 
experts on board is 17% whereas the maximum value is 100% implying that all firms 
within the sampling period have financial experts on their board. The results of this 
statistic is in agreement with the previous findings of Jeanjean and Stolowy (2009) 
from France and Chan, Faff, Khan, and Mather (2013) in Australia that reported a 
maximum value of 100% with respect to financial experts. The result suggests that 
financial experts on a board are important to the firm because they provide financial 
services to the firm among other contributions. This is consistent with the literature 
that notes that financial experts have an important role for instance addressing 
agency problems (Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2009). 
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CEO tenure, which is measured in years in this study, has an average of 7.55 and 
standard deviation of 6.8 years since the appointment as CEO. Using data from the 
United States, Hu and Kumar (2004) reported the mean and standard deviation of 
CEO tenure to be  8.7 and 7.5 years respectively. These figures are slightly higher 
than what is found in this study. Moreover, Sharma (2011) presented 15 and 11 years 
of the CEO tenure as the mean value and standard deviation respectively. His 
findings implied CEOs in the United States have a longer tenure that those in 
Nigeria. 
The first variable on the ownership structures is foreign ownership. The mean value 
of foreign ownership is 25% and standard deviation of 29% indicates that foreign 
investors have some controlling shares in the sample study. Thus, the minimum and 
maximum value range from 0% to 87% respectively. This mean shows that foreign 
ownership may have a considerable influence on all the firm decisions. 
Managerial ownership accounts for 7% on the average with a standard deviation of 
15%. The minimum in this case is also 0% while the maximum value is 63%. These 
statistics have important implications with respect agency theory such that firms with 
reasonable ownership are likely to pursue activities in line with the interests of other 
shareholders. However, in Malaysia, the mean and maximum values of managerial 
holdings are 20.9% of 88.9% respectively (Ishak, 2010). This is higher than those of 
Nigerian managers. From the descriptive statistics, blockholders scored a mean of 
56% on the average with a minimum of 5% and a maximum of 97%. The mean of 
this study is considerably higher than the mean of 36% documented by Liljeblom 
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and Maury (2016) and 32.94% by Harada and Nguyen (2011) from Russia and Japan 
respectively. 
Firm age has an average of 21.3 years with a standard deviation of 12.86 and the age 
runs from 1 to 44 years for the minimum and maximum value respectively. Hence, 
this indicates a relatively high variability of the sample firms with a high of 44 years 
of listing and a low of 1 year prior to the study period. 
Firm size is the natural log of total assets. However, for the descriptive statistics, the 
untransformed figure of the total assets is used. In this regard, the mean value of the 
total assets is 39.30 billion Naira, further, the maximum is figure among the sample 
firms is 592 billion Naira. 
Firm leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. The study reveals a mean of 
53% with a standard deviation of 21%. The leverage ratio ranges from a low value of 
14% to a high value of 90%. These statistics indicate that the sampled non-financial 
firms are highly indebted. This is true when  compared with a mean value of 22% as 
reported by Jiraporn, Kim and Kim (2011) from the United States. 
Sales growth which is the change in sales between a period, is used as a proxy for 
investment growth in Model 2 and Model 3. The statistics show that on the average 
the firms have a mean value of 12% as compared with Amidu and Abor (2006) that 
shows sales growth among firms in Ghana  to be 35.2%. Furthermore, some firms in 
the sample reported a decline in their sales of up to 88% while others have an 
increase in their sales of up to 88%. 
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The last control variable of this study is ratio of retained earnings to capital. The 
statistics for this variable accounts for a mean of 55% remarkably that is higher than 
the 11.7% reported for US firms (Jiraporn et al., 2011). Sample firms of this study 
show a minimum negative of 4%, implying accumulated losses over a period. 
Conversely, the maximum value is considerably higher having a value of 95%. 
This study also provides the descriptive statistics for the dividends payers and non-
dividend payers separately. This is presented in Table 4.4. Prior studies have reveal 
that dividend paying and non-paying firms have distinctive features both in financial 
governance and characteristics (Fatemi & Bildik, 2012; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Kim & 
Kim, 2013). 
Table 4.4 
Descriptive Statistics for the Dividend Payers and Non-dividends Payers Firm  
Dividends payers: PPD = 1 Non-dividends Payers: PPD = 0 
Variable Obs. Mean  St D Obs. Mean  St D P-value 
BSIZE 308 9.12 2.11 288 8.03 2.04 0.00 
BCOMP 308 0.69 0.12 288 0.69 0.13 0.66 
BDIVER 308 0.10 0.09 288 0.07 0.09 0.00 
FINEXP 308 0.47 0.16 288 0.41 0.17 0.00 
CEOT 308 5.79 5.03 288 9.44 7.87 0.00 
FOREO 308 0.31 0.29 288 0.20 0.28 0.00 
MANO 308 0.41 0.12 288 0.11 0.18 0.00 
BLOCKH 308 0.57 0.21 288 0.56 0.22 0.42 
FAGE 308 23.14 13.19 288 19.34 12.2 0.00 
FSIZE(Naira) 308 68.50 110.0 288 8.04 13.1 0.00 
FLEV 308 0.53 0.19 288 0.54 0.23 0.70 
SGRWT 308 0.27 0.17 288 -0.03 0.35 0.00 
RETE 308 0.57 0.17 288 0.54 0.21 0.105 
Note: PPD=propensity to pay dividends; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition; BDIVER=board 
diversity; FINEXP=financial experts on board; CEOT=CEO tenure; FOREO=foreign ownership; 
MANO=managerial ownership; BLOCKH=blockholders ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; 
FLEV=firm leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; and RETE=retained earnings to total capital. 
The statistics in Table 4.4 show that dividend paying firms have a large board size 
with a mean of 9.12 directors and higher proportion of gender diversity of 10% than 
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the non-paying firms. Regarding the presence of financial experts, the dividend 
payers have also a higher value of 47% compared with non-dividends paying firms 
with a value of 41%. CEOs in non-dividend paying firms have longer tenure with a 
mean value of 9.44 years than paying firms whose mean value of CEO tenure is 5.79 
years.  
On the other hand, the statistics of the ownership variables indicate that foreign 
shareholders focus more on dividend payers. The statistics show that the payers have 
on average a mean of 31% compared with non-payers that scored a mean of 20%, 
and this difference is statistically significant. Furthermore, the dividend payers 
continue to show higher percentages in the holdings of managers and blockholders 
respectively. Consistent with Jiraporn et al. (2011), this study shows a percentage of 
managerial ownership in dividend payers of 41%, which is considerably higher than 
the 11% of the non-paying firms. 
Conversely, the statistics on firm financial characteristics in Table 4.4 also shows 
that dividend paying firms are more matured than non-paying firms as the mean age 
of paying firms is 23.14 years compared to non-dividend paying firms with a mean 
age of 19.34 years. The dividend payers are also larger in size as measured by total 
assets of 68.5 billion Naira and have a higher change in sales of 27% and retained 
earnings of 57% than the non-dividend paying firms with mean total assets 8.04 
billion Naira, change in sales of -3% and retained earnings of 54%. These statistics 
confirm the findings revealed by previous studies (DeAngelo et al., 2006; Fama & 
French, 2001; Fatemi & Bildik, 2012; Ferris et al., 2006).  
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Regarding the firms‘ leverage, the current study found non-dividend paying firms to 
be more indebted than the dividend paying firms. The result is in line with Sharma 
(2011) who documented that non-dividend paying firms are relatively more indebted 
and accounted for 54% compared to payers whose mean value was 53%. This 
implies that non-paying firm uses debt to finance their assets and are more likely to 
be subjected to dividend payment restrictions. Thus, they reserve more cash for 
debtholders. 
4.4 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation analysis is conducted to show the association between the dependent 
and independent variables as well as the relationship among the independent 
variables. The correlation analysis of the independent variables is to enable the study 
to ascertain the direction and strength of relationship. All the independent variables 
are continuous; hence, Pearson correlation is used for this study. 
Table 4.5 shows the correlation between all the variables. According to Pallant 
(2011) correlation can be regarded as small when (r=0.10 to 0.29), or medium  
(r=0.30 to 0.49) or large (r=0.50 to 1.0). With respect to this rule of thumb, none of 
the variables exhibited high correlations amongst them and that will require further 
attention. 
The variables with the highest correlation of 48% is between foreign ownership and 
blockholders ownership; this is followed by foreign ownership and firm age with 
43%. Meanwhile, other variables with a moderate correlation irrespective of the 
direction include board size and financial experts on the board 41%, board size and 
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firm size 42%, managerial ownership and firm age 39%, CEO tenure and managerial 
ownership 39%, board composition and managerial ownership 30% as shown in 
Table 4.5. All these values of the correlation are within the medium range of r=0.30 
to 0.49 and do not pose a multicollinearity threat. 
The lowest correlation is 0.11%, which is between CEO tenure and retained 
earnings. Based on these analysis, the correlation between explanatory variables 
confirmed the absence of a perfect association. Overall and in accordance with the 
threshold documented by Gujarati, (2004) and Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson 
(2010), the argument may be made that no multicollinearity issue exists in the study 
because none of the correlation coefficients has a value greater than 0.80. 
Apart from the magnitude, Table 4.5 also shows the direction of the association 
between the variables used in this study and whether they are positive or negative. 
Firms with a large number of board members have a higher portion of female 
directors on the board and are more likely to pay dividends, and the result is 
statistically significant at 1%. However, this result needs to be validated using causal 
analyses. In addition, firms that are controlled by foreign shareholders also have the 
tendency to pay dividends. Furthermore, large and matured firms among the non-
financial firms in the NSE market have a higher sales growth and are more likely to 
pay dividends. 
The correlation between the propensity to pay dividends and firm size is found to be 
positive and statistically significant at 1%. This shows that larger firms are more 
likely to be a dividend paying firm. Conversely, the correlation of CEO tenure and 
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propensity to pay dividends is negative and significant at 1%. This means that firms 
that have CEOs with longer tenure and have considerable managerial ownership are 
less likely to pay dividends. As noted earlier, the findings from the correlation is not 
a causal relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. 
The correlation among the independent variables is also discussed. Board size and 
foreign shareholders are positively correlated indicating that firms with a higher 
number of directors tend to be controlled by foreign investors.  From the correlation 
analysis, the results reveal that firms with larger boards have lower financial 
expertise on boards with shorter CEO tenure and less managerial ownership. The 
results are statistically significant at 1%, and the results may imply that these 
variables are substitutes for each other. The correlation results also show that, among 
the samples firms, matured firms are more likely to have higher sales growth. 
Outside directors on board is negatively correlated with CEO tenure and managerial 
ownership. This correlation result suggests that firms with more outside directors 
may shorten the tenure of CEOs. On the other hand, the firms may be less matured 
and with lower debt to finance its assets and have a lower tendency in the profit 
retention rate. This is an indication that outside directors on board and debt are 
substitutes for each other. 
For firms with a higher proportion of female directors on board may result in a 
higher percentage of financial experts on board. Thus, indicating that the firms may 
be more diverse in terms of gender and financial expertise. Further, the firms could 
be matured and may experience a higher sale growth rate. However, these firms may 
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have a lower tendency to have CEOs with longer tenure. Likewise, firms with a 
considerable portion of females on the board may be less controlled by foreign and 
managerial ownership. Moreover, firms with more female directors on the board 
may have lower blockholders. The result may be inferred that firms with 
blockholders are less likely to be a diverse firm in terms of females. Furthermore, the 
result may indicate that blockholders are less likely to support hiring of a female 
director. 
The result of the correlation of this study also shows that matured firms may have 
more financial experts on the board that were hired to advice the CEO and serve the 
firms in general. This result implies that matured firms require the services of more 
financial experts to properly manage their accumulated funds. 
The last variable among the board characteristics variables is CEO tenure. CEO 
tenure is positively associated with managerial ownership. The correlational result of 
this variable revealed that firms with a CEO serving for a longer period may be 
controlled by executive directors. therefore, reducing the intensity of agency 
problems. This is because the CEO may be less likely to be entrenched. The result 
also indicated firms with longer CEOs tenure may have low foreign ownership, have 
less debt and be less matured. CEO tenure and firm leverage are negatively 
correlated. The result shows that firms with longer CEO tenure are less levered 
indicating that the firms may finance their assets with few debts. 
The results from the correlational analysis of the ownership variables shows that 
foreign and blockholders ownership are positively correlated. The result is 
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statistically significant at 5%. The results also indicate that foreign investors prefer 
more matured and larger firms with a higher growth rate. The correlation result also 
shows that firms with a large percentage of foreign ownership may have a 
considerable number of shares that are controlled by blockholders. In addition, the 
firms could be matured firms that finance their assets through debt and have a higher 
growth rate. Thus, these matured firms may have more access to debt that can be 
employed for asset financing. However, the result from the correlation of foreign and 
managerial ownership is negative. This suggest that executive directors on the board 
may be less interested in investing in firms controlled by foreign investors. It is also 
possible that foreign owners do not use executive directors for control with respect to 
agency theory. 
Like the foreign controlled firms, the results of the correlation also show that 
managerial controlled firms are positively correlated with blockholders indicating 
that the firms tend to have more blockholders ownership. In contrast, the managerial-
controlled firms are less matured and have less sales growth as compared to the 
foreign-controlled firms. 
The correlation result between blockholder ownership and firm size is positive and 
significant. The results show that the larger the firm the more the blockholders in the 
firm. Therefore, blockholders may have more control in larger firms. The result also 
revealed that the blockholder-controlled firms have a higher tendency to finance 
their assets using debts. The correlational result between blockholders and size of the 
firm, may also indicate that the firms have more access to debt financing and, 
therefore, may use debt for their operations.
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Table 4.5  
Correlation Matrix for all Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.PPD  1              
2.BSIZE 0.269*** 1             
3.BCOMP -0.017 0.058 1            
4.BDIVER 0.160*** 0.057 0.015 1           
5.FINEXP 0.179*** -0.389*** -0.049 0.177*** 1          
6.CEOT -0.269*** -0.180*** -0.163** * -0.028 -0.045 1         
7.FOREO 0.185*** 0.112** -0.022 -0.187*** 0.070 -0.228*** 1        
8.MANO -0.219*** -0.171*** -0.303*** -0.087* -0.066 0.393*** -0.178*** 1       
9.BLOCKH 0.032 -0.001 0.015 -0.240*** 0.066 -0.140*** 0.482*** 0.097* 1      
10.FAGE 0.148*** 0.104* -0.029 0.120** 0.090* -0.292*** 0.439*** -0.385*** -0.025 1     
11.FSIZE 0.562*** 0.419*** -0.088* 0.049 0.108** -0.183*** 0.233*** -0.235*** 0.158*** 0.092* 1    
12.FLEV -0.015 0.002 -0.160*** -0.063 0.023 -0.115** 0.080* -0.002 0.083* 0.187*** 0.174*** 1   
13.SGRWT 0.473*** 0.094* 0.014 0.101* 0.079 -0.141*** 0.110** -0.142*** 0.070 0.140*** 0.190*** 0.075 1  
14.RETE 0.066 0.064 -0.090* -0.005 -0.036 0.001 0.027 0.056 0.005 -0.003 0.147*** 0.076 0.004 1 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimates are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. PPD=propensity to pay dividends; BSIZE=board size; 
BCOMP=board composition; BDIVER=board diversity; FINEXP=financial experts on board; CEOT=CEO tenure; FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO=managerial ownership; BLOCKH= 
blockholders ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV= firm leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; and RETE= retained earnings to total capital. 
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4.5 Multivariate Analysis 
This section discusses the results for the multivariate analysis applied in this study 
that aimed at investigating the effect of board characteristics and ownership 
structures on the decision to pay dividends as well as the interaction effect of 
blockholders among the listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. The section is 
rearranged as follows: first, the study discusses the underlying assumption of logit 
regression, second, the study discusses the results of panel logit regression, and third, 
the additional sensitivity analysis. 
4.5.1 Assumptions of Logistic Regression 
The econometrics process suggests some diagnostic tests depending on the nature of 
the dependent and independent variables. Because the dependent variable of this is 
binary in nature, the diagnostic checks for this model differ from those used for 
continuous variables as dependent variables. Hair et al. (2010) Pallant (2011) and 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) stated that logistics regression considers three critical 
assumptions that include sample size, multicollinearity and tests for outliers. Studies 
that use a binary number as the dependent variable are obliged to consider these 
assumptions. The following discuss the assumption of logit regression. 
4.5.1.1 Sample Size 
The first assumption is the sample size or the number of cases to be examined. 
According to Pallant (2011) argument in a logit regression when the independent 
variables are large, the data set also is required to be large. In specific terms, Roscoe 
(1975) as cited in Sekaran and Bougie (2016), provides that the set of data needed 
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for a single  independent variable should range from 10-20. Hence, the data set in 
this study contains 596 cases with a minimum of 13 explanatory variables and it 
represents a ratio of 45:1. This ratio meets the requirement as suggested by Roscoe 
(1975) and Pallant (2011). 
4.5.1.2 Multicollinearity Assumption 
Before conducting a logistic regression analysis, it is imperative to ensure that the 
logistic regression model has little or no multicollinearity. This means that the 
independent variables are expected to be independent. Multicollinearity occurs when 
an explanatory variable is strongly associated with one or more of the other 
explanatory variables (r > 0.90) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). 
The test of multicollinearity for the explanatory variables is presented in Table 4.6. 
The results from the test indicates that the variables do not go beyond the acceptable 
limit. According to Gujarati (2004), the acceptable range of variance inflation factors 
(VIF) values should not be greater than 10 as this may pose a problem of  
multicollinearity. In other words, multicollinearity exists when the tolerance value is 
less than 0.01 (Hair et al., 2010; Pallant, 2011). In line with this suggestion, none of 
the variables has a tolerance value of less than 0.01 or a VIF value of more than 10.  
The highest VIF value in this study is 1.9 for foreign ownership, followed by board 
size, firm age and firm size for 1.72, 1.69, 1.60 respectively. On the other hand, the 
least is 1.06 for retained earnings followed by sales growth with a VIF value of 1.09 




Table 4.6  
Multicollinearity Diagnostic Test  
Variable VIF Tolerance 
BSIZE 1.69 0.5928 
BCOMP 1.22 0.8195 
BDIVER 1.2 0.8364 
FINEXP 1.43 0.7013 
CEOT 1.31 0.7632 
FOREO 1.91 0.5244 
MANO 1.60 0.6242 
BLOCKH 1.56 0.6418 
FAGE 1.72 0.5828 
FSIZE 1.64 0.6096 
FLEV 1.17 0.8546 
SGRWT 1.09 0.9133 
RETE 1.06 0.9466 
MEAN VIF 1.43  
Note: BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition; BDIVER=board diversity; FINEXP=financial experts on 
board; CEOT=CEO tenure; FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO=managerial ownership; BLOCKH= 
blockholders ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV=firm leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; and 
RETE= retained earnings to total capital 
4.5.1.3 Outliers Test 
Hair et al. (2010) stated that outliers are observations with a peculiar combination of 
characteristics and distinctively different from other observations. Furthermore, 
Pallant (2011) denotes that cases with a standardised residual of greater than 3.3 or 
less than -3.3 are regarded as outliers. This study employed residuals during the 
cleaning of the data to ensure that it is free from outliers. Accordingly, in this study, 
the maximum standardized residual is 2.68 and the minimum is -3.10. In this regard, 





Table 4.7  
Outlier Test Using Residual Statistics  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Residuals (r) 596 -0.01 0.74 -3.12 2.63 
Std. residual (rs) 596 -0.01 0.76 -3.10 2.68 
4.6 Panel Logit Regression Results 
The models for estimating the propensity to pay dividends is developed to include 
board characteristics and ownership structures variables. Model 1 is used to construct 
the dependent variable. The independent variables in that model are ROA, firm size 
and investment growth with a binary number as the dependent variable, and the 
model along with the results are shown in Table 4.8 
Yit = β0 + β1ROAit + β2FSIZEit + β3INVSTit + Eit……………………………..(1) 
Table 4.8  
Yearly Regression and Average Statistics from Model 1 for PPD Modelling 
Year ROA FSIZE INVST CONS LR Chi Sqr 
2009 7.89 1.40 -1.28 -9.02 29.29*** 
2010 17.18 0.64 -0.55 -5.25 34.11*** 
2011 10.87 0.83 1.20 -6.79 26.15*** 
2012 3.74 0.85 -0.85 -5.04 13.34*** 
2013 12.59 1.10 -0.25 -7.43 25.13*** 
2014 4.79 1.67 -3.26 -9.69 28.33*** 
2015 3.37 1.49 -3.11 -8.80 28.16*** 
Average coef. 8.63 1.14 -1.16 -7.43 26.36*** 
Average Std. Err. 3.054 0.416 1.457 2.765  
Average z 2.612 2.721 -0.742 -2.675  
Average P>z 0.016 0.014 0.206 0.009  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimates are statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. ROA=return on assets; FSIZE=firm size; INVST=investment growth opportunities; CONS= 
constant; and LR Chi sqr=likelihood-ratio chi-square. 
Table 4.8 contains the results of annual logit regressions that explain the probability 
of firms to pay dividends. For each year from 2009 to 2015 the separate logit 
regressions were run for all the sample firms. The table also reported average 
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coefficients, standard errors, z-values and the probability values that are used for the 
estimation of annual logit regressions using Model 1. In agreement with Tangjitprom 
(2013), the current study also examines the overall significance of the models based 
on the likelihood ratio statistic results in Table 4.8. Evidently, the results from each 
of the estimates is statistically significant at 1%. Furthermore, the sign of the 
coefficients are consistent with the literature (Fama & French, 2001; Fatemi & 
Bildik, 2012) suggesting that more profitable and lager firms tends to pay dividends 
as oppose to loss and smaller firms. Whereas, highly growth firms are less likely to 
be among the dividend payers. 
However, except in 2011 for which investment growth (market to book value of 
equity) is found to be positive. This finding contradicts (Fama & French, 2001; 
Fatemi & Bildik, 2012) but is in line with Tangjitprom (2013) and partially in 
agreement with Ferris et al. (2006) that also reported a positive association between 
growth opportunities and dividends from Thailand and the United Kingdom 
respectively. The result may be interpreted because of the backdrop that the equity 
market suffered. In this, some firms in the NSE may have attempted to entice 
investors by paying more dividends. Alternatively, it may be argued the result is 
driven by the unique features of the Nigerian market. 
4.7 Model Fitness 
The fitness of the model is tested using likelihood ratio chi-square and Wald test. 





Model Fitness of Panel Logit Regression 
Model  Obs. Wald X
2 
 DF LR for rho Rho value 
Two (2)  596 44.87*** 13 46.33*** 0.633 
Three (3) 596 47.63*** 18 37.82*** 0.603 
***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
Table 4.9 shows the result from the fitness test of the two models in the study direct 
model (Model 2) and the moderating model (Model 3) which are used to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. Do board characteristics (composition, size, diversity, financial expertise on the 
board and CEO tenure) affect the propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria? 
2. Do ownership structures (foreign, managerial, and blockholders ownership) 
influence the propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria? 
3. Do blockholders moderate the relationship between board characteristics 
(composition, size, diversity, financial expertise on the board and CEO tenure) 
and the propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria? 
The Wald chi-square is reported in Table 4.9 provides statistical test for assessing the 
model fitness in other words, the difference between the base and proposed model. 
According to Hair et al. (2010) having a statistically significant Wald chi-square, is 
an indication of the fact that the model is fit which is similar to overall F test in 
linear regression. Based on this fact, the Wald chi-square statistic for the current 
study has a value of 44.87 with 13 degrees of freedom, and is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Hence, suggesting the fitness of the model in this case Model 2. 
 
 205 
Conversely, Model 3 contains five different interaction terms, and the results from 
the fitness test reveal Wald chi-square statistics of 47.63 with degrees of freedom of 
18, and the model is statistically significant at 1%. 
Equally, the likelihood-ratio tests for Model 2 and Model 3 are all significant at the 
1% level signifying that the amount of the total variance that has been contributed by 
(rho) the panel-level variance component. Similarly, the values of the rho from the 
results are consistently significant and different from zero for Model 2 and Model 3 
at 0.633 and 0.603 respectively. The results thus, suggest that the panel random 
effects models are better than the pooled models. 
4.8 Testing of Hypothesis and Discussion of Findings 
The results of the estimated panel logit regression are discussed in the following sub-
sections in detail. The discussions are centred on the predicted signs as well as the 
significance of each of the estimated parameters. Further, the study discusses the 
results of the two models separately. As mentioned earlier, Model 2 is a direct model 
whereas Model 3 is with interaction terms. All the two models were also re-
estimated using robust panel logit regression by clustering the standard error at the 
panel lid. 
4.9 The Effect of Board Characteristics and Ownership Structures on the 
Propensity to Pay Dividends 
Table 4.10 provides the results from Model 2 using panel logit regressions to test the 
effect of board characteristics and ownership structures on the propensity to pay 
dividends. The model also included five different firm specific characteristics as 
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control variables. The result is based on panel random estimation. This is because the 
post estimation conducted using Hausman specification test shows a chi-square 
statistic of 9.06 with a probability of 0.7686. Thus, this suggests that the random 
effect model serves as the best model for the analysis. The model employed in 
conducting the analysis is shown below as Model 2. 
PPDit = β0 + β1BSIZEit + β2BCOMPit + β3BDIVERit + β4FINEXPit + β5CEOTit + 
β6FOREOit + β7MANOit + β8BLOCKHit + β9FAGEit + β10FSIZEit + β11FLEVit + 
β12SGWRTit + β13RETEit + Eit………………………. (2). 
Table 4.10  
Results from the Direct Panel Logit Regression Model  
Variable  Expected Sign Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
BSIZE + -0.08 0.16 -0.52 0.60 
BCOMP + 0.08 2.18 0.04 0.97 
BDIVER + 8.62 3.41 2.52** 0.01 
FINEXP + 2.77 1.58 1.75* 0.08 
CEOT + -0.17 0.05 -3.03*** 0.00 
FOREO + 5.95 1.76 3.38*** 0.00 
MANO + 5.64 2.43 2.32** 0.02 
BLOCKH  -6.97 1.96 -3.55*** 0.00 
FAGE  -0.07 0.03 -2.02** 0.04 
FSIZE  6.11 1.03 5.89*** 0.00 
FLEV  -2.82 1.36 -2.07** 0.03 
SGRWT  12.97 2.20 5.90*** 0.00 
RETE  -0.533 0.95 -0.56 0.57 
_CONS  -38.90 6.99 -5.56*** 0.00 Chi-square 
LR test of rho 
Rho Value 
Hausman test:  
Chi-square 
Probability 






Notes: PPD=propensity to pay dividends; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition; BDIVER=board 
diversity; FINEXP=financial experts on the board; CEOT=CEO tenure; FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO= 
managerial ownership; BLOCKH=blockholders ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV=firm 
leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; RETE=retained earnings to total capital. ***, **, and * indicate that the 
parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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4.9.1 Board Size and Propensity to Pay Dividends 
It was hypothesized that board size affects the propensity to pay dividends 
positively. The result of the logit regression reported in Table 4.10 shows that board 
size and the propensity to pay dividends are negatively related, which means that the 
greater the board size the lower the probability for the firm to pay a dividend, 
although the result is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, when the sign of the 
association between the board size and propensity to pay dividend is considered, the 
inference can be made that the result is in line with the notion that a small board may 
be better in terms of monitoring and may not be easily manipulated by the managers 
as compared to a large board. 
Consequently, the result suggests that board size has no impact on the propensity to 
pay dividends. This finding is in line with the previous evidence  (Abdelsalam et al., 
2008; Arshad et al., 2013; Prasanna, 2014; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Yarram & 
Dollery, 2015) that board size does not influence decision to pay dividends and in 
contrast with the findings several scholars (Boumosleh & Cline, 2015; Idris et al., 
2017; Jiraporn & Ning, 2006) who revealed that a firm with a larger number of 
directors on board has more likelihood to affect the payment of dividends. Therefore, 
the finding contradicts the proposed hypothesis (H1) that suggests a positive 
association between board size and the propensity to pay dividends. The negative 
and insignificant findings might be due to the sampling period of the study as it 
covers period immediately after the financial crisis which occurred between 2007 to 
2009 (Abdulkadir, 2015) hence, may impact on the result of board size. 
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4.9.2 Board Composition and Propensity to Pay Dividends 
Board composition is the percentage of outside directors on board. The study 
predicted a positive association between board composition and the propensity to 
pay dividends. Hypothesis two (H2) suggests that the board composition is positively 
related to the propensity to pay dividends. However, the results of the current study 
as shown in Table 4.10 failed to establish a strong association between board 
composition and the decision to pay dividends. This result may imply that outside 
directors on the boards of non-financial listed firms are not influencing corporate 
payout. The findings is consistent with previous studies (Abdelsalam et al., 2008; De 
Cesari & Ozkan, 2014; Yarram & Dollery, 2015) that found no significant 
relationship between likely to pay dividends and board composition. However,  
contradicts Idris et al. (2017) that revealed a significant positive association between 
outside directors on board and decision to pay dividends from the NSE market.  
Some possible reasons for this outcome are the following. First, there are instances 
in some of the firms where previous executive directors having served the board who 
have retired are elected to the board again with non-executive status in other words 
continuation of directorship after retired as an executive director in the firm. 
Although the NCCG has advocated the need of the board of a firm to have most of 
its directors to be from outside, the NCCG did not expressly distinguish between a 
retired executive director who is appointed as an outside director and another outside 
director who has never worked in the firm. Therefore, this allows the firm to hire a 
retired executive director and classify him or her as an outside director. Thus, 
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according to Ofo (2011), this type of director may lack independent in character and 
judgment. 
Second, the management may have some degree of influence on who is to be 
appointed to the board irrespective of whether he or she has qualifications or does 
not have them (Okpara, 2011). Therefore, having connections with the top 
management may grant the candidates for the directorship to secure the position. 
Moreover, when these type of outside directors are appointed they may not be 
committed to the board activities such that they consider some important decisions 
that might affect shareholders‘ interests in the firm. Okpara (2011) noted that outside 
directors remain a challenge in Nigeria because of the inadequate skills and 
familiarity with board roles as well as the fiducial responsibilities. Hence, the board 
may become an avenue for meeting with friends rather than for discussing matters 
that relates to the firm and shareholders as well. 
Third, the outside directors may not be properly evaluated. Inadequate or the lack of 
proper techniques for evaluating the performance of outside directors may also pose 
a serious challenge to the enhancement of the corporate governance practices. This 
issue may, in turn, affect financial decision of which dividend payout decision is one 
of them. 
Fourth, in addition to the above reasons that may have affected the outcome of the 
association between board composition and propensity to pay dividend, may be the 
overstay of directors. This makes members fall short in their monitoring and 
resource provision roles in the firm. 
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4.9.3 Board Diversity and Propensity to Pay Dividends 
Gender diversity represent the percentage of female directors relative to board size. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) predicts a significant and positive relationship between board 
diversity and the propensity to pay dividends among non-financial listed firms in 
Nigeria. Gender diversity is considered important on a corporate board as it helps in 
reducing conflicts between owners and managers (Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 
2016). From a different perspective, Ali et al. (2014) argued that females on the 
board represent a heterogeneous board that the firm requires in achieving its strategic 
decision. They added that board diversity creates linkages and connections with 
external stakeholders, for instance, with suppliers and customers. 
Board with a gender diversity is regarded as something that may enhance corporate 
strategic decisions and broaden networks. It also promotes talent discourse that 
support organizations in becoming more productive and more financially stable.   
Consistent with the hypothesis, the relationship of board diversity with the 
propensity to pay dividends is positive and significant at 5% as shown in Table 4.10 
from Model 2. The result matches the documented findings in the previous studies 
(Al-Rahahleh, 2017; Byoun et al., 2016;  Chen, Leung, & Goergen, 2017; Idris et al., 
2017; Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2016; Pucheta-Martínez & López-Zamora, 
2017). The finding of the current study suggests that shareholders are likely to 
benefit when there is female director on the board since they may influence 
propensity to pay dividends. This is because the female director on board is expected 
to be competent and knowledgeable (Ali et al., 2014; Carter et al., 2010). Their 
competency and knowledge would translate to offering credible services and 
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impartial advice, as well as connections. Thus, consistent with the resource 
dependence theory which suggested that the appointment of a director for instance, 
female will result in supporting the firm by providing unique services that will 
uproot the firm from its problems (Jeffery Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The finding of 
the current study is also agreement with Byoun et al. (2016) who argue that female 
on board will bring unique perspectives as well as resources needed by the firm. On 
the other hand, a female director considers paying dividends as a means of reducing 
conflicts between managers and owners of a firm and, therefore, disciplining the 
manager by influencing the decision to pay dividends. Thus, the female directors 
play a dual role on the board that include resource provision and monitoring the 
managers. 
Furthermore, the existence of a female director in the board room is a breakthrough 
particularly in the Nigerian market where males have dominated corporate boards 
(Mordi & Obanya, 2014).  The inclusion of a female director on the corporate board 
is an indication of a gender-diverse board and the adoption of good corporate 
governance practices. The results of the current study are also consistent with the 
argument that this inclusion might lead to a comprehensive pool of talent directors, 
and it is likely that  the effectiveness of the board could be improved in ways ranging 
from monitoring to resource provision (Larkin et al., 2013). Consequently, the strong 
positive association of the between gender and propensity to pay dividends might 




4.9.4 Financial Expertise on Board and Propensity to Pay Dividends 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) concerns the proportion of financial expertise on board relative to 
board size. The study predicts that a positive association exists between financial 
expertise and the propensity to pay dividends. Consistent with the hypothesis, the 
result as reported in Table 4.10 reveals a significant and positive relationship at 10% 
indicating the likelihood that having financial experts on the board will create a 
higher propensity to pay dividends. The result agrees with the evidence documented 
by Custodio and Metzger (2014). Therefore, the study supports Hypothesis 4. 
The results from the study may be infer that financial experts do not allow the 
accumulation of cash in a firm when a firm could pay dividends. Hence, they may 
use dividends to mitigate agency problems between managers and owners of the 
firm. In addition to the use of dividends as a means of controlling the managers, 
financial experts on a board may likely consider paying a dividend as a 
reinforcement of his or her monitoring so that they protect their reputational capital 
and avoid legal liability that a reduction or elimination of a dividend may cause. In 
this regard, financial experts on a board and likelihood of paying dividend play a 
complementary role with respect to monitoring managers in a firm. 
The finding is consistent with several other studies based on the monitoring and 
resource provision view. For instance, Desender et al. (2013) posited that outside 
directors in a firm‘s boardrooms may employ more audit services as a tool for 
controlling opportunistic managers. In this regard, outside director and audit services 
thus play a complementary role in a firm. Moreover, Kibiya et al. (2016) also 
suggested that financial experts play a greater monitoring role in a firm, which 
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results in providing firms with better earnings quality. Likewise, Cunningham (2008) 
showed that financial experts on a board have a greater tendency to minimize 
aggressive accounting practices. 
Moreover, in line with the resource dependence theory, it could be argued that 
directors with financial expertise may demonstrate his or her skills as well as 
expertise and in turn would enhance the board‘s monitoring roles. Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) indicated that, because financial experts on board are rich in 
resources, they spent more time while advising the firms. Thus, consistent with the 
resource dependence theory which considers the appointment of a director rich in 
resource will result in the advancement and addressing the challenges the firm is 
facing (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Further, it is likely that such advice could include issues that relate to dividend 
policy (Florackis & Sainani, 2016). Güner et al. (2008) also noted that financial 
experts tend to exact considerable influence on the firms through which they increase 
financing inflows and ease the securing credit on behalf of the firm. Consequently, 
directors with financial expertise on a board are associated with better governance, 
and the firm has higher probability of extracting economic benefits from the his or 
her services. Therefore, the results from the current study may not be surprising as 
previous studies have noted the provision of the monitoring and resource roles of 
financial expert directors. Suggesting that the financial expert serve a dual role 
consistent with agency and resource dependence theory. 
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4.9.5 CEO Tenure and Propensity to Pay Dividends 
CEO tenure is the number of years that a CEO has been in his position. Table 4.10 
provides the results of CEO tenure and the propensity to pay dividends. The results 
show that a longer tenured CEO has the probability to decrease the likelihood of 
dividend payments. The result suggests that firms with a CEO who has longer tenure 
tend to be less likely to pay dividends. This result does not agreed with the 
Hypothesis 5 (H5) but supports the findings of Boumosleh (2012) and Boumosleh 
and Cline (2015)  that suggest a longer-tenured CEO tends to pay less dividends. 
They argued that a longer-serving CEO may not use dividends to entrench him or 
herself. The finding, however, contradicts the results of other previous studies such 
as Feng et al. (2007), Hu and Kumar (2004), Jo and Pan (2009), and McGuinness et 
al. (2015) that found CEO tenure to be positively associated with the likelihood of 
paying dividends. 
The current finding may suggest that a CEO may have own a considerably large 
number of shares, which provides an opportunity to align his interests with the those 
of other shareholders in the firm, hence, resulting in less likelihood to pay dividends. 
This argument agrees with agency costs viewed by Rozeff (1982) that insider 
holdings are negatively associated with dividend payout.   
It may also suggest that a CEO who served for a longer term may not have an 
incentive to influence the likelihood of paying dividends bearing in mind that paying 
dividend will make subject him or her to market monitoring. Thus, retaining the 
profit may make him to avoid this type of monitoring. 
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Another reason could be that a CEO may have built a strong reputation with the 
shareholders. Therefore, the shareholders may not be afraid of the fact that the CEO 
may waste the cash available in a firm or that may result in perquisite consumption 
and empire building. In other terms, the purpose of monitoring the CEO is to ensure 
that free cash flow is not wasted and the CEO‘s capability in pursuing value-added 
projects. When the shareholders are satisfied with a CEO‘s performance, there may 
be less need for dividend to be used as a means of discipline the CEO because of the 
costs associated with its payment. 
One other reason for the result may be because of weak governance practices 
because the literature has suggested that strong governance is associated with higher 
dividends (Jiraporn et al., 2011; Sharma, 2011).  Given the corporate governance 
practices in Nigeria, the owners may have to follow extended protocols before firing 
a CEO. Hence, a CEO who stays longer is likely to have more influence on the 
selection of directors who may have little or no support for the decision to pay 
dividends. Therefore, a dividend decision becomes lower when a CEO has longer 
tenure. Moreover, the result also may provide an insight that a CEO may retain more 
profits for his or her personal wealth or to use such funds for acquiring new firms, 
which are not of importance to the shareholders. This is because the protection and 
enforcement of shareholder rights in Nigeria is at a low level (Adegbite, 2015). 
Lastly, the result may also highlight the probable effect of high CEO turnover among 
the listed firms in this study. Some of the firms had a high degree of CEO turnover 
within the sample period due to either searching for higher compensation or firm‘s 
outcomes, for example, performance-related issues. This could have a considerable 
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negative effect on a firm‘s financial policies such that the new CEO may need to 
carefully analyse the existing financial policies of the firm prior to considering 
whether to pay or not to pay a dividend.  Another issue that may explain the negative 
association between CEO tenure and the propensity to pay dividends is that a CEO 
with longer tenure could be more prevalent in the non-dividend paying firms than in 
dividend paying firms. Evidently, Table 4.4, which shows the descriptive statistics of 
the dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms, indicates that the non-dividend 
paying firms have more CEOs with longer tenure than the dividend paying firms. 
The mean value for the non-dividend paying firms is 9.44 as compared with 5.79 for 
the dividend paying firms. 
4.9.6 Foreign Ownership and Propensity to Pay Dividends 
Foreign ownership is measured as the percentage of the holdings of foreign investors 
in a firm. The study hypothesized that foreign ownership has positive and significant 
association with the propensity to pay dividends. The results in Table 4.10 show a 
strong positive relationship between foreign shareholding and the likelihood of 
paying dividends at the 1% level of significance. The result lends support to the 
predicted Hypothesis 6 (H6). The finding also confirms the evidence from the 
correlation analysis documented in Table 4.5, which shows a positive and significant 
correlation between the propensity to pay dividends and foreign ownership holdings 
at the 1% level of significance. 
The result implies that the presence of foreign shareholders with a greater number of 
shares could influence the decision that leads to the payment of dividends to the 
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shareholders. The result is consistent with agency theory, which suggests that foreign 
owners may use dividends as a tool to monitor managers because it may be costly 
and difficult for them living outside the country to take full responsibility for 
monitoring managers. The findings also imply that foreign investors have more 
preference for receiving dividends because of the fear of managerial abuse. The 
finding matches the results of Ghosh (2010), Jeon et al. (2011) and Prasanna (2014) 
that found a strong and positive relationship between foreign shareholdings and 
dividends policy. Therefore, the findings lend support to agency theory that dividend 
payment may constrain the managers from wasting the available cash. 
Furthermore, the result is in line with the view that foreign investors have a 
considerable number of investments in emerging economies particularly those that 
have liberalized their markets (Jeon et al., 2011) and are institutional and, hence, are 
subjected to the prudence man rule. For this reason, they are likely to request 
dividends. This is also the case of the Nigerian market, which allowed more foreign 
ownership after the amendment of the NEPD of 1972 in 1989 and the Nigerian 
Investment Promotion Commission Act in 1995. The 1995 Act removed all 
restrictions regarding foreign investment and considered their features including the 
fact that some of them are institutional owners who may likely demand dividends. 
Accordingly, the result from the panel logit regressions of this study also confirms 
the correlational analysis at the 1% level of significance. Similarly, the result of the 
foreign ownership also confirms findings from the descriptive statistics, which 
suggest that foreign investors have more preference for dividend-paying firms than 
for non-dividend paying firms. This result also shows support to previous evidence, 
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for instance, Baba (2009) who documented that foreign owners are more inclined to 
invest in dividend-paying firms and, therefore, are positively related. 
4.9.7 Managerial Ownership and Propensity to Pay dividends 
Managerial ownership is regarded in this study as the percentage of holdings owned 
by executive directors who occupy seat on the board. Managerial ownership may go 
a long way in addressing agency problems. The study hypothesized that managerial 
shares may impact the propensity to pay dividends positively, (H7). The results from 
Table 4.10 indicate that a significant and positive association exists between 
managerial ownership and the propensity to pay dividends at the 5% level of 
significance. Hence, the result is consistent with the prediction that a positive 
relationship exists between managerial ownership and the propensity to pay 
dividends. This means that as managers acquire more shares in a firm, there is 
greater likelihood of the firm to pay cash dividends to shareholders. The result is in 
agreement with previous evidence that managerial ownership is associated with a 
higher propensity pay dividends (Burg et al., 2001; De Cesari & Ozkan, 2014; Jo & 
Pan, 2009; Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2011; Vo & Nguyen, 2014). 
The finding from this result may highlight the managers‘ intention to communicate 
their commitment to shareholder protection such that securing funds in the market 
and when the needs arise, it could be on favorable terms (Florackis et al., 2015). In 
other words, the evidence may suggest a strategy employed by managers with a view 
to establishing a good reputation in the market, which may enable a manager to 
secure funds with less difficulties to finance projects. 
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Alternatively, this result might also be interpreted in terms of managers from another 
perspective. It is obvious that as the managers have made substantial investment in 
their firm, it is probable that they are going to support a decision to pay dividends. 
This is because the investment in equity constitutes a significant amount of their 
wealth. This argument can be supported by the statistics documented in Table 4.3 of 
this study. The managerial ownership has mean value of 7% and a maximum of 63% 
which is a block, and firms are mandated by the corporate law to disclose any 
shareholding that is equal to or more than 5% in the annual reports. 
The results may be interpreted as a form of managerial entrenchment. According to 
the entrenched view, a manager may use dividends to safeguard his position 
(Farinha, 2003). Therefore, he or she may more be more likely to pay greater 
dividends so that he/she portrays an identity as a good manager who protects or 
aligns his interests with those of the other shareholders. 
However, this view might be weak from the agency theory when the implications of 
paying dividends are considered. One of them is that paying dividends requires a 
substantial amount of cash and, therefore, if it is being paid, the outstanding cash 
balances of a firm could be reduced. The reduction of the cash available may 
constrain a manager  in pursuing wasteful projects or in empire building (Jiraporn et 
al., 2011). Moreover, making dividend payments could enhance monitoring by 
market participants. This is because a manager could be subjected to scrutiny as he 
or she intends to raise capital in the market for investment projects (Rozeff, 1982). 
Consequently, the finding is in line with agency theory that suggests that dividend 
payout aligns the interests of the mangers with those the shareholders. 
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4.9.8 Blockholders Ownership and Propensity to Pay Dividends 
The relationship between blockholders ownership and the propensity to pay 
dividends is predicted to be negative. Based on the results depicted in Table 4.10, 
blockholders ownership has a negative and significant effect on the propensity to pay 
dividends in the non-financial listed firms in Nigeria. The result supports the 
prediction (H8) of the study at the 1% level of significance. 
The result indicates that blockholders ownership is less likely to influence the 
propensity to pay dividends and is consistent with the monitoring role of the 
blockholders in the firm. The blockholders have an incentive to closely monitor the 
managers considering their interest in the firm, and, therefore, they may require less 
dividends as a tool for monitoring managers (Khan, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). 
This evidence agrees with the findings previously documented (Afzal & Sehrish, 
2011; Chang et al., 2016; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003; Harada & Nguyen, 2011; Hu & 
Kumar, 2004; Liljeblom & Maury, 2016; Maury & Pajuste, 2002; Renneboog & 
Trojanowski, 2011; Truong & Heaney, 2007) that revealed a negative association 
between blockholders and the decision to pay dividends. Likewise a recent 
international study by Mehdi, Sahut, and Teulon (2017) also provided a strong 
negative relationship between dividend decision and blockholders ownership. Thus, 
the current study also lends support to the international evidence. 
First, the findings of the current study imply that blockholders prefer no dividends 
because it is less important as a signalling mechanism in the market that the 
managers are committed to shareholder protection. This is because the blockholders 
are committed to monitoring the managers and the firm more closely than others due 
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to their stake in the firm. The stake of the blockholders may constitute a substantial 
portion of their wealth, which provides them with an incentive to closely monitor the 
investment and the firm. 
Second, theory suggests that agency costs and insider ownership are inversely related 
to dividends (Rozeff, 1982). Hence, blockholders and the propensity to pay 
dividends will be negatively related (Hu & Kumar, 2004). The negative association 
between blockholders and the propensity to pay dividends may be inferred as an 
indication that the blockholders are more inclined to support value-addition projects 
rather than expropriating minority interests. 
Third, several factors may result to negative association between blockholders 
ownership and propensity to pay dividends. For example, Hu and Kumar (2004) 
argued that board representation and tax considerations, may allow blockholders to 
have less need for dividend as a monitoring mechanism in the firm. Board 
representation is a feature that was noticed in the ownership structures of the listed 
firms on the NSE. Some of the large blockholders have at least one director on board 
representing their interest and therefore, may allow greater opportunity to carefully 
monitor the managers directly with less dividend to be used in the monitoring 
process. Thus, the negative association between blockholders ownership and 
propensity to pay dividends may not be surprising.  
Fourth, as Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) noted, firms with a substantial 
number of blockholders in a commercial and industrial firm could exhibit a lower 
need for dividend as a monitoring mechanism. This characteristic of the blockholders 
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could be obtainable in the Nigerian market and, therefore, justifies the negative 
association between blockholders and the propensity to pay dividends.  
4.10 Results of Control Variables for the Direct Model 
The result of the control variables used in this study from the direct model are also 
discussed in the following paragraphs. The control variables are, firm age, firm size, 
firm leverage, sales growth and retained earnings. 
Firstly, firm age is expected to be positive related to propensity to pay dividends. 
However, the result from this study shows that firm age is negatively and statistically 
significant. Thus, implying that older firms are less likely to pay dividends. The 
evidence concur with the findings of  Bokpin (2011) from Ghana and argued that 
older firms have lower chances of paying dividend in the market. However, the 
result of the current is inconsistent with  Sharma (2011); Eije and Megginson (2008) 
and Hu and Kumar (2004) who indicated that older firms have more likely to pay 
dividends as they are matured firms with limited or no investment opportunities. 
Secondly, firm size is also used as a control variable in the study. The study predicts 
that firm size measured by logarithm of total asset is positively correlated with the 
firms‘ propensity to pay dividends. Interestingly, the result is consistent with the 
prediction and thus, agrees with Yarram and Dollery (2015) and Sharma (2011) that 
larger firms have more likely to pay dividends compare with small and growing 
firms with more investment opportunities. 
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Thirdly, extant literature on propensity to pay dividend have consistently found firm 
leverage to be negatively associated with dividend decision (Al-Najjar, 2009; Byoun 
et al., 2016; Eije & Megginson, 2008; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Sharma, 2011). This is 
because debtholders may likely sanction financial policies that will at their detriment 
for example decision to pay dividends. In line with this argument, the present study 
found evidence that firm leverage and propensity to pay dividends are negatively 
related. 
Fourthly, sales growth or investment opportunity is also relevant in the propensity to 
pay dividends literatures. Previous studies have indicated that growth firms may be 
less likely to pay dividends because they are experiencing growth and therefore, 
require large cash to finance new project (Fama & French, 2001; Grullon et al., 
2011). Contrarily, the finding from the present study reveals that growth firms are 
positively correlated with propensity to pay dividends. The result implied that high 
growth firms in the Nigerian market can withstand the payment of dividends. It is 
possible that these firms may pay the dividend such that they attract more investors 
to invest in their new equity listing and in turn use such funds to undertake new 
projects. This finding is in line with Arko et al. (2014) who revealed that growth 
opportunities are positively associated with decision to pay dividends. They 
suggested that firms in the Sub-Saharan Africa are using dividends to make their 
shares more attractive. 
Fifthly, retained earnings to total equity is the last control variable used in this study. 
The coefficient of this variable is negative and statistically insignificant. When the 
sign of the coefficient is considered the result could be interpreted as, firm may be 
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less likely to pay dividend when it depends on earned capital. This is because firms 
may have borrowing constrain and therefore, may consider using other source of 
revenue for example retained earnings to finance its investment projects instead of 
paying dividends to shareholders. The result of this variable negates other findings 
previous that shows retained earnings to be positively associated with decision to pay 
dividends (Francis et al., 2011 and DeAngelo et al. 2006). The next section discusses 
the results of the moderating effect of blockholders on the relationship between 
board characteristics and the propensity to pay dividends based on Model 3. 
4.11 Moderating Role of Blockholders Ownership on the Association Between 
Board Characteristics and Propensity to Pay Dividends 
This study adopts a panel logit analysis, and the model was estimated using random 
effects based on Model 3. The current study performs a Hausman test to determine 
whether to choose random effects or fixed effects model for the analysis. The result 
shows a chi-square statistic of 13.74 and probability of 0.7459, thus, indicating that 
the random effect estimates are preferred to fixed effect estimates. Hence, the results 
are discussed based on the random effects estimates, which are documented in Table 
4.11.  
However, on the moderating role of a variable, scholars have provided scenarios for 
meaningful interactions. According to Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003) 
theoretically, there are three meaningful interaction patterns (enhancement, buffering 
and antagonistic interaction) between two continuous independent variables and each 
depends on the regression coefficient of beta values. The first pattern of an 
interaction is referred to as enhancing or synergistic. This is a situation where the 
 
 225 
predictor variables and the interaction term affect the dependent variable in the same 
direction, either all of them are in positive or negative direction. An example of this 
is when β1, β2 and β3 in a model are all positive or negative (where, β1= coefficient of 
the first independent variable; β2 is the coefficient of the second independent or 
moderating variable and β3 = coefficient of the interaction term). The second 
interaction pattern is buffering interaction. This pattern suggests that the predictors 
are in opposite directions and the interaction term support either direction, for 
instance, β1 is positive while β2 is negative and the β3 is in either way. The third 
pattern is antagonistic interaction where the predictors are in the same direction and 
the interaction term takes the opposite direction. For example, if β1, β2 are positive, 
then β3 is negative and vice versa. Consequently, the pattern of signs is important in 
determining the type of an interaction (Cohen et al., 2003). The model used for the 
estimation is provided as follows: 
PPDit = β0 + β1BSIZEit + β2BCOMPit + β3BDIVERit + β4FINEXPit + β5CEOTit + 
β6FOREOit + β7MANOit + β8BLOCKHit + β9BSIZE*BLOCKHit + 
β10BCOMP*BLOCKHit + β11BDIVER*BLOCKHit + β12FINEXP*BLOCKHit + 
β13CEOT*BLOCKHit + β14FAGEit + β15FSIZEit + β16FLEVit + β17SGWRTit + 









Table 4.11  
Results from Panel Logit Regression with Blockholders as Moderator 
Variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
BSIZE  -0.90 0.44 -2.05** 0.04 
BCOMP  9.62 5.73 1.68* 0.09 
BDIVER  -7.52 8.61 -0.87 0.38 
FINEXP  -0.36 4.93 -0.07 0.94 
CEOT  -0.41 0.13 -2.98*** 0.00 
FOREO  6.05 1.71 3.53*** 0.00 
MANO  4.88 2.39 2.03** 0.04 
BLOCKH  -17.12 9.34 -1.83* 0.06 
BSIZE_BKH  1.49 0.74 1.99** 0.04 
BCOMP_BKH  -17.42 9.08 -1.92** 0.05 
BDIVER_BKH  31.50 15.84 1.99** 0.04 
FINEXP_BKH  5.92 7.74 0.76 0.44 
CEOT_BKH  0.46 0.21 2.13** 0.03 
FAGE  -0.07 0.03 -2.15** 0.03 
FSIZE  6.32 1.05 6.00*** 0.00 
FLEV  -3.01 1.41 -2.13** 0.03 
SGRWT  13.47 2.22 6.06*** 0.00 
RETE  -0.50 0.98 -0.51 0.60 
_CONS  -34.80 8.60 -4.05*** 0.00 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Rho Value 
LR test of rho 
Hausman test:  
Chi-square 
Probability 







    
Notes: PPD=propensity to pay dividends; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition; 
BDIVER=board diversity; FINEXP=financial experts on board; CEOT=CEO tenure; 
FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO= managerial ownership; BLOCKH= blockholders ownership; 
BSIZE*BLOCKH= interaction term between board size and blockholders ownership; 
BCOMP*BLOCKH=interaction terms between board composition and blockholders ownership; 
BDIVER*BLOCKH=interaction term between board diversity and blockholders ownership; 
CEOT*BLOCKH=interaction term between CEO tenure and blockholders ownership; 
FINEXP*BLOCKH=interaction term between financial experts on board and blockholders 
ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV= firm leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; 
RETE=retained earnings to total capital. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimates are 
statistically significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
4.11.1 Board Size, Blockholders Ownership and Propensity to Pay Dividends 
The study hypothesized that blockholders ownership moderates the relationship 
between board size and the propensity to pay dividends (H9). The result as reported 
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from Model 3 reveals an interesting finding. Adding the interaction term reverses the 
direction (sign) of the association between board size and the propensity to pay 
dividends changes from negative to positive. The result in Table 4.11 supports the 
predicted hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. Theoretically, the regression 
result indicates that blockholders ownership moderated the relationship. Moreover, 
the form of the interaction according to Cohen et al. (2003) is antagonistic 
interaction because the independent and moderating variable are all negative (same 
direction) whereas, the interaction term is positive. Therefore, the evidence suggests 
that firms with blockholders ownership may have larger board and more likelihood 
to influence dividend payment.  
Like other studies that found that a firm with a larger board tends to pay more 
dividends in addressing agency conflict (Al-Najjar & Kilincarslan, 2016; Belden et 
al., 2005; Boumosleh & Cline, 2015; Jiraporn & Ning, 2006), this study documents a 
similar result from the Nigerian market only when a firm is controlled by 
blockholders. The result is consistent with the finding of Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) 
who show that, when family control at least 5% of a firm‘s shareholdings, the board 
size is likely to have positive effect on dividend payout. Therefore, the presence of 
both blockholders ownership and a larger board produces a greater likelihood to 
disgorge cash to the shareholders. 
The result may imply that, the board may be large because in addition to the other 
directors on the board, blockholders may have director(s) representing their interest 
as this characteristic is common among the non-financial listed firms on the NSE. 
Therefore, these directors may agree to reinforce their monitoring role in the firm 
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with paying more dividends and protect their reputational capital which is consistent 
with the resource dependence theory. Lastly, result is consistent with the literature 
that firms with large boards are more likely to pay dividends (Chen et al., 2011; 
Iqbal, 2013). 
The result may also suggest that larger boards due to the existence of blockholders in 
the firm might offer better monitoring services. This is because within the board 
there are more directors who could pose more questions to managers when they 
perceive that a decision that is not in line with the interests of the owners of the firm. 
Therefore, the board may use dividends as a controlling tool. 
Consequently, the finding shows that of board size and blockholders in non-financial 
firms interact together towards enhancing corporate accountability and fairness. The 
positive relationship on the interaction term between blockholders ownership and 
board size may also provide an explanation for the importance of blockholders 
ownership in corporate governance practices. Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) argued 
that a considerable number of important governance mechanisms largely depend on 
the existing ownership structure of the firm. 
4.11.2 Board Composition, Blockholders Ownership and Propensity to Pay 
Dividends 
From the regression result in Model 3, reveals a positive coefficient for board 
composition, while the coefficient of the moderating variable negative. Furthermore, 
the coefficient of the interaction term is found to be negative and statistically 
significant, hence, interaction occurs and the form of the interaction pattern is 
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referred to as buffering (Cohen et al., 2003). This means that blockholders ownership 
weakens the effect of board composition. Therefore, the result of the interaction term 
is consistent with predicted hypothesis H10 that blockholders moderates the 
relationship between board composition and propensity to pay dividends. The result 
therefore, means that the present of blockholders would have an effect on the 
percentage of outside directors on board such that they would have lower likelihood 
on dividend payment decisions and the finding agrees with prior study (Hu & 
Kumar, 2004). 
The result may suggest that, subject to the existence of blockholders in the firm,  
outsider director on the board are likely to use dividend in monitoring managers. It is 
also possible that blockholders have taken the lead in the selection and appointment 
process of outside directors. In this case the blockholders may consider outside 
directors with greater monitoring abilities and with the required board experience, 
hence, require less dividend to be used as a monitoring tool in the firm. This 
argument opposes to the instances obtainable in Nigeria in which some outside 
directors are appointed without the requisite qualifications (Okpara, 2011). 
Another possible reason for this result may be the type or feature of the blockholders 
in the firm. When blockholders are those that are more inclined to cash dividends as 
a return on their investment, they probably support such a decision either directly or 
indirectly. Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) documented that blockholders in the 
form of industrial and commercial firms are less likely to impact dividends. This 
may imply that, when the blockholders are not industrial and commercial or do not 
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form part of the majority, for instance institutional investors in the firm, they may 
influence the firm to pay dividends (Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Short et al., 2002). 
Additionally, the blockholders may have more incentive to monitor the firm as 
compared to non-blockholders. Therefore, the managers may not require dividend 
payment as a form of commitment that builds a reputation for raising funds in the 
market soon (Harford et al., 2008). The presence of blockholders may suffice as a 
control mechanism, and, hence, the firm may be less likely to pay dividends. 
Previous studies have shown that blockholders have a negative effect on board 
composition (Kang et al., 2007; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005) and may have an impact on 
their monitoring role in the firm. 
On the other hand, the blockholders may have board representation such that they are 
viewed as insiders, thus, being consistent with agency theory that suggests a negative 
association between insiders and dividend payment (Farinha & López-de-Foronda, 
2009; Jensen et al., 1992; Rozeff, 1982; Truong & Heaney, 2007). In this regard, 
dividend payout may be lowered when insider holdings increase, thus, a dividend 
becomes less important as a monitoring tool in a firm (Farinha & López-de-Foronda, 
2009). 
4.11.3 Board Diversity, Blockholders Ownership and Propensity to Pay 
Dividends 
Board diversity as mentioned earlier refers to the existence of a female director on 
the board. The study hypothesizes that blockholders moderate the relationship 
between board diversity and the propensity to pay dividends (H11). With regards to 
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this hypothesis, the result in Table 4.11 shows strong positive and statistically 
significant relationship between board diversity and propensity to pay dividends in 
the presence of blockholders in the firm at the 5% level. However, with regard to 
pattern of the interaction as suggested by the theory is antagonistic interaction 
(Cohen et al., 2003) since both board diversity and blockholders are on the same 
direction (negative) and the insignificant of board diversity may not effect on the 
form of the interaction. Since the variable of interest is the interaction term which is 
statistically significant. 
The result is in agreement with the previous evidence documented by Byoun et al. 
(2016), Idris et al. (2017), Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms (2016), and Pucheta-
Martínez and López-Zamora (2017) that female directors are positively related to 
propensity to pay dividends. 
The result of the current study may mean that firms are more likely to pay dividends 
when female directors and blockholders are jointly presence in the firm. 
Furthermore, female directors on board do not hesitate to ratify the decision to pay 
dividend when blockholders are likely to play a monitoring role in the firm. In other 
words, the female directors are more willing to protect their reputations and, 
therefore, disgorge cash to the shareholders given the presence of blockholders in the 
firm. 
The result could also be interpreted from the view of promoting good governance in 
the firm. The 2011 NCCG has stated that blockholders should facilitate good 
corporate governance practices. In this regard having a female director is considered 
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as one way for corporate monitoring and for facilitating well informed decision 
making (Mordi & Obanya, 2014). Similarly, the paying of a dividend to shareholders 
is an indication of strong governance in a firm because managers have lower 
tendencies for abusing the available cash in the firm (Jiraporn et al., 2011). 
Therefore, the interaction of female directors on board with blockholders is likely to 
result in good governance and, hence, paying dividends to the shareholders. 
It could also possible to infer from the result that firms with blockholders may 
encourage more diversity in terms of gender with considerable board experience and 
monitoring skills and hence, supporting the resource dependence theory. A female 
director in this regard is likely to demonstrate her expertise and ensure that managers 
do not deviate from the interests of their principals, thus, influencing the decision to 
pay dividends to mitigate agency problems that may arise. 
4.11.4 Financial Expertise on the Board, Blockholders Ownership and 
Propensity to Pay Dividends 
The result from Model 3 as reported in Table 4.11 indicates a positive association 
between financial experts on the board and the propensity to pay dividends when 
there are blockholders but is not statistically significant. This result, therefore, does 
not find sufficient evidence to support hypothesis (H12). But then, the interaction 
form is antagonistic as financial experts on board and blockholders ownership have 
negative impact on propensity to pay dividends and the interaction term is on the 
opposite direction of the two variables (financial experts on board and blockholders 
ownership).    
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From the evidence, it could be deduced that blockholders and financial expertise on 
board are not compatible in terms of monitoring, therefore, resulting in an 
insignificant association as they interact together on decision to pay dividends. The 
result from Model 3 also confirmed the findings from the correlation statistic, which 
shows an insignificant relationship between financial expertise on the board and 
blockholders ownership. 
Another plausible explanation of the finding may be related to overall and individual 
effectiveness. The presence of financial experts may lead other members of the 
board to be reluctant in monitoring or less watchful because of his expertise. Based 
on this notion, when a director with financial expertise on the board become less 
effect in monitoring as he/she spends little time, this may impact the effectiveness of 
other members on the board. Consequently, his/her influence on the decision to pay 
dividends may be less pronounced. A financial expert may also have little or no 
experience in board processes or is elected as a board member merely to meet the 
regulatory requirements by NCCG 2011. 
A further explanation for the insignificant result could be due to the tendency that the 
financial experts may be a rubber stamp in which a manager has control over them 
given the size of the board as evidenced by Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996). They 
found that the CEO has control over a large board, and firms with larger boards 
including financial experts as members tend to have free rider problems. 
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4.11.5 CEO Tenure, Blockholders Ownership and Propensity to Pay Dividends 
Table 4.11 shows the result of the interaction between blockholders and CEO tenure 
using Model 3. Interestingly, with the introduction of blockholders as a moderator, 
the direction of influence between CEO tenure and propensity to pay dividends 
changes from negative to positive. Furthermore, the interaction is positively and 
statistically significant at 5%, which indicates that subject to the presence of 
blockholders in the firm, CEO with longer tenure would be more likely to pay 
dividends. According to the theory the interaction pattern is antagonistic interaction 
as found on board size, board diversity and financial expertise on board. Hence, 
Hypothesis 13 (H13) is supported, and the finding also contrasts with previous 
evidence (Hu & Kumar, 2004; McGuinness et al., 2015) that indicate a strong 
positive association between CEO tenure and the decision to pay dividends in the 
absence of blockholders. This result implies that as the CEO tenure gets longer, 
blockholders may likely institute further control by paying more dividends. Thus, 
deflating cash that may be wasted by the CEO. 
Further, the CEO may also be a shareholder giving additional power to entrench 
himself/herself by paying more dividends when there are blockholders in the firm or 
make use of managerial discretion to consume excess cash flow. The result may also 
be interpreted by the managerial inertia argument that a longer-tenured CEO tends to 
loss creativity that will enrich the firm and, therefore, result in distributing cash as 
dividends (Cheng et al., 2010; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). 
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4.12 Results of Control Variables for the Interaction Model 
The study also uses five control variables (firm age, firm size, firm leverage sales 
growth and retained earings) that were previously included in the direct model. The 
results for these control variables are consistently like those reported in the direct 
model in terms of direction and significance level. Therefore, the discussions made 
on these variables suffices. The only difference in on the coefficient, the result of the 
coefficient of firm age remains intact as previous reported on the direct model. 
Whereas, firm size has increased from 6.11 to 6.32. Similarly, firm leverage has also 
increased from -2.82 to -3.01 and lastly, sales growth coefficient has changed from 
12.97 to 13.47. Conversely, retained although insignificant, the coefficient shrinks 
from -0.53 to -0.50. 
4.13 Robust Standard Error Estimation 
It is possible that an observation may not be lacking independence because of the 
serial correlation threat as firms may appear more than one time, which may have a 
considerable effect on the reported z-statistics and influencing the statistical 
significance (Rogers, 1993). To address the issue, the study re-ran both the direct and 
interaction models and clustered them at the pane lid, thus, correcting 
heteroskedasticity and potential time series autocorrelation. 
The results are show in Tables 4.12.1 and 4.12.2 Comparing the two results of the 
direct model reported in Table 4.12.1, are small changes exist in the coefficient of 
board size and financial expertise on the board and the two control variables of sales 
growth and retained earnings.  
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However, changes occur across all the variables when the normal otherwise known 
as default standard errors is compared with the robust standard errors. For instance, 
the normal standard error of the financial expertise on board is 1.58 whereas the 
robust standard error is found to be 1.76. The greater standard error from the 
financial experts on the board renders its coefficient to be statistically insignificant. 
This larger standard error may not be surprising as panel logit regression takes the 
firm cluster effect into account and autoregressive correlation within the firm 
clusters (Hauser, 2013). Except for financial expertise on board, the other variables 
reported with the default standard errors that are statistically significant remain 
intact. Even though, the level of significance for board diversity and CEO tenure 
variables has increased from 10% to 5%. 
This estimation is reported in Table 4.12.1 and the model used for the estimation is 
also given; Model 2 is written as: 
PPDIt = β0 + β1BSIZEit + β2BCOMPit + β3BDIVERit + β4FINEXPit + β5CEOTit + 
β6FOREOit + β7MANOit + β8BLOCKHit + β9FAGEit + β10FSIZEit + β11FLEVit + 










Panel Logit Regression with Robust Standard Error for Direct Model  
Variable  Normal standard errors Robust standard errors 
PPD=1 Exp. Sign Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
BSIZE + -0.08 0.16 0.60 -0.09 0.18 0.63 
BCOMP + 0.08 2.18 0.97 0.08 2.37 0.97 
BDIVER + 8.62 3.41 0.01*** 8.62 3.53 0.02** 
FINEXP + 2.77 1.58 0.08* 2.78 1.76 0.11 
CEOT + -0.17 0.05 0.00*** -0.17 0.06 0.01** 
FOREO + 5.95 1.76 0.00*** 5.95 1.85 0.00*** 
MANO + 5.64 2.43 0.02** 5.64 2.46 0.02** 
BLOCKH  -6.97 1.96 0.00*** -6.97 2.03 0.00*** 
FAGE  -0.07 0.03 0.04** -0.07 0.04 0.05** 
FSIZE  6.11 1.03 0.00*** 6.11 0.98 0.00*** 
FLEV  -2.82 1.36 0.03** -2.82 1.17 0.02** 
SGRWT  12.97 2.2 0.00*** 12.98 2.03 0.00*** 
RETE  -0.53 0.95 0.57 -0.54 1.03 0.60 
_CONS  -38.9 6.99 0.00*** -38.90 6.45 0.00*** 
Chi-square 
Degree of freedom 
Rho Value 









Notes: PPD=propensity to pay dividends; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition; BDIVER=board 
diversity; FINEXP=financial experts on board; CEOT=CEO tenure; FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO= 
managerial ownership; BLOCKH=blockholders ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV=firm 
leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; RETE=retained earnings to total capital. ***, **, and * indicate that the 
parameter estimates are statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The results from Table 4.12.2, which is on the interaction model, show again that the 
coefficient of the regression on the independent variables exhibit few changes. With 
reference to the interaction terms which are the variables of interest in the model, 
only the interaction term of board composition has an increase of 0.01 when the 
default and model with robust standard errors are compared. Conversely, equating 
the estimations on the basis of their standard errors, changes have been occurred in 
all the explanatory variables. The largest changes among the interaction terms is on 
board diversity with a value of standard error of 14.55. This is followed by the board 
composition interaction term with a value of 9.16 against 9.08 for robust and default 
result respectively. The CEO tenure interaction term has the least scored with a value 
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of 0.21 for both default and robust standard errors respectively. Interestingly, none of 
the interactions of interest become insignificant with the robust standard errors 
estimations. However, the interaction of board composition has dropped from a 5% 
percent level of significance to a 10% level of significance. But this does not affect 
the conclusion derived from the findings. 
The result of the estimation is reported in Table 4.12.2, and the model used for the 
estimation is also given as; 
PPDit = β0 + β1BSIZEit + β2BCOMPit + β3BDIVERit + β4FINEXPit + β5CEOTit + 
β6FOREOit + β7MANOit + β8BLOCKHit + β9BSIZE*BLOCKHit + 
β10BCOMP*BLOCKHit + β11BDIVER*BLOCKHit + β12FINEXP*BLOCKHit + 
β13CEOT*BLOCKHit + β14FAGEit + β15FSIZEit + β16FLEVit + β17SGWRTit + 













Table 4.12.2  
Panel Logit Regression with Robust Standard Error for Interaction Model  
Variable  Normal standard error  Robust standard error  
PPD=1 
 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
BSIZE  -0.90 0.44 0.04** -0.90 0.42 0.03** 
BCOMP  9.62 5.73 0.09* 9.63 5.69 0.09* 
BDIVER  -7.52 8.61 0.38 -7.52 8.27 0.36 
FINEXP  -0.36 4.93 0.94 -0.37 4.85 0.94 
CEOT  -0.41 0.13 0.00*** -0.41 0.14 0.00*** 
FOREO  6.05 1.71 0.00*** 6.05 1.63 0.00*** 
MANO  4.88 2.39 0.04** 4.88 2.35 0.04** 
BLOCKH  -17.12 9.34 0.06* -17.12 9.77 0.08* 
BSIZE_BKH  1.49 0.74 0.04** 1.49 0.72 0.04** 
BCOMP_BKH  -17.42 9.08 0.05** -17.43 9.16 0.06* 
BDIVER_BKH  31.50 15.84 0.04** 31.50 14.55 0.03** 
FINEXP_BKH  5.92 7.74 0.44 5.92 8.47 0.49 
CEOT_BKH  0.46 0.21 0.03** 0.46 0.21 0.02** 
FAGE  -0.07 0.03 0.03** -0.08 0.03 0.02** 
FSIZE  6.32 1.05 0.00*** 6.33 0.89 0.00*** 
FLEV  -3.01 1.41 0.03** -3.02 1.20 0.01** 
SGRWT  13.47 2.22 0.00*** 13.48 1.87 0.00*** 
RETE  -0.50 0.98 0.60 -0.50 1.09 0.64 
_CONS  -34.80 8.60 0.00*** -34.81 8.13 0.00*** 
Chi-square 
Degree of freedom 
Rho Value 









Notes: PPD=propensity to pay dividends; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition; 
BDIVER=board diversity; FINEXP=financial experts on board; CEOT=CEO tenure; 
FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO= managerial ownership; BLOCKH=blockholders ownership; 
BSIZE*BLOCKH= interaction term between board size and blockholders ownership; 
BCOMP*BLOCKH=interaction terms between board composition and blockholders ownership; 
BDIVER*BLOCKH=interaction term between board diversity and blockholders ownership; 
CEOT*BLOCKH=interaction term between CEO tenure and blockholders ownership; 
FINEXP*BLOCKH=interaction term between financial experts on board and blockholders 
ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV=firm leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; and 
RETE= retained earnings to total capital. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimates are 
statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Furthermore, using the robust standard error estimation for both direct and 
interaction model, the fitness of the two models remains intact and is statistically 
significant. Thus, this indicates the absence of heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation threats in the models. Summarily, the results from these two models 
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confirms the robustness of the results reported in Table 4.10 and 4.11. Besides using 
the robust standard error specifications, the study also conducts other sensitivity 
tests, which are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
4.14 Additional Analysis 
The aim of the sensitivity analysis is to ascertain whether the results obtained in 
Models 2 and 3 holds when subjected to different estimations. This study conducts 
several robustness checks using different model specifications. An alternative 
definition of the dependent variable is used for checking the robustness of the 
previous estimation reported in Table 4.11. First, a raw number, 1 if the firm pays 
dividends and 0 if otherwise called PPD_DUM is assigned to the dependent variable. 
The second robustness estimation is conducted by employing a continuous variable 
called dividend to total assets (DVTOASST) as the dependent variable in lieu of 
binary number. Lastly, the study adopts the actual number for three independent 
variables that includes board composition, board diversity and financial experts on 
board instead of the proportion or percentage. 
4.14.1 Alternative Measure of Dependent Variables 
In the first estimation, the dependent variable for Model 2 and Model 3 is replaced 
with a raw binary number (0,1). The dependent variable is defined as 1 when a firm 
pays dividends, and otherwise 0. There is a distinction between the primary 
dependent variable (PPD), which is used in the entire analysis and the dependent 
variable that is used for the sensitivity analysis. The primary dependent variable is 
constructed using ROA, firm size and growth opportunities. A payer is selected 
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based on probability as discussed in Chapter Three. However, the dependent variable 
(PPD_DUM) used for the sensitivity analysis is a raw number ignoring the three firm 
characteristics mentioned in the previous chapters. A value 1 is assigned for a firm in 
a year if it pays a dividend and 0 if otherwise. The result is reported in Table 4.13.1 
and Table 4.13.2 for the direct and interaction models. 
Table 4.13.1 
Robustness Check using DV: PPD_DUM (Raw Number) for Direct Model  
Variable  DV = PPD DV = PPD_DUM 
PPD=1 Exp.Sign Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
BSIZE + -0.08 0.16 0.60 0.06 0.13 0.61 
BCOMP + 0.08 2.18 0.97 0.36 1.84 0.84 
BDIVER + 8.62 3.41 0.01** 10.88 2.86 0.00*** 
FINEXP + 2.77 1.58 0.08* 1.94 1.35 0.15 
CEOT + -0.17 0.05 0.00*** -0.10 0.04 0.01** 
FOREO + 5.95 1.76 0.00*** 4.65 1.30 0.00*** 
MANO + 5.64 2.43 0.02** 3.53 1.90 0.06* 
BLOCKH  -6.97 1.96 0.00*** -4.62 1.43 0.00*** 
FAGE  -0.07 0.03 0.04** -0.02 0.03 0.29 
FSIZE  6.11 1.03 0.00*** 4.03 0.66 0.00*** 
FLEV  -2.82 1.36 0.03** -2.51 1.10 0.02** 
SGRWT  12.97 2.20 0.00*** 9.20 1.35 0.00*** 
RETE  -0.533 0.95 0.57 -0.83 0.87 0.33 
_CONS  -38.90 6.99 0.00*** -27.07 4.78 0.00*** 
Chi-square 
Degree of freedom 
Rho Value 


















Notes: PPD_DUM=1 if a firm pays dividend and 0 if otherwise in a year; BSIZE=board size; 
BCOMP=board composition; BDIVER=board diversity; FINEXP=financial experts on board; 
CEOT=CEO tenure; FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO=managerial ownership; BLOCKH= 
blockholders ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV=firm leverage; SGRWT=sales 
growth; and RETE=retained earnings to total capital. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimates 
are statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Based on the output as reported in Table 4.13.1 from the direct model, the Wald chi-
square is 61.58, which is higher than 44.87 for the model with PPD but the fitness of 
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the model is not affected. The overall result of the model fitness is statistically 
significant at 1% and is comparable the results reported using PPD as the dependent 
variable.  
Likewise, a comparison on whether the panel is superior to pool logit is also made. 
This is done through examining the intra-class correlation known as rho. When the 
value of the rho is zero, it implies that the component of panel-level variance is 
unimportant and vice versa. The result for this test shows that the rho has a value of 
49.9% with Chi-square value of 33.17 and is statistically significant at 1%. This is 
also the case for the main model even though there is slight difference for the 
statistics results. A Hausman test is also performed to determine whether the random 
effects or fixed effects model is appropriate for the analysis. The result from the 
Hausman test reveals a chi-square statistic of 6.72 and a probability of 0.916. This 
statistic suggested that random effect estimates should be used instead of fixed effect 
estimates. 
Furthermore, a comparison between the two model PPD and PPD_DUM is also 
made on the direction and significance of the independent variables. Among the 
board characteristics variables, board diversity is statistically significant, but the 
level of significance dropped from 5% to the 10% level. Financial expert on board 
becomes insignificant with the introduction of a different dependent variable 
PPD_DUM, but the sign remains positive as it was it the model with PPD. CEO 
tenure remains negatively and statistically significant. The level of significance has 
increased from the 10% to the 5% level of significance. 
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On the other hand, the ownership structures variables of foreign and managerial 
ownership are positively and statistically significant as predicted earlier. Although 
the level of significance for managerial ownership drops from the initial 5% level in 
the model with PPD to the 10% percent level when PPD_DUM is used. The last 
ownership variable is blockholders holdings. The level of significance level as well 
as the direction for this variable is similar to the previous results of PPD which were 
reported in Table 4.13.1.  
Consequently, the result from the model with PPD_DUM is relatively consistent 
with the one with PPD as its dependent variable. Therefore, the result is qualitatively 
similar. The next paragraph compares the results from the interaction model based 
on the PPD_DUM. 
The result from the interaction model based on PPD_DUM is shown in Table 4.13.2. 
There is a slight difference on the Wald statistic between the PPD and PPD_DUM 
models. The previous model with the PPD measurement has a Wald statistic value of 
47.63 and is lower than 63.86 for the PPD_DUM model. Interestingly, the 
significance level of the model fitness does not change in both the two models 
despite their differences in terms of dependent variable measurement. 
The intra-class correlation (rho) is reported to be different from zero for the two 
models. The rho value for PPD_DUM model is found to be 45.9% with the 
likelihood ratio Chi-square of 20.79 statistically significant at 1%. This statistic is the 
same as reported for the PPD model with small variability on the Chi-square. These 
statistics provide evidence that the random panel model is favourable as opposed to 
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the pool model in both PPD and PPD_DUM models. Likewise, the Hausman test is 
also conducted, and the result shows a Chi-square value of 10.94 with probability of 
0.896 indicating the preference of random effect estimates over fixed effect 
estimates. 
Table 4.13.2 
Robustness Check using DV: PPD_DUM (Raw Number) for the Interaction Model  
Variable  Model 3: DV= PPD Model 3: DV=PPD_DUM 
PPD =1 
 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
BSIZE  -0.90 0.44 0.04** -0.68 0.38 0.07* 
BCOMP  9.62 5.73 0.09* 4.46 4.59 0.33 
BDIVER  -7.52 8.61 0.38 8.55 6.73 0.20 
FINEXP  -0.36 4.93 0.94 0.12 4.16 0.97 
CEOT  -0.41 0.13 0.00*** -0.30 0.10 0.00*** 
FOREO  6.05 1.71 0.00*** 4.91 1.31 0.00*** 
MANO  4.88 2.39 0.04** 3.18 1.88 0.09* 
BLOCKH  -17.12 9.34 0.06* -16.58 8.13 0.04** 
BSIZE_BKH  1.49 0.74 0.04** 1.36 0.64 0.03** 
BCOMP_BKH  -17.42 9.08 0.05** -7.42 7.30 0.30 
BDIVER_BKH  31.50 15.84 0.04** 4.32 12.41 0.72 
FINEXP_BKH  5.92 7.74 0.44 3.77 6.52 0.56 
CEOT_BKH  0.46 0.21 0.03** 0.38 0.17 0.02** 
FAGE  -0.07 0.03 0.03** -0.03 0.03 0.19 
FSIZE  6.32 1.05 0.00*** 4.01 0.66 0.00*** 
FLEV  -3.01 1.41 0.03** -2.70 1.13 0.01*** 
SGRWT  13.47 2.22 0.00*** 9.22 1.35 0.00*** 
RETE  -0.50 0.98 0.60 -0.78 0.89 0.37 
_CONS  -34.80 8.60 0.00*** -20.37 6.37 0.00*** 
Chi-square 
Degree of freedom 
Rho Value 









Notes: PPD_DUM=1 if a firm pays dividend and 0 otherwise in a year; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board 
composition; BDIVER=board diversity; FINEXP=financial experts on board; CEOT=CEO tenure; 
FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO= managerial ownership; BLOCKH=blockholders ownership; 
BSIZE*BLOCKH=interaction term between board size and blockholders ownership; BCOMP*BLOCKH= 
interaction terms between board composition and blockholders ownership; BDIVER*BLOCKH=interaction term 
between board diversity and blockholders ownership; CEOT*BLOCKH=interaction term between CEO tenure 
and blockholders ownership; FINEXP*BLOCKH=interaction term between financial experts on board and 
blockholders ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV=firm leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; and 
RETE=retained earnings to total capital. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimates are statistical 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Comparing the two models with different dependent variables PPD and PPD_DUM, 
the results shows no changes in the directions of the interaction terms. Conversely, 
there are changes on the level of significance of the moderator and the interaction 
terms. The moderator, which is blockholders ownership, is negative and significant. 
The level of the significance increased from 10% in the PPD to 5% when 
PPD_DUM is employed. 
Out of the three interaction terms with a strong positive effect on the propensity to 
pay dividends, only two of them are reported to match the PPD model. The 
interaction of board size and CEO tenure are statistically significant at the 5% level 
of significance. These findings are not different from the result reported when PPD is 
used in estimating the model. However, the use of PPD_DUM as the dependent 
variable renders the interaction of board diversity to be statistically insignificant but 
the direction remains unchanged. Likewise, board composition interaction also 
becomes insignificant with this sensitivity test. Collectively, the results from the 
model suggest the importance of blockholders shareholding in the firm with regards 
to the propensity to pay dividends. 
4.14.2 Robustness Check using Continuous Dependent Variable 
The study further, checks for the robustness of the propensity to pay dividends model 
using a continuous variable and the use of the variable is consistent with the 
literature (Al-Najjar & Kilincarslan, 2016; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Sharma, 2011). In 
doing so, the current study uses total cash dividends scaled by total assets and is in 
line with Francis et al. (2011), Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2009), and Jiraporn et al. 
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(2011). Among the advantage of this measurement of total cash dividends scaled by 
total assets is the stability of book value of assets over time (Barclay, Holderness, & 
Sheehan, 2009). 
The regression analysis for the robustness check is conducted using panel corrected 
standard error. This is because linear models may have potential threats of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the disturbances (Beck & Katz, 1995). This 
allows the present study to obtain efficient estimators that are robust and hence is 
consistent with previous studies (Habib & Jiang, 2012; Montalvan, Barilla, Ruiz, & 
Figueroa, 2017; Nakano & Nguyen, 2012). The dependent variable is dividends to 
total assets whereas the independent variables are those used in the probability 










Table 4.14.1  
Alternative Measure of DV- dvtoasst for Direct Model  
 
 DV=PPD DV= DVTOASST 
Variable Exp Sign Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
BSIZE + -0.08 0.16 0.60 0.0016 0.0004 0.000*** 
BCOMP + 0.08 2.18 0.97 -0.0100 0.0066 0.132 
BDIVER + 8.62 3.41 0.01** 0.0218 0.0121 0.071* 
FINEXP + 2.77 1.58 0.08* 0.0245 0.0055 0.000*** 
CEOT + -0.17 0.05 0.00*** -0.0005 0.0001 0.000*** 
FOREO + 5.95 1.76 0.00*** -0.0038 0.0028 0.177 
MANO + 5.64 2.43 0.02** -0.0123 0.0056 0.029** 
BLOCKH  -6.97 1.96 0.00*** -0.0024 0.0045 0.599 
FAGE  -0.07 0.03 0.04** 0.0001 0.0001 0.308 
FSIZE  6.11 1.03 0.00*** -0.0131 0.0037 0.000*** 
FLEV  -2.82 1.36 0.03** 0.0065 0.0013 0.000*** 
SGRWT  12.97 2.20 0.00*** 0.0277 0.0043 0.000*** 
RETE  -0.533 0.95 0.57 -0.0034 0.0050 0.490 
_CONS  -38.90 6.99 0.00*** -0.0334 0.0105 0.001*** 
Chi-square 
Degree of freedom 






Chi-square = 262.12***  
(df=12) 
R-squared= 0.3075 
                  - 
Notes: DVTOASST=dividend to total assets; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition; BDIVER=board 
diversity; FINEXP=financial experts on board; CEOT=CEO tenure; FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO= 
managerial ownership; BLOCKH=blockholders ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV=firm 
leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; and RETE=retained earnings to total capital. ***, **, and * indicate that the 
parameter estimates are statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The study further conducts a sensitivity analysis using dividend to total assets. The 
result of the model is reported in Table 4.14.1 and is compared with the initial result 
of PPD as the dependent variable measurement based on the direct relationship as 
reported using Model 2. The model with DVTOASST measurement is also found to 
be fit with a Chi-square of 262.12 and is statistically significant at 1%. The 
likelihood ratio test is also conducted to further ascertain the fitness of the model. 
The result of the explanatory power of the shows a R-squared value of 30.75%, thus 




However, on the coefficient and standard errors, there are considerable changes on 
all the variables. These  changes are expected because the model is subjected to 
different measurements on the dependent variable that is changed from a binary to 
continuous variable and is consistent with previous evidence on the decision to pay 
dividend (Francis et al., 2011; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Sharma, 2011). 
When examining the direction and level of significance, unlike, in the PPD model, 
board size become positive and statistically significant at 1%. Board diversity, 
financial experts on board and CEO tenure remain unchanged. Although the level of 
significance of board diversity was reduced from 5% in the PPD model to 10% in the 
second model with a continuous dependent variable. On the other hand, the 
significance level of financial experts on board has increased from its existing level 
of 10% to 1% from the PPD to DVTOASST models respectively. 
Furthermore, two of the ownership structures variables reported in Table 4.12.1 
become statistically insignificant. The direction of foreign and managerial ownership 
also changes from positive in the PPD model to negative with the DVTOASST 
variable although blockholders ownership remain negative as it is in the PPD model. 
Only managerial ownership is found to be statistically significant at 5%. 
Consequently, the results of the board characteristics variables from these two 
models are similar whereas, the ownership structures result is not. However, when 
the sign of blockholders ownership is taken into consideration, it could be said to be 
partially similar. The interaction result DVTOASST dependent variable is also 
compared and discussed. 
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Table 4.14.2  
Alternative Measure of DV- dvtoasst for the Interaction Model  
Variable  DV=PPD  DV=DVTOASST 
  
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
BSIZE  -0.90 0.44 0.04** -0.0009 0.0007 0.219 
BCOMP  9.62 5.73 0.09* -0.0056 0.0119 0.640 
BDIVER  -7.52 8.61 0.38 -0.0429 0.0170 0.011** 
FINEXP  -0.36 4.93 0.94 0.0242 0.0144 0.093* 
CEOT  -0.41 0.13 0.00*** -0.0011 0.0002 0.000*** 
FOREO  6.05 1.71 0.00*** 0.0000 0.0031 0.997 
MANO  4.88 2.39 0.04** -0.0149 0.0059 0.012** 
BLOCKH  -17.12 9.34 0.06* -0.0610 0.0130 0.000*** 
BSIZE_BKH  1.49 0.74 0.04** 0.0044 0.0014 0.001*** 
BCOMP_BKH  -17.42 9.08 0.05** -0.0131 0.0221 0.552 
BDIVER_BKH  31.50 15.84 0.04** 0.1224 0.0308 0.000*** 
FINEXP_BKH  5.92 7.74 0.44 -0.0006 0.0208 0.976 
CEOT_BKH  0.46 0.21 0.03** 0.0011 0.0004 0.003*** 
FAGE  -0.07 0.03 0.03** 0.0000 0.0001 0.561 
FSIZE  6.32 1.05 0.00*** -0.0128 0.0039 0.001*** 
FLEV  -3.01 1.41 0.03** 0.0063 0.0014 0.000*** 
SGRWT  13.47 2.22 0.00*** 0.0267 0.0041 0.000*** 
RETE  -0.50 0.98 0.60 -0.0027 0.0051 0.596 
_CONS  -34.80 8.60 0.00*** 0.0021 0.0131 0.872 
Chi-square 
Degree of freedom 





0.603                               
Chi-square = 1872.12***  
(df=17)  
- 
R-squared = 0.322                   
Notes: DVTOASSTN=dividend to total assets; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition; 
BDIVER=board diversity; FINEXP=financial experts on board; CEOT=CEO tenure; 
FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO= managerial ownership; BLOCKH=blockholders ownership; 
BSIZE*BLOCKH= interaction term between board size and blockholders ownership; 
BCOMP*BLOCKH=interaction terms between board composition and blockholders ownership; 
BDIVER*BLOCKH=interaction term between board diversity and blockholders ownership; 
CEOT*BLOCKH=interaction term between CEO tenure and blockholders ownership; 
FINEXP*BLOCKH=interaction term between financial experts on board and blockholders 
ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV=firm leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; and 
RETE=retained earnings to total capital. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimates are 
statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Based on the interaction Model 3, as reported in Table 4.14.2 using dividend to total 
assets as a measure of the dependent variable (DVTOASST), the study found the 
model also to be fit. From the table the model scores a Chi-square value of 1872.12 
and is statistically significant at 1%. The value of the Chi-square changes because it 
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is a linear model, and the estimation method differs. However, the level of 
significance remains unchanged when the two models are compared with each other. 
Unlike, the probability model, the linear model has a reported R-square. This R-
square provides information with regards to the explanatory power of the model. 
From Table 14.14.2, the R-square of the model is 0.322. This means that it explains 
32.2% of the variability in the dependent variable. 
A further comparison on significance and directions of the interaction terms 
presented in Table 14.4.2 indicates that three of the terms are not sensitive to the 
changes made in the dependent variable from a binary to a continuous variable.  
Evidently, the moderator, which is blockholders ownership, retains its significance 
and direction whereas, the three interaction terms, board size, board diversity and 
CEO tenure, are positively and statistically significant. Thus, the findings indicate 
that the result are not different from those reported in the probability model. 
Consequently, comparing the direct and interaction models based on R-square, it 
could be seen that the addition of the interaction terms has improved the linear 
model. The reported R-square of the direct model is 30.75% whereas, the interaction 
has an R-square of 32.2%. Hence, the interaction model has more explanatory power 
than the direct model. 
4.14.3 Alternative Measure of Independent Variables 
In the last the robustness checks, the study adopts alternative measures of board 
composition, board diversity and financial experts on the board. Following Byoun et 
al. (2016) this study uses the actual number of outside directors on the board, female 
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directors on the board and financial experts on the board instead of ratios to test 
whether they are sensitive to PPD. The result of the estimation is provided in Table 
4.15.1. 
The existing model with ratios is on the left-hand side of the Table 4.15.1 while the 
new re-estimated model is on the right side of the table. Evidence from Table 4.15.1 
shows the explanatory power of the direct model by using alternative measurement 
for the three independent variables mentioned above. Both the two models are 
similar in terms of their fitness although there are differences when the value of the 
statistics is compared but it has no effect on the model fitness. For instance, the 
alternative model has a Chi-square of 46.57 for the model fitness whereas, the main 
model (PPD) reported a Chi-square of 44.87 both are statistically significant at 1%.  
Furthermore, both the two models suggest the preference for panel and based on 
random effects estimates despite the slight difference on value of the Chi-square for 
the intra-class correlation and Hausman test statistics. From the result as reported in 
Table 4.15.1, 63.3% of the variance is because of the differences across panels which 
is higher than 61.7% for the main and alternative model respectively. However, these 
differences do not pose an issue to the overall fit of the alternative model. 
This alternative measure does not change the association between the propensity to 
pay dividends and board diversity and financial expertise on board. All these 
independent variables remain positive and statistically significant as reported in the 
main model. However, the level of significance for the board diversity has dropped 
from 5% to 10% while financial expertise on board has increased from 10% to 5% 
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for the existing and alternative models respectively. Other variables that include 
CEO tenure and the three ownership structures variables indicate no difference exists 
between the two models in terms of direction and the level of significance. 
Table 4.15.1  
Robustness Check using Alternative Measures of Independent Variables for the 
Direct Model  
Variables  DV=PPD DV=PPD 
PPD=1 Exp Sign Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
BSIZE + -0.08 0.16 0.60 -0.28 0.25 0.24 
BCOMP + 0.08 2.18 0.97 -0.01 0.26 0.95 
BDIVER + 8.62 3.41 0.01** 0.75 0.40 0.06* 
FINEXP + 2.77 1.58 0.08* 0.43 0.21 0.03** 
CEOT + -0.17 0.05 0.00*** -0.16 0.06 0.00*** 
FOREO + 5.95 1.76 0.00*** 5.58 1.71 0.00*** 
MANO + 5.64 2.43 0.02** 5.36 2.36 0.02** 
BLOCKH  -6.97 1.96 0.00*** -6.87 1.91 0.00*** 
FAGE  -0.07 0.03 0.04** -0.06 0.04 0.05** 
FSIZE  6.11 1.03 0.00*** 5.89 0.99 0.00*** 
FLEV  -2.82 1.36 0.03** -2.81 1.34 0.03** 
SGRWT  12.97 2.20 0.00*** 12.61 2.12 0.00*** 
RETE  -0.533 0.95 0.57 -0.44 0.94 0.63 
_CONS  -38.90 6.99 0.00*** -35.83 6.10 0.00** 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
LR test of rho 
Rho Value 

















Notes: PPD=propensity to pay dividends; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition, measured 
in number; BDIVER=board diversity, measured in number; FINEXP=financial experts on board, 
measured in number; CEOT=CEO tenure; FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO=managerial 
ownership; BLOCKH= blockholders ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV=firm 
leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; and RETE= retained earnings to total capital. ***, **, and * indicate 
that the parameter estimates are statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Regarding the interaction terms as reported Table 4.15.2, the alternative measure of 
the independent variables does not change the fitness of the alternative model. The 
alternative model is significant at 1% likewise the rho value different from zero and 
its likelihood ratio test is also statistically significant at 1%. Thus, this suggests that 
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the panel model is superior over pool for the analysis. Furthermore, the result from 
the Hausman test also indicates the preference of random estimates over fixed effect 
models. This evidence is also applicable to the main model with ratios. 
The new measurement of board composition, board diversity and financial expertise 
on board does not result in changes in the association of the interaction terms of 
these variables with the PPD, although some slight variations exist in the 
significance level. The level of significance of blockholders ownership increases 
from 10% in the previous main model to 5% in the alternative check. Similarly, the 
significance level of two interaction terms, the board size and board composition, 
dropped from 5% to 10% with the new measurement in the alternative model. The 
level of significance of the interaction terms of board diversity, financial expertise on 









Table 4.15.2  
Robustness Check using Alternative Measures of Independent Variables for the 
Interaction Model  
Variable  Main model Alternative measure of four IVs 
PPD=1 
 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
BSIZE  -0.90 0.44 0.04** -1.46 0.67 0.02** 
BCOMP  9.62 5.73 0.09* 0.95 0.64 0.13 
BDIVER  -7.52 8.61 0.38 -0.98 0.94 0.29 
FINEXP  -0.36 4.93 0.94 0.11 0.63 0.85 
CEOT  -0.41 0.13 0.00*** -0.40 0.13 0.00*** 
FOREO  6.05 1.71 0.00*** 5.70 1.65 0.00*** 
MANO  4.88 2.39 0.04** 4.81 2.33 0.03** 
BLOCKH  -17.12 9.34 0.06* -23.64 7.47 0.00*** 
BSIZE_BKH  1.49 0.74 0.04** 2.13 1.11 0.06* 
BCOMP_BKH  -17.42 9.08 0.05** -1.76 1.07 0.09* 
BDIVER_BKH  31.50 15.84 0.04** 3.47 1.75 0.04** 
FINEXP_BKH  5.92 7.74 0.44 0.64 0.99 0.51 
CEOT_BKH  0.46 0.21 0.03** 0.44 0.21 0.03** 
FAGE  -0.07 0.03 0.03** -0.07 0.03 0.03** 
FSIZE  6.32 1.05 0.00*** 6.05 1.00 0.00*** 
FLEV  -3.01 1.41 0.03** -2.96 1.38 0.03** 
SGRWT  13.47 2.22 0.00*** 13.01 2.12 0.00*** 
RETE  -0.50 0.98 0.60 -0.41 0.97 0.66 
_CONS  -34.80 8.60 0.00*** -27.70 6.61 0.00*** 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Rho Value 
LR test of rho 

















Notes: PPD=propensity to pay dividends; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition, measured in number; 
BDIVER=board diversity, measured in number; FINEXP=financial experts on board, measured in number; 
CEOT=CEO tenure; FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO=managerial ownership; BLOCKH= blockholders 
ownership; BSIZE*BLOCKH=interaction term between board size and blockholders ownership; 
BCOMP*BLOCKH=interaction terms between board composition and blockholders ownership; 
BDIVER*BLOCKH=interaction term between board diversity and blockholders ownership; CEOT*BLOCKH= 
interaction term between CEO tenure and blockholders ownership; FINEXP*BLOCKH=interaction term 
between financial experts on board and blockholders ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV= firm 
leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; and RETE=retained earnings to total capital. ***, **, * indicate that the 
parameter estimates are statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Summarily, equating the main results to the additional analysis, the findings of this 
study are robust. Based on the direct model, board diversity and financial experts on 
board have been consistently significant and according to the predicted hypothesis of 
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the study. The exception was for dividend to total assets as an alternative measure 
for dividend where financial expertise on board is statistically insignificant. 
Although CEO tenure results does not support the hypothesis of the study, the 
negative association persists throughout the estimations. 
The ownership structures variables also reveal strong and consistent results and are 
according to the hypothesis in all the estimations. But when dividend to total assets 
was introduced in the model these variables became insignificant. Foreign and 
managerial ownership became negative and statistically insignificant. In contrast, 
blockholders ownership retained its negative sign even though not statistically 
significant. 
Finally, the reported results indicate the importance of block owners in the non-
financial firms listed on the NSE. Interestingly, the interaction terms for all the 
estimations were also statistically significant and moderated three of the five board 
structures variables. Accordingly, the findings on board diversity, financial experts 
on board and the ownership structure are important in explaining the propensity to 
pay dividends in the Nigerian market. The findings are also supported by estimating 
the average marginal effect used in the study which is discuss in the following 
section. 
4.14.4 Marginal Effects of Propensity to Pay Dividends 
The current study also supports the findings of the panel logit results with marginal 
effects, which is shown in Table 4.16. According to Williams (2012), the marginal 
effect, otherwise referred to as economic significance, is another way by which the 
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effects of variables in nonlinear models such as logit regression analysis can be made 
more meaningful. In other words, the marginal effect provides a representative value 
for variables in nonlinear models. In the words of Cameron and Trivedi (2009) ―A 
marginal effect (ME), or partial effect, most often measures the effect on the 
conditional mean of y of a change in one of the regressors, say, xj. In the linear 
regression model, the ME equals the relevant slope coefficient, greatly simplifying 
analysis. For nonlinear models, this is no longer the case, leading to remarkably 
many different methods for calculating MEs‖. 
Table 4.16  
Analysis of Marginal Effects for Direct Model  
Variables Exp.Sign dy/dx Std. Err. P>z 
BSIZE + -0.06 0.17 0.73 
BCOMP + -0.25 2.32 0.92 
BDIVER + 10.33 3.60 0.00*** 
FINEXP + 2.99 1.66 0.07* 
CEOT + -0.15 0.06 0.01** 
FOREO + 6.05 1.71 0.00*** 
MANO + 4.88 2.40 0.04** 
BLOCKH  -7.41 2.04 0.00*** 
FAGE  -0.08 0.04 0.03** 
FSIZE  6.33 1.05 0.00*** 
FLEV  -3.02 1.42 0.03** 
SGRWT  13.48 2.23 0.00*** 
RETE  -0.50 0.99 0.61 
Notes: PPD=propensity to pay dividends; BSIZE=board size; BCOMP=board composition, measured in number; 
BDIVER=board diversity, measured in number; FINEXP=financial experts on board, measured in number; 
CEOT=CEO tenure; FOREO=foreign ownership; MANO=managerial ownership; BLOCKH= blockholders 
ownership; FAGE=firm age; FSIZE=firm size; FLEV=firm leverage; SGRWT=sales growth; and RETE= 
retained earnings to total capital. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimates are statistical significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
This study uses the average marginal effect in determining the impact of the 
independent variable on the probability of paying a dividend. This is because of the 
advantage average marginal effect has over other techniques. For instance, using the 
average marginal effect will allow the researcher to use all the data, but not their 
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means and the average marginal effect provide a superior estimates compared to 
others (Williams, 2012) and authors such as Cameron and Trivedi prefer it (2009). 
Moreover, previous studies on the decision to pay dividend (Al-Najjar & 
Kilincarslan, 2016; Kuo et al., 2013) also used the average marginal effect in 
determining the impact of the independent variable on the probability outcome. 
Furthermore, the study assesses the marginal effect of the independent variables in 
the direct model that is Model 2. However, Model 3 has interaction terms and, 
therefore, estimating the marginal effect for the model is not possible. Williams 
(2012) posited that ―The value of the interaction term cannot change independently 
of the values of the component terms, so you cannot estimate a separate effect for the 
interaction‖. Additionally, the absence of a categorical variable is also a constrain for 
estimating the marginal effect of the interaction terms. Based on this notion, the 
discussion of the economic significance is only on Model 2. 
Table 4.16 indicates that board diversity accounts for a higher marginal effect on the 
propensity to pay dividends among the variable of interest in the table. This means 
that it has more influence on the propensity to pay dividends. The positive marginal 
effect as reported from Table 4.16 shows that, if board diversity changes by 10%, 
then the likelihood of paying a dividend increases by 103.3%. 
Similarly, the result reveals that an increase in 10% of financial expertise on board 
may result in a 29.9% increase in the probability of paying a dividend and it is 
statistically significant at 10%, thus, supporting the hypothesis of the study. 
However, the last board structure used in this study is CEO tenure. The association 
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between CEO tenure and the propensity to pay dividends is found to be negative and 
statistically significant. Therefore, the marginal effect of this relationship indicates 
that as the tenure of CEO is increased by 10%, the likelihood of dividend payment 
may be reduced by 1.5%. This result contradicts the hypothesis of the current 
studies. Consequently, only two of the board structures variables are consistent with 
the hypothesis of the studies and have a strong average marginal effect on the 
likelihood of dividend payment. But the three ownership structures variables are 
statistically significant and consistent with the hypothesis. 
The result as reported in Table 4.16 further shows that the marginal effect of foreign 
ownership is 6.05. This implies that a 10% increase in the number of shares held by 
foreign investors may lead to more likelihood of the firm to pay dividends by 60.5%. 
The result is statistically significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect of shares 
held by executive directors on a board reveals that the propensity to pay dividends 
may be increased by 48.8% because of 10% increase in the executive shareholdings. 
Conversely, blockholders ownership is associated with a decrease in the probability 
of paying dividends. From the Table 4.16 the result shows that a 10% increase of 
blockholders ownership may reduce the propensity to pay dividends by 74.1%. 
Summarily, the marginal effect presented in this study provides additional 
information with regards to investment decision. This is because the level at which a 
variable influences the likelihood of dividend payment is been understood with the 
help of marginal effect analysis. 
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4.15 Summary of Hypotheses Testing  
The summary of findings of this study for the direct and interaction models are 
tabulated in Table 4.17. 
Table 4.17  





H1: There is positive relationship between board 
size and the propensity to pay dividends. + Insign. 
Not 
supported 
H2: There is positive relationship between board 
composition and the propensity to pay dividends.  + Insign. 
Not 
supported 
H3: There is positive relationship between board 
diversity and the propensity to pay dividends.  + + Supported 
H4: There is positive relationship between 
financial expertise on board and the propensity to 
pay dividends.  
+ + Supported 
H5: There is positive relationship between CEO 
tenure and the propensity to pay dividends. + - 
Not 
supported 
H6: There is positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and the propensity to pay dividends. + + Supported 
H7: There is positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and the propensity to pay 
dividends. 
+ + Supported 
H8:  There is relationship between blockholders 
ownership and the propensity to pay dividends.    Supported 
H9: Blockholders moderates the relationship 
between board size and the propensity to pay 
dividends. 
  Moderated  
H10: Blockholders moderates the relationship 
between board composition and the propensity to 
pay dividends. 











H11: Blockholders moderates the relationship 
between board diversity and the propensity to pay 
dividends.  
  Moderated 
H12: Blockholders moderates the relationship 
between financial expertise on board and the 
propensity to pay dividends. 
  Not Moderated 
H13: Blockholders moderates the relationship 
between CEO tenure and the propensity to pay 
dividends. 
  Moderated 
4.16 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter provides the empirical results and discussions on the effect of board 
characteristics, ownership structures on propensity to pay dividends and the 
moderating effect of blockholders on the relationship between board characteristics 
and propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria. The tool of analysis used in the study 
include, descriptive statistic, t-test, correlation and panel logit regression to address 
the questions raised. 
The empirical results indicate that among the board characteristic variables used in 
the study, gender diversity and financial expertise on board play a vital role in 
explaining how propensity to pay dividends is influenced by these corporate 
governance variables. The study also found strong evidence that foreign, managerial 
and blockholders ownership affect propensity to pay dividends among the non-
financial listed firms on NSE. Similarly, the results from the interaction of 
blockholders ownership with board characteristics also indicates the relevance of 
blockholders ownership on propensity to pay dividends. board size, board diversity, 
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financial expertise and board and CEO tenure have antagonistic interaction pattern. 
Whereas, the pattern of interaction for board composition is buffering. However, the 
interaction terms of board size, board composition, board diversity and board CEO 
tenure were statistically significance. Thus, suggesting that blockholders could 
increase and decrease the propensity to pay dividends. 
Finally, the study conducted some additional analysis by altering the dependent 
variable as well as the measurement of three independent variables from the board 
characteristics used in the study to see if they are sensitive to the changes made. 
Interestingly, the results from these analyses did not change significantly. Thus, 







CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS                                                                
5.1 Introduction 
The main objective of the study is to investigate the effect of board characteristics, 
ownership structures on propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria. The sub-objectives 
were: 1) to examine the effect of board characteristics on the propensity to pay 
dividends; 2) to investigate the influence of ownership structures on propensity to 
pay dividends and 3) to investigate the moderating role of blockholders on the 
association of board characteristics and the propensity to pay dividends. 
The study examined non-financial firms listed in the NSE for a period of seven (7) 
years with 596 firm-year observations. The dependent variable was constructed 
using three firm characteristics that included firm size, ROA, and growth 
opportunities consistent with the literature and this is referred to as the propensity to 
pay dividends. The study uses board characteristics and ownership structures as 
independent variables. The board characteristics variables included are board size, 
board composition, board diversity, financial experts on board and CEO tenure. 
Whereas, the study used foreign, managerial and blockholders ownership as proxies 
for ownership structures. 
5.2 Overview of the Research Results 
Given the nature of the constructed dependent variable PPD, the study uses panel 
logit regression based on random effects because the outcome from Hausman‘s test 
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suggested the use of random effects models. The study also re-estimated the model 
using standard robust error by clustering the standard error at the panel lid. The study 
also conducted a robustness check using two different variables PPD_DUM and 
dividends to total assets as alternative measures of the dependent variable. In 
addition to this, the study also uses actual numbers of three independent variables, 
which include board composition, board diversity and financial experts on board. 
The results from the estimations suggest that firm characteristics are important when 
considering the decision to pay or not to pay dividends in the NSE market. These 
characteristics are firm size, ROA, and growth opportunities. Cumulatively, the firm 
characteristics highlighted the likelihood of a firm to pay dividends. The results from 
the descriptive statistics shows that 52% of the sampled firms did pay dividends. The 
result also shows that dividends payers tend to be distinct from the non-payers in 
terms of board characteristics and ownership structures. The dividend-paying firms 
have larger boards with a higher percentage of female on board, higher financial 
expertise and less CEO tenure. On top of that, dividend-paying firms have a higher 
percentage of foreign investors, and the firms are more matured than the non-
dividend paying firms. 
From the regression results, positive relationship between board diversity and 
propensity to pay dividends emerges. The result indicates that firms with a higher 
number of the female directors have more likelihood to pay dividends in Nigerian 
market. Further, the findings suggest that a female director tends to play an 
important role in the board. A female director may use dividends as a tool in 
 
 264 
mitigating conflicts between managers and owners of the firm and, therefore, 
discipline the manager by influencing the decision to pay dividends. 
The study also found strong evidence with respect to financial expertise on board. 
The result reveals a significant and positive relationship indicating more likelihood 
of dividend payment when a financial expert is on the board. Therefore, it may be 
deduced that financial experts may not allow the accumulation of cash in a firm as 
this may lead to overinvestment or perquisite consumption. Hence, financial experts 
may use dividends to eradicate agency problems between managers and shareholders 
of a firm. 
The ownership structures also provide strong and sufficient evidence on the 
likelihood of dividend payment. The findings suggest that dividends may be paid by 
firms when foreign investors and executive directors hold a portion of the shares in a 
firm. In contrast, the presence of blockholders in a firm indicates that they are less 
likely to influence the decision to pay more dividends. Therefore, they act as a 
substitute for dividend to be used as a mechanism to control managers. This could 
mean that blockholders may monitor a firm because they have an incentive to do so 
and managers need not signal their commitments to the market by paying dividends. 
Additionally, in the second stage of the study, blockholders ownership is used as a 
moderating variable on the association between board characteristics and the 
propensity to pay dividends. The results reveal that blockholders positively moderate 
board size, board diversity and CEO tenure and negatively moderate board 
composition. The results are statistically significant. The findings imply that the 
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board of a firm is more likely to be large in the presence of blockholders, and there is 
a higher probability of a firm to pay dividends. Similarly, the presence of the 
blockholders may lead to a greater percentage of female on the board, and the tenure 
of the CEO may be longer and consequently the firm may more likely to pay 
dividends. However, the study found that a firm may be less likely to pay a dividend 
when there is higher percentage of outside directors on board in the presence of 
blockholders.  
The findings from the interaction may be argued in the following paragraphs. 
Previous studies have found evidence that blockholders are less likely to influence 
the payment of dividends. Thus, appointing directors to act on their behalf may be 
more conservative on the use of dividends as control mechanism and may be willing 
to demonstrate his expertise in monitoring the managers without considering another 
tool such as dividend to be used as a monitoring tool. 
The literature has established that independent directors on board are negatively 
related to dividend. Conversely, the NCCG 2011 has explicitly recommended that 
the blockholders should contribute to the good governance practices in the firm. 
Therefore, the blockholders might engage or appoint independent directors on their 
Previous studies have found evidence that blockholders are less likely to influence 
the payment of dividends. Thus, directors acting on their behalf may be more 
conservative on the use of dividends as control mechanism. Further, he or she may 
be willing to demonstrate his or her expertise in monitoring the managers without 
employing dividends as an additional mechanism for monitoring. 
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behalf or as their representative on board who are considered as good monitors. In 
this case, such independent directors might be less likely to pay dividends. 
However, the scenario may change when the independent directors are in contact 
with other type of directors on board (outsider or insider). This is because some 
scholars have criticised the independent directors that they lack required time to 
study the firm and this may affect their monitoring services in firm. Therefore, the 
other directors may have greater impact on the board decisions particularly when it 
comes to financial issues. The outside directors for example, may have been fully 
aware of the firm and the type of the CEO the firm is having because some of them 
were previous officers of the firm more than the independent directors. Hence, they 
may convince other directors (representative of blockholders on the board e.g. 
independent directors) to use dividends in addition to other monitoring tools 
available. Consequently, board characteristics and ownership structures are 
important in determining the propensity to pay dividends in the Nigerian market. 
5.3 Contributions of the Study 
The study contributes to the body of existing literature both on resource dependency 
and agency theories through board characteristics comprising of board diversity, 
financial experts on board and partly contributions were also made on size of the 
board and CEO tenure. Additionally, the study also made contributions to ownership 
structures variables such as foreign, managerial and blockholders ownership likewise 
on the moderating role of blockholders on the decision to pay dividends. In specific 
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terms, the research has theoretical implications coupled with policy implications, and 
these are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
5.3.1 Theoretical Implications 
This study is an extension of the propensity to pay dividends literature. This is 
because it replicates the propensity to pay dividend model in the Nigerian market, 
which is an entirely different environment compare to previous studies conducted in 
the United States and other countries such as the United Kingdom, Korea and India.  
Therefore, it is expected that the findings of this research could be of importance to 
the Nigerian market. 
Considerable number of the previous research refers to their dependent variable of 
dividend payer and non-dividend payer in a straightforward manner. This study 
however, used ROA, firm size, and investment opportunities to construct the 
dependent variable. In doing so, a logit regression was estimated annually from 
2009-2015 (sampling period), and the results for every variable (ROA, firm size, and 
investment opportunities) were summed and divided by seven years of study. The 
annual values of the ROA, firm size, and investment opportunities for every firm 
were fitted into the propensity model. Therefore, a firm is said to be a dividend payer 
when it has a predicted probability of 50% or more and did pay a dividend in that 
year. However, if a firm that did not satisfy these two conditions (having a predicted 
probability of 50% and paid a dividend in that year), it was referred to as non-
dividend paying firm. 
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This study also contributes to the body of knowledge by investigating how board 
characteristics and ownership structures affect a firm‘s propensity to pay dividends. 
The approach is entirely new in sub Saharan Africa particularly in Nigeria. 
Based on individual variable, the study offers incremental evidence on board 
diversity as it affects the propensity to pay dividends. The evidence supports agency 
and resource dependence theories that female directors on a board mitigate agency 
problems using dividends payment. Similarly, from the perspective of resource 
dependence theory, female directors on board are resourceful directors given their 
commitment to their role on the board and their experience in the industry and in the 
firm. Female directors are likely to offer diverse opinions and contribute to wider 
discussions that may result in better decisions, which may enhance the performance 
of the firm and monitoring effectiveness. Further, female directors may use more 
dividends to fortify their monitoring role in the firm. The use of dividends could help 
in protecting their reputational capital and against legal liabilities that may arise as 
board directors may fall short of their responsibilities as enshrined by law. 
This study also contributes to the existing literature on how directors with financial 
expertise on board impact the propensity to pay dividends. Previous research has 
focused on financial reporting quality and addressing earnings management. This 
study widens the knowledge by examining the role of financial experts on board on 
the propensity to pay dividends. Moreover, the present study is among the first to 
explore the relationship between financial expertise on the board and the propensity 
to pay dividends particularly in the context of the Nigerian market. 
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A heterogeneous board is expected to bring about improvements in a variety of firm 
outcomes. Shareholders are the prime beneficiaries from the services offered by a 
heterogeneous board of directors. The services range from a monitoring role to 
resolving problems faced by firms and in corporate strategy development. Financial 
experts, in particular, are required by firms for corporate planning and determining 
issues that are likely to influence corporate value. Financial expert directors, 
moreover, are regarded as being rich in resources, which are very useful to an entity 
as they provide expert advice to the CEO and the board on issues relating to cash 
management such as dividends. 
Agency theory emphasizes the importance of the financial expertise of a director 
based on monitoring opportunistic managers and, hence, in reducing agency related 
costs. Conversely, the resource dependence view of point considers the ability of 
directors as a condition for providing the required monitoring services. A financial 
expert director (insider or outsider) may have the incentive to protect his/her 
reputation and will, therefore, provide services that will protect the interests of 
shareholders such as influencing the propensity to pay more dividends. 
Apart from the governance practices of a firm, ownership structures equally have 
effect on a firm‘s financial policies. This study also shows that the existing 
ownership structures of a firm have an impact on the propensity to pay dividends. 
Managers and foreigners who own shares in a firm tend to influence firms to 
consider a decision to pay dividends. The findings also contribute to the agency 
theory in that managers may like to build a reputation in the market through dividend 
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payments so that the managers may not encounter difficulties in the markets when 
raising capital in the future. 
Foreign investors also have impact on the propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria. 
The findings indicate that the foreign owners may have a preference for dividends 
such that the payment of the dividends could be used to control opportunistic 
managers. The foreign owners could find dividend payments to be less expensive 
because there may be considerable distance between their residence and the country 
in which they hold investments. Moreover, their support for paying more dividends 
may be explained from the tax perspective. It is likely that there is a bilateral 
agreement on tax-related matters between an investor‘s country of origin and the 
hosting country. The agreement could be that the foreign owners may be subject to 
less tax and, in return, the host country may be allowed to export its natural 
resources while being taxed at a lower rate. Therefore, such type of agreement may 
lead foreign owners to exert more influence on firms to pay dividends because they 
have less tax burden. 
This study adds to prior studies on dividend policies through offering new evidence 
on the dividend payout decisions of listed firms on the NSE. The study provides an 
explanation to the unexplored decline in the payment of dividends. The study 
revealed that an increase level of blockholders ownership may likely contribute 
strongly to the decline in dividend payments among the non-financial listed firms in 
Nigeria. This study also found agency theory to explain the decision of whether to 
pay or not to pay dividends. This is because blockholders have a strong monitoring 
incentive given their holdings in a firm and, therefore, may use less dividends as a 
 
 271 
mechanism for control. The findings further suggest that blockholders may not use 
dividends to control managers in a firm. 
On the other hand, the study also contributes to a less explored area, which is the 
interaction between blockholders and board structures and its effect on the 
propensity to pay dividends among non-financial listed firms in Nigeria. This is 
consistent with the view that any governance mechanisms that may put in place for 
investor protection should also consider the presence of blockholders. This is 
because the blockholders could be useful in mitigating managers owners related 
agency problems. This study incorporated blockholders as a moderator in the study, 
which is yet another area that has received less attention in the propensity to pay 
dividend framework. The results from the interaction is appealing as they provide 
more information in explaining the decision to pay dividends in the NSE market. 
Considerable blockholdings in a firm comes with a greater incentive to closely 
monitor a firm‘s financial policies, and dividend payout is part of these financial 
policies. The interaction effect of board size, board diversity and CEO tenure with 
blockholders provides a strong influence on the propensity to pay dividends. 
Given the role of blockholders as moderator, this study supports and further explains 
the resource dependence theory. It states that, when the board is large, there is 
tendency to have members who are resourceful with much experience. They provide 
diverse opinions, which will contribute to greater deliberations that may result in 
better decisions, enhanced performance and improved monitoring functions. 
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Moreover, the study also finds strong evidence on the moderating role of 
blockholders on the association between board diversity and CEO tenure on the 
propensity to pay dividends. The evidence, hence, suggests that a female director 
serving on the board may contribute more to the decision to pay dividends in the 
presence of blockholders. Therefore, this lends support to the resource dependence 
theory perspective that a heterogenous board has higher level of performance and, in 
turn, affects a firm‘s financial policies. In this regard, a female director may perhaps 
influence the decision to pay dividends and use dividends as a mechanism to control 
agency conflict in the firm. It could also be viewed that a female director is 
appointed to the board because of her qualities in terms of qualification, skills, and 
experience (board capital). Therefore, a female director is likely to use dividends as 
an additional control mechanism because free cash flow in a firm may be wasted by 
managers, and this may affect her reputation as resourceful director. 
The study also provides a strong relationship between a longer-serving CEO and the 
propensity to pay dividends, which depends on blockholders ownership in a firm. It 
is likely that blockholders consider a CEO with longer tenure to be more beneficial 
to the firm, for example, because of acquiring of more experience. Thus, 
blockholders may insist on extending a CEO‘s tenure in the firm and, in turn, pay 
more dividends as a way of rewarding the shareholders. Therefore, this research adds 
to agency theory by suggesting that paying dividends will perhaps align the interests 
of managers with those of the shareholders. 
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5.3.2 Contribution to Practice 
The findings of this study also show the relevancy of corporate governance 
mechanisms in the alignment of the interests of the principal and agent in relation to 
dividends. Accordingly, the study is expected to benefit regulators in the capital 
markets, current and potential shareholders, and researchers. The study also widens 
the view of dividends policy decisions among the non-financial listed firms in NSE. 
The contributions from this study are timely given the provision made on the 
structures of board of directors in the NCCG by the SEC, which requires listed firms 
to have diversity in terms gender and financial expertise. Thus, this study provides 
an insight into the roles played by these directors on corporate dividends. This 
finding is vital to the SEC with reference to their monitoring and enhancing good 
governance practices among the listed firms. 
The present study documents empirical evidence that a board of a firm with females 
and directors with financial expertise may result in an increased likelihood to pay 
dividends. The result may help in evaluating firms that have consistently failed to 
pay a dividend. Therefore, the SEC and NSE as a regulator of the capital market may 
increase their understanding from this finding. 
The findings of this study also indicate the greater influence of blockholders on the 
dividend policy of firms. The study shows that blockholders are less likely to support 
the payment of dividends; hence, both SEC and NSE may benefit from this study by 
re-examining the pool of blockholders role in relation to the use of dividend as a 
monitoring tool in the firm and on the enforcement of good corporate governance 
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practices. This is because the pool of blockholders in the firm are attributed to 
decrease in the propensity to pay dividends. This may have implication for other 
investors who preferred dividends than capital gains.  
The study further suggests that the regulatory authorities consider stipulating the 
upper limit of shares to be acquired by existing managers in a firm. This can help in 
reducing the intensity of agency problems because having a large number of shares 
in the firm may likely provide an avenue for managers to become entrenched. In 
turn, firms with entrenched managers are likely to exacerbate agency problems 
particularly in country like Nigeria in which other control mechanisms such as 
corporate takeovers and shareholder activism are very weak. 
Overall, the study has added to the previous literature on dividends and corporate 
governance. It is worth mentioning that the existing 2011 NCCG code provisions 
need to be expanded to fully address agency related conflicts. Therefore, more rules 
and clear explanations should be provided. This could boost the confidence of the 
shareholders and other stakeholders of the capital market because the reputation of 
the regulatory authorities is determined by making adequate provisions, which are 
aimed at protecting the interests of the investors in the market. Likewise, full 
disclosure of ownership that may capture various classes of owners such as foreign, 
institutional retail, domestic institutional and retail. Additionally, providing 
information regarding whether an institution is tax exempt or otherwise is strongly 
recommended. This classification will allow for informed judgements prior to 
investing or after the investment decision has been considered. 
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The study further suggests that regulatory authorities, shareholders, and other users 
of accounting information demand a standardize and consistent way of reporting the 
status of every board member as to whether he/she is an executive director, a non-
executive director or an independent director. This may permit the ascertaining of 
the level of compliance among other things. Accordingly, a detailed classification of 
the holdings of various shareholders in a firm is also recommended. Many firms tend 
to use different ways of reporting the classes of shareholders holdings on a yearly 
basis. This habit may portray a negative image of the firms and regulatory bodies to 
the investors. 
Furthermore, the findings of this study indicate the importance of blockholders to a 
firm. Their interactions with the board structure variables provide a substantial 
outcome on the propensity to pay dividends. Alternatively, the combination of 
blockholders who may have directors on board representing their interest with other 
directors have resulted in an increase of likely to pay dividends. This is an interesting 
finding but further control need to be put in place particularly on the directors 
representing the interest of blockholders such that conflict of interest between 
majority and minority holders may be avoided while attempting to address agency 
problems between owners and managers.  
The 2011 NCCG recommends that a firm to decide on a percentage of holding that 
may qualify a shareholder to have a directorship on the board representing his or her 
interest. However, existing and potential shareholders may drive benefit if the 
regulatory bodies could consider specifying the proposition of shares that permits 
block owners to have a director on board that represents their interests in the firm. 
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This provision is lacking in the 2011 NCCG. Moreover, the percentage of holdings 
should be provided and with detailed responsibilities for directors representing the 
block owners to avoid conflict of interest. 
Potential and existing investors who have a preference on dividend will find this 
study useful as it will allow them to consider whether to invest in firms with more 
blockholders because blockholders are less likely to influence paying dividends. In 
contrast, foreign and managerial owners are more likely to make a firm consider 
dividend payment. Therefore, potential investors that are incline to dividends may 
also invest in foreign and managerial controlled firms. 
Gender diversity is vital as it has distinct features, which are monitoring and resource 
provision. However, some firms examined in this study do not have any female 
director on their boards. In this regard, it is of relevance if regulatory authorities 
consider stipulating a percentage dedicated for the female directors. On the other 
hand, the shareholders are encouraged to support the election of female directors in 
their firms as they can enhance monitoring and resource provision in the firm. 
5.4 Limitations of the Study 
This study focused on the non-financial firms listed in NSE market. Therefore, its 
findings may not be extended to other area of corporate governance practices for 
example, board meeting and multiple directorship. Similarly, the findings cannot be 
extended to financial firms or firms listed on the other markets of the NSE known as 
the Alternative Securities Market (ASeM). The ASeM is a market for small and 
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medium sized firms, which raise long-term capital at a low cost for their future 
growth and investments. 
Furthermore, the study is also constrained with the availability of data. Some firms 
within the non-financial sector were not included as they did not have complete data 
to carry out this research. Among the causes of this constraint is the late filing of 
returns to the regulatory bodies. Other offences that are sanctioned by SEC and NSE, 
for instance, unauthorized publication and the non-disclosure of material information 
among others, also constrained the number of firms included in the study. Hence, 
only 89 firms had a complete set of data for the seven-year study period. 
Regarding the ownership structures, the study takes account of the shareholdings of 
executive directors who are appointed to the board and did not include other officers 
in a managerial capacity in a firm that do not form part of the board of directors. 
Furthermore, the study does not distinguish between foreign institutional or foreign 
individual ownership because of data limitations. 
Despite the limitations, the validity of the results prevails as the study underwent 
rigorous statistical processes for achieving its objectives. These processes make the 
research outcomes important and valuable. 
5.5 Further Research Areas 
Considering the findings of this research as well as its limitations, the study proposes 
avenues for further investigations that are highlighted in the following paragraphs. 
First, future study should consider variables such as board meeting; multiple 
 
 278 
directorship and inside directorship among others. It will also be interesting if studies 
are to be conducted on other classes of ownership e.g. CEO ownership; institutional 
and family ownership. Similar study may be carried out in listed financial firms with 
a view to determine whether similar conclusions could be reached on propensity to 
pay dividends. Likewise, examining the firms under the Alternative Securities 
Market (ASeM) could also be interesting because not all investors are interested in 
the firms listed on main market of the NSE. Another fruitful area worth investigating 
is a cross-country study in sub-Saharan Africa. This will enhance the understanding 
of the propensity to pay dividends and may represent the African point of view of the 
phenomenon. 
Second, on the measurement of the dependent variable, this study utilizes a binary 
number with two dimensions; pay dividends ―1‖ and not to pay dividend ―0‖. Future 
study may consider the use of multinomial model to capture other firms for example 
that are predicted to pay but did not pay; predicted not to pay but pay; in addition to 
the predicted payers that did pay a dividend. Using a multinomial variable may 
provide further information on the propensity to pay dividends that are not captured 
by a binary regression. 
Third, future studies may further examine board composition by disintegrating the 
outside directors into various categories such as outside directors who have not been 
an executive director in the firm previously and outside directors who have been a 
director in the firm as well as identifying independent directors in the firm. 
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Fourth, classifying the blockholders ownership into various group may add value to 
the current literature and its impact on the likelihood to pay dividends in Nigerian 
market. This is because previous studies have found blockholders in the form of 
commercial and industrial do affect dividend policies differently. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis is centered on board characteristics and ownership structures and how 
they affect the propensity to pay dividends. A lack of study in the Nigerian market 
that combines the propensity to pay dividends model with board characteristics and 
ownership structures variables motivated the research. The evidence indicates that 
firm characteristics are important determinants of the propensity to pay dividends. 
The findings from the study show that firm governance structures that include board 
diversity and financial experts on board have impacts on a firm‘s likelihood to pay 
dividends. 
Similarly, the study also found the existing ownership structures to have a significant 
effect on the propensity to pay dividends in Nigeria. The study shows that foreign 
and managerial ownerships are more likely to influence the decision to pay dividends 
whereas, investors with block holdings in the firm have less of a likelihood to affect 
the dividend payment decision in non-listed financial firms. Moreover, this study 
contributes to the area of corporate governance with reference to monitoring and 
resource provision. On the other hand, the study has contributed to dividend policy 
particularly to the growing literature on the propensity to pay dividends. 
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Interestingly, the current study provides statistically and significant evidence on the 
interaction effect of blockholders ownership, on the relationship between board size, 
board diversity and CEO tenure and the propensity to pay dividends. Consequently, 
the results indicate that, when the board of a firm is large, with a female director and 
a CEO with a longer tenure, in the presence of blockholders, firms exhibit a higher 
likelihood of paying dividends. Evidently, the results have revealed the importance 
of the blockholders in the governance structures of a firm regarding the decision to 
pay dividends.  
Finally, this study may be of benefit to the regulators and shareholders in light of 
firm governance and the decision to pay dividends by the firms. The study suggests 
that shareholders, particularly those with a higher preference for dividends, closely 
monitor their boards when firms are controlled by blockholders as it may lead to 
decrease in the payment of dividends. In conclusion, this study should serve as 
another foundation for the enhancement of the corporate governance practices in the 
Nigeria market by encouraging larger board that may consist of experienced and 
well-informed female directors since the presence of blockholders is prevalent 
among the non-financial listed firms on the NSE. Moreover, having larger boards, 
presence of female directors on board, CEO with a longer tenure, and blockholders 
appears to jointly relate well as they encourage propensity to pay dividends.  
The study should also serve as a basis for further examination of propensity to pay 
dividends in Nigerian market by extending the Fama and French propensity to pay 
dividends model. In doing so researchers may consider incorporating some important 
variables pertinent to the Nigerian market. It will also be interesting that future 
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should consider other corporate governance and ownership structures variables in 
their studies. This will further increase the understanding of corporate governance 
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Sampled of Non-Financial listed on the NSE 
S/N  FIRM S/N FIRM S/N FIRM 
1 FTNCOCOA 35 MAYBAKER 71 MRS 
2 LIVESTOCK 36 MORISON 72 OANDO 
3 OKOMUOIL 37 NEIMETH 73 TOTAL 
4 PRESCO 38 PHARMDEKO 74 ACADEMY 
5 AGLEVENT 39 UNIONDIAGN 75 AFROMEDIA 
6 CHELLARAM 40 CHAMS 76 AIRSERVICE 
7 SCOA 41 COURTVILLE 77 ABCTRANS 
8 TRANSCORP 42 COMP W-HOUSE-GRP 78 CILEASING 
9 UACN 43 ETRANZACT 79 CAPHOTEL 
10 ARBICO 44 NCR 80 CAVERTON 
11 JBERGER 45 OMATEK 81 INTERLINK 
12 ROADS 48 AVONCROWN 82 LEARNAFRCA 
13 UAC-PROP 49 BERGER PAINTS 83 NAHCO 
14 7UP 50 BETAGLAS 84 RTBRISCOE 
15 CADBURY 51 CAP 85 REDSTAREX 
17 DANGFLOUR 53 CUTIX 86 TANTALIZER 
18 DANGSUGAR 55 DANGOTE CEMENT 87 TOURIST 
19 FLOURMILL 56 GREIF NIG 88 TRANSEXPR 
20 GUINNESS 57 WAPCO 89 UNIVERSITY PRESS 
21 HONYFLOUR 58 PAINTCOM   
24 NASCON 59 PORTPAINT   
25 NESTLE 60 PREMPAINTS   
26 NB 61 ALUMINIUM EXTRUSION   
27 ENAMELWA 63 MULTIVERSE MINING   
28 PZ 64 THOMAS WYATT NIG.   
29 UNILEVER 65 BECO PET PRODUCT    
30 UNIONDICON 66 CONOIL PLC   
31 VITAFOAM 67 ETERNA PLC   
32 EVANSMED 68 FORTE OIL    
33 FIDSON 69 JAPAUL OIL   
34 GLAXOSMITH 70 MOBIL   
 
 
